POROUS BORDERS, INVISIBLE BOUNDARIES?
Ethnographic Perspectives on the Vicissitudes of Contemporary Migration

Edited by:
Jayne Howell
Deborah R. Altamirano
Faedah M. Totah
Fethi Keles

A publication of the Committee on Refugees and Immigrants
Society for Urban, National, Transnational, and Global Anthropology
American Anthropological Association
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The 21st century continues to see an explosion of all forms of migration due to socioeconomic, political, and security pressures. The International Organization for Migration reports that currently 244 million individuals are considered migrants. While the number has increased in the past several years, the estimated percentage (currently 3.3) of migrants in the total global population has remained relatively stable over the past two decades. However, it is alarming that approximately one-fourth of these migrants are escaping political strife. In real numbers, the International Organization for Migration reports that 40 million individuals are internally displaced and another 22 million are refugees. In addition, although it appears that international borders are on many levels porous, the growing security industry and rising anti-immigrant sentiment in many countries reflect the reality that border crossings remain fraught with difficulties and dangers. Borders are increasingly becoming difficult to cross as new technology and policy increase surveillance and patrolling of state boundaries. Migrants’ adjustment in their new homes continues to be challenged by nativists who create difficulties for those trying to establish a new life in host countries. Nonetheless, many migrants are able to create sustainable communities and establish healthy ties with the vast majority of the population in their new home.

With images and headlines rife with accounts of rescues of migrants in the Mediterranean, child detainees at the U.S.-Mexico border, and military atrocities in cases of genocide, it is small wonder that the need for well-managed migration policies and the safety of migrants is among the 2015 United Nations Development Goals. These realities emerged in the American Anthropological Association’s Open Anthropology issue focused on the theme “World on the Move.” As editor Alisse Waterston notes, the significant number of humanitarian crises and ongoing legislative debates are of particular concern for anthropologists and others dedicated to establishing safe havens.

With these issues and images in mind, the editors of this volume are committed to supporting scholarship that goes beyond statistical data regarding the numbers of people crossing borders, including those being deported or living in refugee camps. We build on the warm reception to the 2017 CORI volume Maintaining Refuge: Anthropological Reflections in Uncertain Times co-edited by David Haines, Jayne Howell and Fethi Keles to further explore dimensions of migration. The current volume’s title Porous Borders, Invisible Boundaries can be interpreted in many ways. Among these is that albeit some individuals are crossing borders in record numbers, others are not able to cross geopolitical boundaries. At the same time, the experiences of those who do cross may include encountering subtle and not so subtle forms of discrimination, financial uncertainty, and in the worst case scenario, violence.

The 22 essays in this volume address the realities of migration in a number of settings. They address several issues confronting migrants. In some cases, it is the challenges of being a migrant in today’s world, while in other instances it is the precariousness of being a refugee. Several essays explore the vulnerability of migrants due to their religious affiliation, gender, age, or sexual identity or preferences. This includes but is not limited to the legal quagmires many migrants find themselves in due to lack of documentation in a world with constantly changing policies around borders.

However, it is not just about the experiences of migrants but several essays also reveal ways that citizens who wish to offer support or humanitarian aid to migrants or act as advocates for them may find themselves in vulnerable positions. At the same time, many of these essays speak of positive outcomes of migration or crossing of borders, which can come in many forms including friendships made, the establishment of social networks and communities, and economic gains.

The volume is organized into three geographical sections: “Europe,” “United States,” and “Global South.” Although the first two geographical regions might be seen as “destinations” and the latter as “sending,” the essays reflect that lines are not so clearly drawn, as movement is often fluid and can flow in multiple directions. These poignant discussions are separated by two photos essays, each with insights regarding the relevance of the images included.

The editors of this volume thank the board members of the Society for Urban, National, Transnational and Global Anthropology for financing this project and making the volume available free of charge. We invite you to share these essays with students, colleagues and non-anthropologists alike. We believe there has never been a greater need for anthropology than there is today, and consider that these pieces underscore the importance of anthropological contributions to debates about migration.

Jayne Howell
Deborah R. Altamirano
Faedah M. Totah
Fethi Keles
PART ONE

EUROPE
INTRODUCTION - EUROPE

After reaching its height in 2015, the global human crisis persists, resulting in thousands of immigrants and refugees seeking safe harbor in Europe. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the UN Migration Agency, in the first nine months of 2018, over 80,000 migrants entered Europe by sea.¹ While immigrants and refugees flee their countries of origin, countries in Europe continue to respond to new arrivals with both humanitarian concern and protectionist policies. Greece, Spain, and Italy remain major points of entry for migrants and refugees arriving from Sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey, Afghanistan and Syria. These Mediterranean countries, which serve as the southern border of the Schengen area, have been tasked with detaining and processing the newcomers, delaying or denying their entrance into the northern, central and eastern countries that comprise the European Union.

The continued arrival of immigrants and refugees, and the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment throughout Europe, have resulted in a number of countries redefining, militarizing and even reintroducing internal border controls within the Schengen area.² These reconstituted borders not only complicate the already challenging conditions migrants and refugees encounter, but also continue to sow tensions between governments and between local and immigrant populations throughout Europe. Those tensions, as well as the diverse spaces immigrants and refugees occupy while in-transit, upon their arrival and during the process of their settlement in Europe, are reflected in the broad range of essays included in this section.

The ways in which political turmoil in the country of origin and anti-immigrant policies in the country of destination converge to create a challenging and often treacherous situation are highlighted in Russell Manzano’s essay on sub-Saharan migrants to Italy. She delves into the experiences of African migrants as they confront an often hostile environment during their transit through Libya. Her narratives reveal the extent to which in-transit migrants are subjected to multiple forms of exploitation, largely based on race and ethnicity, at the hands of detention center authorities, labor traffickers, and the local farmers who exploit their labor. In their narratives, the migrants bring to light their resilience and their fortitude as they cope with their detention, their indentured servitude and their eventually passage to Italy.

Juan Pablo Aris Escarcena and Amanda Carolina Da Silva examine the porous nature of the complex Italo-French border. They consider how local level politicians, in the Italian city of Ventimiglia and the French city of Calais, have sought to allay anxieties of the local population stemming from the expanding and increasingly organized immigrant enclaves. In both cities, the authors express how food distribution bans were not just about banning an essential human need, but rather were more about exerting control over migrants’ movements and the activists who support them.

Part One: Europe

The complex border area between Ventimiglia and Calais also serves as the site of Sofia Gemmo’s insightful essay. Gemmo, a native Italian, invokes her local knowledge and emic perspective to explore the impact of the 2015 rollback of the 1988 Schengen Agreement, a cornerstone of the EU that removed internal borders, that effectively closed the porous border between Italy and France. This militarized re-bordering between Italy and France has served to funnel immigrants to detention centers in southern Europe in which, she contends, women immigrants are categorized along racialized lines. Gemmo addresses how politicians, in Italy in general and in Ventimiglia in particular, have responded to nativist fears over perceived threats to “ideal” Italian/European identity through heteropatriarchal control over women’s bodies. In particular, she examines how women’s reproduction and particularly the reproduction of immigrant women of color becomes a nexus of identity politics, xenophobia, patriarchy and cultural resistance.

Similarly, Marjan Moris and Jori De Coster rely on the life histories of a Congolese and an Afghan immigrant in Belgium to explore the affective and material negotiations involved in belonging. In the course of their various mobilities to and from destinations within Belgium, the two immigrants encounter institutional and individual gatekeepers, some complicating and others facilitating immigrant belonging. The precarious paths to recognition by the host society are laden with shifting, and sometimes conflicting, feelings of safety, attachment and resistance the two immigrants cultivate as they run into boundaries in the spaces and places surrounding them. Moris and De Coster’s essay provides a deeply person-centered look at some of the complex negotiations of identity immigrants go through in today’s Europe.

Even in the Netherlands, one of the most socially progressive countries in Europe, authorities struggle with the vicissitudes of immigration when faced with migrants seeking asylum based on sexual orientation. Sarah French Brennan thoughtfully exposes the subjective barriers LGBTQ, and particularly Muslim LGBTQ, asylum seekers face when immigration authorities question the legitimacy of their sexual orientation and, by extension, the legitimacy of their claim for asylum. Brennan raises a critical concern regarding how immigrants who identify as LGBTQ must “perform” their gender identity for immigration authorities who then judge whether the “performance” is real or contrived. Her narratives bring to light the extreme vulnerability faced by LGBTQ asylum seekers as they are forced to navigate the ill-defined border between “legitimacy” and “performance.”

We end this section with Petra Kuppinger’s intimate look at how culture, ethnicity, language and religion all intersect in a German hair salon. Kuppinger focuses on ways that small urban spaces can serve as meeting places for meaningful immigrant and native encounters. Her ethnographic account of Aynur’s Hair Salon in Stuttgart, Germany, explores how the joining of an immigrant-run salon with a German-run salon served to create a “third-space” in which the multi-ethnic clientele of the joined salons were able to transcend cultural, religious and linguistic boundaries through their conversations of shared experiences of ordinary life.
‘WHEN I WAS IN THE BOAT I THOUGHT I WAS ALREADY DEAD’: 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND EXPLOITATION OF IN-TRANSIT MIGRANTS IN LIBYA

Russell Rice Manzano

Sometimes I just say that life is difficult, [but] not for all. In Libya, I do not know why they do not treat you like a human being. They treat you like an animal, like you do not have blood like them, or you are not a human being like them.

--Elijah, a 16-year old migrant from The Gambia.

Between 2013 and 2017, migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe greatly increased with thousands of migrants arriving to Italy, by sea, every month. While migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa encounter many difficulties throughout their journey, the time they spend in transit through Libya has become increasingly dangerous. Based on my ethnographic research with Sub-Saharan migrants, I explore the current conditions for in-transit migrants in Libya and reveal the vulnerabilities and human rights abuses many encounter during their passage. I argue that, despite current migration policies in place, criminal networks in Libya control much of the migrant traffic to Europe and contribute to the increased exploitation of in-transit migrants by subjecting them to trafficking, false imprisonment, and slavery.

One critical factor impacting migration from Sub-Saharan Africa to Italy is the unregulated immigration system in Libya. Samuel Cheung (2012) explains that migrants risk arrest in Libya by different armed groups who control borders, ports, and prisons. Although many policies are unclear, the Global Detention Project (2015) reports that Libyan immigration law criminalizes migrants who cross the border without immigration documents, allowing for the imprisonment of migrants for undetermined lengths of time. Additionally, Cheung (2012) argues that Libya is a deregulated state, operated by various armed factions. The Libyan immigration policies that are in place remain unclear and unenforced thus allowing these armed factions to exploit migrants without fear of retribution.

METHODS

In 2015 and 2016, I conducted three months of ethnographic research at six reception centers for asylum seekers in Siracusa, Sicily. I returned for preliminary doctoral research for three weeks in 2018 to examine the experiences of African migrants living in Sicily. I gained access to the centers through the assistance of a local migration activist whom I met while on a study abroad trip in 2010, and collected data through participant observation and informal and semi-structured interviews. My interviews were conducted in English and Arabic, with the use of a translator for those who only spoke Arabic. Participants ranged in age from 14 to 65 years old. Their origin countries include The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, Liberia, Egypt, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. While my research focuses predominantly on the experiences of young men and boys who crossed into Libya, I did speak to women as well. However, I often found women migrants
reluctant to share their experiences with me. I chose not to pursue interviews with the women out of respect for their privacy and in consideration of intense trauma many had experienced while in-transit.

In 2015, many migrants conveyed to me that they had willingly entered into financial agreements with smugglers, each paying the equivalent of $1000 to $3000 in local currency for safe passage to Italy by boat. In interviews conducted in 2016, migrants revealed that, after they crossed the border into Libya, they were subjected to a new pattern of exploitation that included false imprisonment, slavery, and human trafficking.

LIBYA: PRISONS AND BAIL

For many, Libya is an unplanned destination in which Black African migrants find themselves targeted for human rights abuses, including false imprisonment. Tairou, a 15-year-old migrant from Ghana, conveyed that almost all individuals in prison were Black Africans and he only saw one Arab man in the prison while he was there. Likewise, Benjamin, a 17-year-old boy from Nigeria was arrested after entering Libya and explained that there were only a few Arab men in prison. Their stories confirm that officials often target Black African migrants who find themselves imprisoned for undetermined lengths of time and are subjected to inhumane conditions and torture. Elijah, the boy quoted at the beginning of this essay, also described his time in the Libyan prison:

“I was in prison for five months. So, [in prison] when people die, they do not take the dead body at night, they take it the next day then they put it in the fire. You will see example [sic] like my friend; tomorrow morning they put my friend in the fire. In the prison, always people die because there are many, and too much heat.”

Elijah stated that the prisons were so overcrowded that imprisoned migrants often would become sick and die.

In addition to the horrific conditions, migrants described how they were tortured while in the Libyan prisons and only after they arrived in Italy did they receive treatment for their injuries. Hakim, a 16-year-old boy from The Gambia, explained that while imprisoned the guards took him outside to work; if he refused, they beat him:

“So, I was in prison, and they were making us work for nothing. They would say that they would leave you [in the desert] if you did not work. So, we are working there and if you say you are sick, they would say that you are not willing to work, so they would beat you, they would beat you [on the bottom of your feet] for you to force yourself to get up.”

Hakim is only one example of how migrants are tortured and exploited in Libyan prisons. Four Nigerian men also described their experiences of torture in Libya. They showed me their scars, including one man who had large scars on his legs and one large scar on his arm. He said he had received that scar in prison, the result of a gunshot wound. The scar was on the inside of his arm near his wrist and looked to me like a defensive wound, as if he had been holding his arm over his face when he was shot.
In addition to being subjected to physical violence, migrants also described how they were sold off to local farmers. Only two migrants reported that they escaped from prison due to the negligence of prison guards. Most of my informants were released from prison only after Libyan farmers, whom they did not know, paid their “bail.” The migrants were then enslaved and had to perform physical labor on the farms. Only young Black African men and boys, from regions in sub-Saharan Africa, were “sold” to local farmers as unpaid labor, indicating that ethnicity, skin color and gender were factors in their trafficking.

The information that I obtained from these individuals further confirms news reports of Libyan slave auctions in which migrants are sold to locals for manual labor (Elbagir et al. 2017; Squires 2017). It appears that many of my research participants were sold into slavery to work during harvest season. The migrants reported that they only remained on these farms for two to five months, after which the farmers told the migrants that their labor was no longer needed. Surprisingly, after the harsh treatment they were subjected to in prison and, despite being trafficked for their labor, my informants came to regard these farmers as their rescuers. Prison conditions were so horrific that when an Arab farmer “bailed out” Benjamin and took him to his farm, he did not question the intentions of the farmer. Benjamin described the farmer as his “rescuer” who had liberated him from prison, gave him a place to live, food to eat, and did not expose him to the same abusive conditions that he had encountered in prison. Although migrants were not subjected to the same abuses on the farms that they had experienced in prison, they were still subjected to unpaid and forced labor.

My informants recounted that once the farmers no longer needed their labor, they were taken, involuntarily, to the Mediterranean coast in Tripoli. There, they were either left at the seashore or they were threatened and beaten until they boarded a boat to cross the Mediterranean. Adam, a 17-year-old boy from Nigeria, explained that he did not want to leave the farm, but he did not have a choice.

“The farmer said I would have to go back to Nigeria and that he had to pay money for me. I said I could not go back because of Boko Haram, so he said he would send me to Europe. One night while I was sleeping he woke me up and forced me on a boat. There were one hundred people on the seaside and he told me to join them.”

When I asked participants why they thought the farmers took them to the seashore, they explained that they did not know the reason. They only knew that they were forced to board the boats. Once again, these young men and boys were subjected to human traffickers. Daniel, a 17-year-old boy from Nigeria told me, “I did not want to go, but [the farmer] forced me with a gun and started beating me. When I was in the boat I thought I was already dead.” He explained that he cried when the farmer told him to get in the boat and he was fearful for his life. The experiences of these, more recent, migrants, stand in stark contrast to experiences described by the migrants I interviewed in 2015. Those earlier migrants reported that they were not forced to leave Libya; rather they willingly paid smugglers thousands of dollars to travel across the Mediterranean. By 2016, my informants described being subjected to expanding trafficking networks in which they
were not only imprisoned and sold into slavery by those operating the prisons, but also trafficked to Italy.

CONCLUSIONS

The exploitation and trafficking of migrants is an on-going international human rights concern. My fieldwork reveals that, in the past few years, rather than improving, the conditions for in-transit migrants in Libya had drastically deteriorated. This deterioration is largely due to the increase in the number and strength of armed militia groups operating in the region. These militia groups, who now control Libyan borders along the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea, also operate in conjunction with larger transnational trafficking networks. My interviews with local migration activists and workers at reception centers for asylum seekers in Sicily confirm that Libyan trafficking networks are operating in conjunction with human traffickers in Sicily.

Still, human trafficking represents only one form of exploitation to which in-transit migrants in Libya are subjected. It appears that the current influx of migrants into Libya, along with the increase of armed militias, has made it easier for the police, who often collude with traffickers, to detain and exploit these vulnerable populations for economic gain. Despite these abuses, new agreements enacted in 2017 between Italy and Libya seek to tighten European border control and stop the central Mediterranean route to Europe from Libya. These policies aim to strengthen the Libyan Coast Guard, increase surveillance, prevent migrants from departing Libya for Europe, and return migrants’ boats at sea to Libyan authorities (Risoleo 2017; UNHCR 2017). However, these policies do not address the underlying issues concerning migration to Italy; rather they shift the responsibility of aiding migrants from the Italian government to Libya, where migrants are trapped in cycles of exploitation or forced to find alternate routes to Europe.

The effects of these policies are already evident in Italy, which has seen a 75 percent decrease in migrant arrivals from January to April of 2018 compared to the same time in 2017 (UNHCR 2018). Likewise, fewer migrants have arrived in Siracusa, Sicily, in the first half of 2018, than in previous years. A worker at one reception center explained that the center housed over 100 migrants in 2016, but only four migrants in May of 2018. Fully aware of the human rights abuses in Libya, she speculated with great concern that the low number of migrant arrivals in Sicily meant that they were stranded in Libya. If authorities continue to restrict migration to Italy, the conditions and human rights abuses of in-transit migrants in Libya will continue to worsen. The criminal organizations that operate borders, prisons, and migration routes in Libya will continue to expose migrants to physical violence, slavery, and human trafficking. As long as criminal organizations continue to function unchecked, these in-transit migrants to Italy will remain vulnerable to exploitation and subjected to horrific and inhuman conditions.
ENDNOTES

1 My research participants included migrants of varying legal status in Italy. However, since they were in transit during their time in Libya, I use the term “migrant” despite the differences in legal status after arriving in Italy.

2 In this essay, I use the terms “Black” and “Arab” to describe ethnicity, skin color, and facial features because this is the language used by participants in this research.

3 These international agreements include the Malta Declaration and the Memorandum of Understanding

REFERENCES


DETERRING SOLIDARITY ON BORDER SPACES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION BANS IN VENTIMIGLIA AND CALAIS

Juan Pablo Aris Escarcena and Amanda Carolina Da Silva

During the so-called "refugee crisis" in Europe, the presence of migrant groups in European cities has motivated very different reactions from local authorities and civil society. Taking into consideration two key aspects, the typology of destination cities and reaction of local authorities, we focus on two specific cities—Ventimiglia and Calais—because they are both situated at important points of passage on the borders between states. Also, in each case, local authorities have chosen a deterrence approach in the form of a ban on food distribution to deal with immigration issues. We analyze the different ways in which local authorities of Ventimiglia and Calais have implemented bans directed at food distribution programs for migrants and the responses to the bans from local citizens' solidarity organizations.

This essay is based on ethnographic research carried out in Ventimiglia, Italy and Calais, France, in 2017. We conducted participant observation with the migrant communities that have suffered the most direct effects as a result of the food distribution bans, working with the main volunteer organizations that assist these communities.

THE INTERDICTION OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN VENTIMIGLIA

The city of Ventimiglia is an Italian municipality located less than 20 km from the French border. Since 2011, this city has gained fame for its proximity to the first point where border controls were re-established in the Schengen Area (Hess, 2017). This area is critical because it is a major destination point for exiles who fled their countries during the "Arab Spring." The migrant population began to settle in Ventimiglia in 2016, after the dismantling of the migrant camp in Balsi Rosi, the small enclave closest to the border. During the current "refugee crisis" in Europe and continuing even now, this border between France and Italy has been tightly controlled.

In August 2016, Ventimiglia’s Mayor Enrico Ioculano introduced a municipal ordinance that prohibited the distribution of food to migrants. This political measure was legitimized for reasons of public health, ostensibly to maintain the well-being of migrants whose health could be compromised by the consumption of unsafe food and unsanitary conditions.

But the food ban has never been implemented in an absolute way to all organizations; rather it was applied in a discretionary way. For example, Caritas Ventimiglia-San Remo and the Church of Sant’Antonio continued to distribute food every day, even though the ban was in place. These Catholic organizations have always played an important role in assisting the community of migrants in Ventimiglia. Still, other non-faith-based organizations were prohibited from distributing food. The first sanctions for distributing food during the ban were imposed seven months after its implementation, in March 2017, when three French volunteers received fines “because they had provided food to migrants without authorization.” A month later, the mayor, Enrico Ioculano, revoked
the municipal ordinance banning food distribution because, as he stated, "the situation had changed."

In order to understand the significance of the food ban, we need to understand the application of this legal measure within the context of its evolution as one part of a larger social process. We suggest that the ban on food distribution to migrants is the result of an escalation of political measures imposed by local authorities to prevent migrants' freedom of movement at a porous border. It is also an attempt by authorities to manage a complicated situation of how to contain a migrant population that has been construed as a "threat" to the surrounding population.

In 2015, the situation on the border between Italy and France was largely shaped by the events at the Balsi Rosi camp and the actions of the organization "No Borders" that allied with the migrants settled there. After a violent dismantling of this camp by the Italian police forces, many volunteers were expelled from the region through a legal instrument known as the "foglio di via." The migrants were then dispersed to different Italian centers. Since the destruction of the Balsi Rosi camp, Ventimiglia has become a central node of the migratory route for those migrants attempting to cross the border. The migrants began sleeping in the train station, in the Church, and later in Via Tenda, under the highway bridge that goes to France. Eventually, the growing number of migrants living under this bridge constituted a population of close to two thousand people.

In the summer of 2016 the Ministry of the Interior, through the prefecture of Imperia and in collaboration with the Italian Red Cross, decided to open a transit camp on the outskirts of the city. This was a partial solution, because the camp never had the capacity to accommodate all the migrants present in Ventimiglia. However, migrants were reluctant to enter the transit camp because of its heavy police presence and fingerprint requirements. The ban against the distribution of food arose in August 2016 in response to the growing settlement under the bridge, as a measure to put an end to the encampment at "Via Tenda." The aim of the authorities was to create a hostile environment that would force the migrants to go to the transit camp or leave the city altogether.

**CALAIS: HIGH DETERRENCE AFTER THE JUNGLE "TOLERANCE"

Immigration to Calais and the "Calais Jungles" has been very well documented by researchers, such as Kin Rygiel (2011) and Michel Agier (2009, 2015). The "Calais Jungles" (officially "La Lande") were in place between 2015 and 2016. They were informal and extremely precarious settlements that were constructed by migrants in the vicinity of the official day care center Jules Ferry. The camps grew into an active and established community with schools, shops, restaurants and even an art gallery. Still, conditions in the "Jungles" remained harsh given the lack of services, resulting in serious problems regarding health and hygiene.

Initially, the French state not only tolerated the "Jungles" but saw them as a model for civil society engagement in addressing the needs of the many migrants flowing into the area. The state allowed the migrants to be protected by grassroots associations and volunteers, who provided migrants with basic services and managed a food distribution program. The migrants were also free to assemble and were able to organize their living spaces according to their needs (Djigo 2016: 36). While the conditions in the "Jungles" were barely at a subsistence level, the migrants and their international cadre of volunteers
created a hospitable environment. Migrants enjoyed a degree of freedom that fostered individual and collective artistic expression and social action.

Still, the “Jungles” became problematic for the French authorities, for two reasons. First, the population of people living in the “Jungles” continued to expand, reaching over six thousand by official counts. Some estimates put the population even higher, at ten thousand inhabitants. Second, the “Jungles” became too visible and exposed the vulnerability of the migrant population living there. Media coverage of the “Jungles” provoked waves of solidarity among the French population but also increased criticism of the government over its ineffective policies toward migrants. In September 2016, French President François Hollande announced that the “Jungles” would be destroyed and their inhabitants moved to official facilities where they could live with “dignity.” Still, despite the destruction of the “Jungles” migrants continued to arrive in Calais.

The food distribution program was the only action that remained in place after the “Jungle” destruction. In March 2017, the mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart, promoted the first food distribution ban. The mayor justified the ban by stating that migrants, gathering in large numbers to acquire food, imposed a danger to the city. Similar to the justification for the ban in Ventimiglia, the prohibition against food distribution was presented by the mayor of Calais as a protection, not only against the problems created by the migrants but also as a protection for the migrants. However, we posit that, similar to the situation in Ventimiglia, the ban was established to end the migrants’s occupation of the public space where the distributions took place (“Des Dunes” Industrial Area). At the same time, the volunteer associations that distributed food received a series of health control visits. These actions by the local government served as constant attempts to hinder and discourage the presence of both the migrants in the city and the volunteers and associations that assisted them.

On May 22, 2017, the food distribution ban was revoked by order of the Administrative Court of Lille against the City of Calais (Ordinance Nº1702397). But this legal decision did not prevent the growing criminalization of volunteers by the “delit de solidarité.” Still, despite the 2017 revocation of the directive, the authorities continued to put in place measures to further discourage volunteers from assisting the migrants and distributing food. The first measure designed to totally eliminate food distributions was put in place in March 2018, in which local civil society organizations were replaced by State-controlled organizations. This time, rather than a local directive issued from the mayor of Calais, the directive was imposed by the French State.

CONCLUSIONS

We have presented, briefly, the historical process by which prohibitions against the distribution of food have been established in Ventimiglia and Calais, cities that have become key sites along the migratory routes within Europe. Our discussion highlights two key points. First, in both Calais and Ventimiglia, the bans against food distributions were presented as protective mechanisms imposed by local authorities. Through rhetorical acrobatics, the prohibitions that deprive migrants of the most basic human need are represented as a means to protect them. This invites us to reflect on the perverse effects of humanitarian logic, well presented in the theoretical approaches established by authors such as Fassin (2007, 2011), Fischer (2013), Malkki (1996), and Ticktin (2005, 2014, 2015).
Second, in both Ventimiglia and Calais, the bans against food distribution did not focus on the activity itself, but rather were imposed as a set of restrictions through which to inhibit the activity indirectly. Through this indirect approach, authorities sought to achieve a double purpose: 1) Create a hostile environment in order to discourage the presence of migrants and to gradually expel them from these cities and, 2) obstruct and criminalize the involvement of volunteers and organizations engaged in assisting and advocating for the migrants.

Among the restrictive measures adopted by several of the main European states at present, bans on the distribution of food to migrants is one of the most aggressive. From an analytical point of view, the analysis of these measures as historical and socio-political processes opens a privileged opportunity for more in-depth research into how the logics of control and government operate to exert control over both vulnerable migrant populations and their allies.

ENDNOTES

1 Characterization with which it is usually referred to in the period between 2015 and 2017, and focused on the arrival of exiles due to the Syrian conflict


3 During ethnographic research, in December 2017 several migrants wanted to sleep in the camp on a stormy day, but they were refused access for the lack of space.

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WEBS OF NATIONALISM, PATRIARCHY AND RACISM
AT THE ITALO-FRENCH BORDER OF VENTIMIGLIA

Sofia Gemmo

In 2015, France declared a state of emergency and sealed its borders, ostensibly suspending the principle of internal freedom of movement between European Union (EU) Member States that are signatories to the Schengen Agreement. It is important to note that the principle of freedom of movement is foundational to the creation of the Schengen treaty and the European project. To revoke this principle by illegally stretching border code law means that the EU is completely transforming its make-up. The action by France strengthened EU efforts begun in the 1990s to halt the movement of refugees before they reached the EU external borders, thereby exposing the political and moral failures of the so-called European immigration crisis today. Through the instrumentalization of the state of emergency in times of neoliberal austerity, this newly aligned "European stand" effectively introduced illegal, militarized border controls between EU Member States (MS) thereby instituting a securitized regime legalizing repressive and violent practices governing immigration on the basis of security and control, whilst maintaining utmost devotion to human rights.

In the past two decades, Italy’s position as a refugee "entry zone" to “Fortress Europe” has been heavily politicized. Anti-immigrant sentiments are on the rise, which culminated with the March 2018 election of an anti-immigration government. Today, general dissent in Italy, largely in response to EU austerity measures, has resulted in the strengthening of two anti-establishment, anti-European parties that today form the fragmented Italian parliament. The outcome has been a conservative government that has employed extreme anti-immigrant and racist rhetoric, and fomented nationalist and heteropatriarchal family values, specifically regarding control over women’s reproduction, to promote their concept of the ideal Italian character and European citizen.

In this essay I investigate the development of racist, nationalist and sexist sentiments in the context of the politicization of anti-immigrant rhetoric in Europe. I focus, specifically, on the ways in which these expressions of heteronormativity and racism inform government and nativist attitudes towards refugees, particularly women, at the Italo-French border of Ventimiglia. My understanding of these complex intersections is the result of my participation with different solidarity groups and refugees at the Franco-Italian internal border, and is further informed through my double position as a researcher and a white woman with dual citizenship. I grew up in Italy and live daily with the subtle violences of patriarchy that shape Italian culture. I present two interlaced contradictions that, I suggest, promote violence and exploitation against refugees who are in-transit through Ventimiglia to Northern Europe. The first contradiction I find is the current re-composition of internal borders in Europe, which raises violent sentiments among the Italian population towards refugees and represses forms of solidarity. The second contradiction lies in the myth of the woman of color who reproduces the traditions of "the other"; she is then set in opposition to Italian women who refuse traditional gender roles.
These gendered underpinnings amplify increasing anti-migrant rhetoric, further the exploitation of the woman of color and raise the question of how these “ideals” of Italian and European character are actually re-produced. If women traditionally have been the bearers of national reconstruction and stewards of ethnic preservation and traditional values, how then are these relations shifting in a newly configured neoliberal global and European milieu? Furthermore, how are racist discourses of immigration gendered, differentiating women of color as victim and men (Muslim man) as the oppressor?

**WEBS OF EXPLOITATION AT THE ITALO-FRENCH BORDER OF VENTIMIGLIA**

Since 2015, the story of Ventimiglia has been represented in the media and through a targeted political campaign as a symbol of EU political failures. At this time, militarized border controls returned to the prerogative of EU Member States, resulting in all borders surrounding Italy to be sealed and heavily surveilled. Refugees trying to reunite with their family members and friends in northern Europe literally have been trapped in Italy. In fact, few of the thousands of people who transit through Ventimiglia, the majority of whom arrive from Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Syria, Gambia, Nigeria, and Liberia, via Libya, submit asylum applications in Italy, intending instead to move through Italy to other parts of Europe.

The border area has, in effect, been transformed into an expanding juridical border area in an unchecked region that experiments with “governance of immigration” reflecting a Nationalist discourse that incites violence toward refugees (Barbis 2017). As legal experts assert, these practices elucidate the unlawful selection criteria being dictated by the Italian police authorities and the political will to prevent refugees from moving outside the confined territory of refugee hotspots, regardless of their international right to ask for asylum in the EU (Caprioglio 2018). These flexible and ambiguously managed devices of confinement and detention match the EU regulations aimed to prevent the arrival of refugees in Europe and maximize their exploitation.

In Ventimiglia, today, the militarized practice of dealing with refugees attempting to cross the border is a controversial de-funneling mechanism. After attempting to cross dozens of times through mountains and coastal trails, hidden in trains, trucks and cars, refugees are arbitrarily captured and loaded on buses. In a joint collaboration between the government, police and private bus companies, refugees are escorted to Taranto, one of the largest detention facilities in the south of Italy, a “refugee hotspot” where refugees, mainly men, have been more than once. This means that, unless they are completely confined in the south (which is why more and more formal and informal detention facilities are being created in the south), refugees continue to move upwards. In many cases, refugees are brought to the hotspots in the south, and the next day they take trains to return north.

In this sorting facility, refugees are identified and classified on the basis of the color of their skin. Few nationalities are selected and granted legal possibilities to begin the bureaucratic cycle of applying for asylum. The majority are deemed "economic migrants" and as such they usually receive an expulsion decree, which immediately places them on a path of illegality and makes them more vulnerable to violence (Caprioglio 2018). This militarized movement of people subjects refugees to control by criminal organizations that, through the ever-growing capolarato exploit their labor in the agricultural regions in the south.4

Women, families and unaccompanied minors face similar pushback at the French
border through continuous illegal rejections and the State’s systematic violation of rights protecting unaccompanied minors (MSF 2018). Violent border practices tend to separate women and young girls from their families, which further endangers their already vulnerable lives. This institutes an informal response to gender, which leaves women to be managed by other spaces of illicit action.

The construction of a Red Cross Camp in Ventimiglia is another site of violence in this border regime. This camp was not conceptualized as a humanitarian safe space, but rather it serves as a re-identification camp, “welcoming” refugees who, upon arrival, are required to provide fingerprints, thereby allowing authorities to track and retain records of refugees’ movement and entry into the country. In addition, the camp does not prioritize safeguards to protect refugee women and children from violence and abuse.

For two years, the local parish operated as the only informal space of hospitality devoted to women, children and families. However, a city ordinance passed in July 2017 prohibited this kind of solidarity action, as well as prohibited the distribution of food and water to refugees. The ordinance required the transfer of women to the Red Cross facility. However, fearful of what they would be subjected to in the camp, many women and their families chose to stay at a refugee enclave located on the banks of the Roya River, even when they were in need of medical assistance. Not only is the Red Cross camp located under a dangerous freeway entrance, but people have to walk more than 5 kilometers away from the city center, on an unlit road with no sidewalks, to reach it. Once at the camp, women refugees, and NGOs working in the area, have repeatedly reported cases of sexual harassment and assault. Women and children are also vulnerable to the well-organized trafficking and prostitution networks that target the camp. These realities, which are only partially recognized by the Red Cross and local authorities, fundamentally deter women from taking advantage of the services of the camp and place them in a state of high vulnerability for exploitation and abuse.

OUTSIDE OF THE ITALO-FRENCH BORDER THERE IS A CRISIS OF VALUES

After the past election, more politicians are evoking an affective language to promulgate racist and heteronormative rhetoric to further the "myth" of an ideal character of the European citizen. More specifically, much media attention was given to far-right politicians who railed against the immigrant "other" and linked their rhetoric to the protection of "our Italian women." This fomented heteropatriarchal normativity, traditional family values and a patriarchal xenophobic need to control the reproduction of women. Interestingly, while these far-right political parties claim to be Euro-skeptic, in fact, they rely on fairly similar convictions expressed among other leaders in EU, whose anti-immigrant rhetoric is also linked to the ideal of ethnically united and homogenous peoples of Europe. A belief of the "ideal character of Europe", espoused by certain factions within the EU Member States, is consistent with their ideas of national sovereignty within the European ethos (Nicoloson et al. 2016).

This seemingly contradictory re-arrangement among EU Member States, within EU institutions and in the Italian Parliament, has allowed two major realignments of racist and sexist discourses. First, it has fostered an environment in which new and old political parties routinely utilize fears and anxieties projected against the figure of the "migrant other" to foment new populist beliefs that reaffirm nativist nationalism. Populist parties commonly blame the EU for its failure to deal with the immigration issue which has served
to promote the immigrant as "the other" responsible for the current crisis, thus creating a "common enemy" and grounds for shared action (Nicolson et al. 2016). Secondly, the construct of individualizing the "common danger" in certain refugees operates through what Sara Ahmed (2003) calls an "affective economy" in which negative racialized feelings and attitudes "stick" to certain bodies, and therefore are attributed as coming from those bodies. This allows for preemptive selective policies that distinguish desirable others—those capable of representing the "ideal" character of Europe—from those perceived as not assimilable into European and Italian societies, economies or systems of shared values.

In this context, nationalist discourses exploit feminist themes to mobilize European action devoted to women’s liberty and equality, yet represent Islam as a fundamentally misogynist religion and culture (Farris, 2017). Correspondingly, as Nicolson et al. (2016) suggest in The Unstated Politics Of Stranger Making In Europe, this has helped the new political parties gain greater support as they move in a midway position through alliances that balance national social democracy against the global market pressures and reassert ethno-nationalism within popular political discourses.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, while the reintroduction of militarized border controls and the instrumentalization of anti-immigrant rhetoric is driving the contemporary European political and economic realignment with its Member States, the representation of Europe as the bearer of liberties, progressiveness and love for human rights remains fundamental for this reconstruction of national identity. This has consolidated a governance of immigration that uses sexuality, race, gender and nation to align the EU to the global trends of securitization, and nationalism to halt refugees from entering Europe. From the nativists’ perspective, the most visible fear of the "other" is represented as the biological reproduction of women of color and the threat they pose to a darkening of the "pure white Italian lineage." Although this rhetoric echoed in the media is not inaccurate, it is only a superficial discourse that does not analyze those historical structures of violence that seek to maintain opportunity for some and restrict movement and access to others.

ENDNOTES

1 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ%3AL%3A2016%3A077%3ATOC&uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.077.01.0001.01.ENG
3 Lega Nord (the Northern League is a far-right party led by now Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini) and Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S- declared far-left, led by Di Maio).
4 Capolarato is a diffused practice in Italy based on the criminal exploitation of cheap labour in agriculture, construction and other sectors.
5 "Our Italian Women" is utilized in Twitter campaigns by members of the Northern League with #firstItalianwoman (#primaLeItaliane). Lorenzo Fontana, now Minister of Families, repeatedly uses campaigns against abortion, homosexuals and traditional family values. http://www.today.it/politica/lorenzo-fontana-ministro-famiglia.html
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http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol2no3_2003/ahmed_love.htm
(...) the knowledge we have of our surroundings is forged in the very course of our moving through them (...). [Ingold 2000: 227]

In this essay we look at negotiations of belonging as expressed through mobility and stasis. Both are part of mundane, everyday life and have the power to challenge, redraw or affirm borders and boundaries. We use belonging as a concept for its open-endedness and understand it as inherently spatial. We nevertheless move beyond a merely territorialized understanding to include emotion and affect, intertwined with temporality, materiality, and embodiment.

To illustrate the relevance of mobilities for processes of belonging, we draw on the life histories of two immigrants dwelling in the northern part of the province of Antwerp in Belgium. Despite their different backgrounds, they share a complex positionality of “visible outsider”, packed with multiple, intersecting vulnerabilities, in part stemming from their precarious trajectory towards formal Belgian citizenship. Their life histories were recorded during two separate ethnographic studies, carried out by the respective authors between 2012 and 2016.

Colette, one of the two immigrants discussed in this essay, was born in Kinshasa and migrated to Belgium in 2009 as an adult, together with her two children, one of whom was diagnosed with autism. Surviving polio as a child has damaged Colette’s legs and caused impaired mobility (crutches and later a wheelchair). Her bodily difference holds a central role in her identity as an educated businesswoman and founder of an NGO for disabled people in Kinshasa, and she maintains strong connections to her Congolese political, social, activist and professional network. She made a conscious decision to move to Belgium to improve life for her autistic son. Despite her knowledge and resources, it took more than three years to receive a long-term residence permit. She gets by on a very modest state benefit, and she and her children were provided with a social housing apartment.

Ramis, the other immigrant whose life history we draw on in the essay, was born and raised in rural Afghanistan. When his parents were murdered he became one of Kabul’s many street children. He left the country at the age of fifteen, fleeing Taliban recruiters. He haphazardly ended up in Belgium in 2006 as an unaccompanied minor asylum seeker, and has since lived mostly in the same small city that initially hosted him in a local housing initiative until he turned eighteen (the age of majority in Belgium). Ramis did not receive an education after the age of eighteen, and has been unemployed for most of his adult life. He received a permanent residence permit after about two years without legal residence, and five years of annually renewed subsidiary protection. He has no contacts in Afghanistan stemming from his childhood, but throughout the years developed a network of Afghan refugees and immigrants, dwelling in or passing through Belgium.
OUTSIDERS IN THE "OUTSIDE"

While Belgium hardly has any "purely rural community" (Meert 2000: 331), the dwelling places of Colette and Ramis, though physically located in the province of Antwerp, nevertheless belong to the rural mindscape of Flanders, the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium. A shared local identity exists, based on a boundary between this area—in the local dialect referred to as "the outside"—and "the city" of Antwerp. Ethnocultural and socioeconomic diversity make up the most prevalent differences between the "two" mindsapes, leading to a stereotype of suburban and rural areas as white, tranquil and privileged spaces. In contrast, cities are conceptualized as riddled with crime, immigrants and poverty. Unlike remote rural areas elsewhere in Europe, long distances and a lack of services and provisions (such as public transport, language schools, social workers, or social housing) are not as serious an issue here. Nevertheless, whereas the social and material infrastructures of the city increasingly cater to a population marked by superdiversity, these new realities are progressing more slowly toward the suburbs and beyond. Therefore, both respondents rely on the city as a resource for, among other things, connecting to ethnic peers and for finding specific food items or specialized help and services. In that sense, neither their sense of belonging, nor their experience of poverty, are likely to be considered as "rural" as predicted by others' research (Marissal et al. 2013).

BORDER CROSSING AND AFFECTIVE MOBILITY

For those confronted with social exclusion or isolation, "longing" (Probyn 1996) for a place that allows for "feeling at home", with security and continuity (Savage et al. 2005), prompts continuous exploration of new sites and ways to belong. In that sense, longing itself may be the ultimate border-crossing praxis, as it is the very locus from which "others" and "other places" one longs for are identified. We find "translocality" a usable concept here as it emphasizes ongoing processes and the various forms of interconnectedness that exist between people, things and the realm of places (see e.g., Appadurai 1995; Haraway 1988; Massey 2005). For Colette, translocal belonging is one possible resource in building her identity as a businesswoman who is not restricted to either Congo or Belgium. For Ramis being—or rather "becoming"—Afghan in Belgium during times of crisis, saved him from identification with fellow homeless people in his small rural town. This latter population is, stereotypically, comprised of impoverished older, Belgian-born single men with substance abuse problems.

But translocal, virtual or affective connections do not entirely resolve the material, corporeal and localized aspects of belonging. Colette, whose physical mobility is limited by her disability, has difficulties to connect with her immediate environment and community.

“My little computer permits me to write to many people. But I want to go outside. I want to do something. I want to restart my NGO here.”

Her account shows the force of "longing", by revealing how compromises are made on the level of identification. At times, practices of belonging conflict with intersecting identities. Despite her being Catholic, she tells us:

“My only friends in the neighborhood are Jehovah’s Witnesses. They are the only people I have seen since I’ve been here. They were also the only people who..."
passed by my door. They came to talk about God and because I had no one else
and they accepted me ... we became friends. (...) I am not a Jehovah’s Witness,
but they do want to help me.”

SHIFTING LANDSCAPES AND THE MATERIAL DIMENSION OF BELONGING: THE BUS

In both life histories, buses appear as special sites for the making and unmaking of a
sense of belonging. Not only do bus rides form a connection between different 'local places',
they also connect the now with the past, as they evoke comparisons between experiences
in the here and now, to bus rides elsewhere. The unspoken rules about the balance
between socializing, conviviality and indifference in the space that is the bus reveal
practices of belonging and exclusion. When contrasting how she lived in Congo versus her
encounters with everyday racism in Flanders, Colette narrates:

“One time - I had just had an operation - there was something wrong with my
foot. I wanted to take the bus but could not enter and everybody started to
stare at me, including the bus driver. Eventually an African lady stood up from
the back of the bus and helped me inside.”

Ramis’ bus rides to and from Antwerp reflect his changing affect towards both his
rural ‘hometown’ and the city. He is initially drawn to rural areas and intimidated by the
idea of a city—a consequence of both his childhood experiences and his socialization into
the local discourse about the risks and vices of the city. Bus rides in this context are
occasional adventures, excitingly risky, with goals linked to exploring boundaries,
friendship and recreation. Some rides also signal resistance, for instance when Ramis and
his friends cross an international border by bus while their immigration status forbids it.
Ramis used to take such a bus together with other unaccompanied minor asylum seekers of
his housing initiative. Asked about why this trip was worth the risk, Ramis reveals rebellion
against the felt injustices of the asylum system. His reason—“just because we could”—is
complemented with stories of being excluded from international excursions at school or
sport clubs.

Later however, Ramis is forced out of his village as an ‘undocumented migrant’ and
develops a distinctive urban survival network. Bus rides become a hassle as ticket controls
can lead to his getting arrested and repatriated. After this period, Ramis returns to ‘normal’
life in the smaller rural city. Yet, from this period onwards, he maintains an Afghan social
network typified by reciprocity and mutual support. Bus rides now serve mostly as
shopping trips to get halal food, Afghan spices, tea and medicine in order to host Afghan
friends, as well as to reconnect to and maintain his translocal social capital.

PAPERWORK AND CATEGORIZATION: THE POLITICS OF BELONGING

According to Yuval-Davis, “politics of belonging (...) relates to the participatory
politics of citizenship as well as to that of entitlement and status” (2006: 19). Both Ramis’
and Colette’s life histories reveal an environment ridden with borders and boundaries
brought about by processes of normalization (Graeber 2012) and form-alization (Cohen
1994) of subjects in the modern nation-state. Their “subjective experiences of belonging or
not belonging are profoundly shaped by political belonging” (Antonsich 2010: 634). Their
accounts make clear how institutions, documents, procedures, stamps, places and regimes
of surveillance all are meant to assure the maintenance of order and people's place therein. For instance, Ramis' young age upon entry initially allowed for the label of minor, which granted him temporary protection from both expulsion and incarceration. Later, not being recognized as a refugee while having become "adult" led to years of homelessness and uncertainty. The administrative border barring access to citizenship was one he contested by developing an iterative trajectory to his lawyer's office and the Immigration Office, and engaging in a hectic and hypermobile urban survival network, while simultaneously finding peers in places of mooring, waiting and being stuck. Similarly, for Colette, bodily difference led to being categorized as disabled, which entitled her to protection and benefits in Belgium. Yet, in order to fully qualify for these, she had to become Belgian. This made her trips forth and back to Kinshasa more difficult, as from then on, she had to apply for a visa each time she wanted to enter Congo.

For both, a large proportion of everyday mobility consists of visits to/from and waiting for all kinds of professional gatekeepers with administrative power, such as lawyers, social assistants, nurses and caretakers who either affirm or contest identities and legitimate ways of belonging. These mobilities highlight the everyday consequences of the political dimension of belonging. Specific agents moreover engage in exclusionary practices that enforce or problematize mobility. Such acts of exclusion include racial steering, in which the trope of belonging is mobilized as a discursive resource for exclusion (Antonsich 2010), as well as direct and more subtle forms of discrimination, quite commonly encountered in education, housing and labor. As Colette narrates about a social assistant who regularly visits her home:

"She will tell me things like "the Belgian money is gone", "the Belgian money is finished."
I told her: "I don't take it from your pocket. I am just asking you to fill in the document and to send it to the person who has to decide."
Her: "I am just saying that there are many people in Belgium that are asking for this kind of budget and that are waiting and that there is no more money in Belgium."

BELONGING AND FUTURE MOBILITIES

Mundane mobilities as well as (frustrated) instances of stasis effectively unveil the labor that goes into continuous attempts to belong. "Every passage from place to place and the changing horizons along the way" (Ingold 2000: 227) have the potential to create new (exclusionary and inclusionary) boundaries, while also producing insight as to how to work with and through them. Colette and Ramis’ struggles to belong have not (yet) induced long-term or unidirectional mobility such as return migration or onwards migration. While their accounts show boundaries and borders are effective in demarcating their “place” in society, they both continue to negotiate their belonging, thereby crossing, blurring, transcending, and redrawing the boundaries surrounding them.
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QUEER FUTURITY AND THE “BACKWARD” MUSLIM:
AN ANXIOUS INTERSECTION FOR QUEER MUSLIM
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE NETHERLANDS

Sarah French Brennan

“Can you see your future here, in Holland?”

Tall white men holding glasses of white wine and interested expressions waited for an answer. The younger man, whom they watched expectantly, did not respond, his face frozen. I was eavesdropping (not subtly.) There was plenty in my surroundings—an elegant exhibit opening at a “gallery of gay art” in a northern Dutch city, the Spring of 2016—for me to feign attention.

The gallery owner approached the group from behind, touching the small of the young man’s back, smiling at his questioners. It’s likely the gesture was only meant to reassure the young man. But there was something about the moment that, from my vantage, presented like our host—a middle-aged man whose work outside this gallery focused on aiding queer asylum seekers—exhibiting his finest acquisition. Perhaps this is an ungenerous interpretation. But, the young man (who I learned was Syrian) encircled by tall Dutchmen, and glossy photos of naked dark-skinned bodies behind him, stood statue-still.

I don’t know how, or if, he answered the question. I’d often heard inquiries like this addressed to asylum seekers, and while this moment seemed to be an explicit incitement to a bit of performance art, questions of future and futurity intertwine multifariously in the lives of queer Muslim asylum seekers.

In my research, conducted in the Netherlands between 2014-2016, I question the role played by individual, communal, and national imaginings of futures in producing and constituting “LBGTI” (the legal category) asylum seekers. How does futurity work for and against queer Muslim asylum seekers in the Netherlands?

FUTURITY AND BACKWARDNESS

“Asylum seeker” (asielzoeker) is a future-oriented term. The status, I found, is primarily characterized by the experiences of “seeking”, hoping, waiting. Once processed, asylum seekers either become refugees or deportees. Among the 83,070 first-time asylum claims in the Netherlands between 2014-2016 (IND), it is difficult to estimate how many apply on the basis of sexual or gender identity. The Netherlands, (and most European countries) do not collect data on the specific reasons for asylum. Among these indeterminate numbers of queer asylum seekers are many of the Muslim faith and/or background. They face the fear and uncertainty of all asylum seekers, as well as the isolation and extreme difficulty of proving their cases so common among queer asylum seekers. Furthermore, they face alienating and sometimes violent Islamophobia in the country where they ultimately hope to find safety.
If notions of queer futurity have grown in part as responses to the queer death drive (Edelman 2004) and historic associations of queerness with death, disease and discontinuity, queer Muslim asylum seekers represent a troubled queer futurity. By classification they are backward-focused: forced into telling and re-telling narratives casting them as eternal victims, chased out of their homes by death; named asylum seeker, a label exclusively responding to a past. According to Edelman (2004), queers are seen to embody “future-negating”, in opposition to heterosexuals whose ability to reproduce children is seen as future-affirming. Queer asylum seekers present an interesting addition to this problematic of queer futurity: Queer asylum seekers themselves contribute to the growth of queer populations (if they are allowed to stay). The “queer death drive” in this case, may be reworked to apply to failed asylum claims, whereby individuals are sent back to life-threatening conditions. If, as Muñoz (2009) declares, “queerness is not yet here”1—well, neither are asylum seekers. Those suspended in asylum systems are not here, and not there, and they will not be granted asylum as “queer” but as the circumscribed identity LGBTI.

In “the West,” Muslim asylum seekers are tied, oppositionally, to futurity— the supposed exceptional homophobia and backwardness (or anti-futurity) of Muslim migrant communities is reported upon and fretted about frequently in public discourses on migration, refugees, religion, and what it means to be Dutch. While in public imaginations Muslims are stuck in an earlier century, Dutch national imaginary takes great pride in being future-looking— “first” on myriad issues, from sexuality to environmentalism. Dutch engineers are sought globally for their expertise in defending land that is largely below sea level, to prepare other countries for coming environmental crises. In 1987, The Netherlands was the first country to erect a monument to homosexual victims of the Holocaust and, in 2001, a year after legalizing prostitution, became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage (Hekma & Duyvendak 2011). Since the death of Pim Fortuyn, who campaigned against Muslim migrants, homosexuality has had “an unprecedented centrality to Dutch politics” (Dudink 2017:3), making the Netherlands arguably the quintessential case of homonationalism.2

When populist provocateur politicians (many currently triumphant across Europe and the United States, such as Fortuyn’s successor, Geert Wilders), speak ominously of demographic threats and particularly of “Islamization,” they pit the futurity of Muslim asylum seekers against the future of the nation-state, and, in explicit instances of homonationalism, against a white-washed queer futurity that often marginalizes or erases the needs and experiences of queers of color. Often, in apocalyptic imagery alluding to a drowning native population, Muslims are described as a threat to “Dutch culture” and its mythic tradition of liberalism, sexual freedom, and gender equality. Wilders, who has campaigned to ban the Qu’ran and to “send Moroccans back,” militarizes Islamophobia. Even in less radical circles—despite proclaimed commitments to universal human rights—in practice, refugees are often met with suspicion. Muslim migrants particularly face suspicions that their loyalties lie elsewhere (Asad 1993; Cesari 2004; Silverstein 2005) and assimilation into the (presumed homogenous) “native” population’s values and ways of life will be difficult or impossible.
“BACK, BACK, BACK.”

Akram was an enthusiastic host. It was our first meeting—Summer of 2016—and he welcomed me to the asylum reception center, a modern building in western Amsterdam, as if it were his family home. After experiencing harassment by other residents at the center, his hallway had been recently designated for queer asylum seekers. He had a room to himself with a bathroom, refrigerator and water boiler. This was certainly the best accommodation I’d seen in a reception center. The conditions varied widely across the country, but others I’d spoken with shared rooms with one to six other asylum seekers, often with dormitory-style bathrooms.

This reception center’s central location in Amsterdam was a particular advantage for queer asylum seekers, as most arrive alone. Queer social organizations tended to be based there, though smaller organizations were also located in medium-sized cities. These organizations were lifelines to those enduring as lonely months of waiting and uncertainty crawled past. Additionally, participation in such organizations could bolster an asylum claim—helping to establish your credibility as “truly” queer.

Akram offered me tea, foil-wrapped cheese triangles, white bread and biscuits that he squeezed onto a small plastic table near his bunk bed. Both of us seated and well fed, Amir began his story. He suddenly seemed quite tired. Unprompted, he began describing the first time he had sexual feelings about another boy. The first time he kissed another boy. His mother’s reaction when she caught him with a friend. Street harassment. Threats. Leaving Syria. Midway, he apologized to me. He had told this story so many times since arriving in Amsterdam nine months ago, and he found it difficult.

I told him we didn’t need to continue. He said he wanted to tell his story, but to always be looking “back, back, back,” made him feel... something he couldn’t articulate in that moment. He rubbed his face with both hands.

He was worried. Akram had been advised to disavow his faith because “people here, they don’t think you can be gay and Muslim.” He’d met asylum seekers who’d been rejected, and sent home; he knew others who’d been successful and now lived on their own. But he also knew people stuck in limbo whose cases dragged for months and even years, without explanation.

He wasn’t sure he looked “gay enough.” I asked what he thought that meant. He smiled, shrugged. He’d heard something about painting your nails being convincing to asylum authorities, but he didn’t want to. Suddenly, he snapped back into host mode: “More tea? Please, take more tea.”

“LGBTI” ASYLUM IN THE NETHERLANDS

Asylum claims based on sexual orientation and gender identity remain extremely difficult to adjudicate. “Proving” one’s queerness is always a problematic proposition, and many of these asylum seekers who have spent much of their lives hiding these parts of themselves, are now asked to present “proof” in a formal setting. Cases across Europe demonstrate the difficulty of using one culture group’s definitions and conceptions of gender, sexuality, and associated behaviors, knowledge, experience, and self-presentation to decide the credibility of claims from around the globe. A Pakistani man’s asylum claim was rejected because he did not cite any great personal struggle in “coming out”, and the courts reasoned that he could not be gay in Pakistan without facing such a struggle (Jansen and Spijkerboer 2011). Asylum claims have also been denied because applicants were
unable to recite information about their home country's laws on homosexuality, or about local gay and lesbian bars. In demonstrations of bisexual invisibility as well as serious misunderstandings of social systems in other countries, applicants who are married to a person of another sex, or who have children, have also been denied (Jansen and Spijkerboer 2011). Clearly, stereotypes and culturally specific ideas of what it means to be “LGBTI”, as well as preconceptions about home cultures of applicants are deployed in the deciding of these cases.

The issues surrounding LGBT and queer identities (as well as their intersections with race and ethnicity) in relation to the state are of growing concern among social theorist and scholars. El-Tayeb argues that minority identities are policed “through the endlessly repeated questioning of origin” (El-Tayeb 2011:168) and because “this questioned minoritarian subject lacks the discursive power to shape the exchange”. The options (in this case, categories and boundaries of sexuality) remain limited to those offered by the majority. As a result, “minorities remain invisible and mute between the antagonisms of native norms and foreign aberration, only able to become subjects of speech if they take on a fake but accepted identity.” (El-Tayeb 2011:168) Examining the productive power of the category of “transgender”, Valentine adopts Foucault’s interest in the meanings and values behind labeling and looks at how categories such as transgender “are productive of the very phenomena they seem to describe” (Valentine 2007:30). The state regulates migration through legal, political, cultural and economic means that “in turn reproduce sexual identities, practices and categories.” (Manalansan 2006: 235) Epstein and Carrillo argue that the “processes of subject formation are evident in the efforts by countries such as... the Netherlands to instruct immigrants from certain regions of the world to embrace, as a prerequisite to belonging, an open-minded pluralism with respect to variations in sexual identities and practices.” (Epstein and Carrillo 2014: 261.) While the Dutch may have fluid sexualities, they require asylum seekers to conform to narrow definitions of sexual categories to be “credible.”

FORMING FUTURES

When public figures fret about demographic threats posed by migration to the Netherlands, they often mention the size and density of the country. At 16,000 square miles, the Netherlands is half the size of the U.S. state of Maine. It’s is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, and yet, just a short train ride outside of Amsterdam, you can find yourself in the middle of green pastures as far as the eye can see. The country has a history of building dikes, seawalls, dams, and dunes, consciously constructing its own visible borders. Since the 16th century land has been reclaimed and waters redistributed from lakes and seas, greatly transforming the physical contours of the country.

The Dutch have—quite literally—made room and made space throughout their history. Is this ability to create physical space really so different than the questions they now face regarding cultural space? The impediment to honoring their human rights commitments and homonationalist claims seems to come down to a fear of not having this cultural space to welcome people of Islamic faith. The exclusion of many queer Muslim asylum seekers is justified by the specter of the fraud perpetrated by those individuals (again, imagined in large numbers) who will lie about being queer to take advantage of European welfare systems and economic opportunities. If you cannot perform LGBTI
properly, you'll be rejected and deported/sent back, and you have no future, not in the Netherlands—and if the fear that initially led you to flee was indeed well founded, then perhaps you have no future at all.

ENDNOTES

1 Munoz discusses queerness as being an “ideality” which can be used to imagine the future, a horizon we may never reach but can continue to move towards.

2 “Homonationalism” is a term coined by Jasbir Puar (2007), and describes the ideology through which Western nations have come to see themselves, via a proclaimed acceptance of “LGBTI” identities, as exceptionally tolerant societies, protectors of diversity, and executors of “freedom” and “choice” in the neoliberal system. By casting other regions and cultures, for example the “Middle East”, as oppressive and repressive and in particular drawing Middle Eastern homosexuals and women as in need of saving, the “West” (despite its inequitable legal treatment of LGBT communities within its borders) gains the political and moral authority to further imperial projects.

REFERENCES


In recent years, debates about immigration have been central in politics and the media. Politicians, journalists, pundits, and ordinary people passionately discuss the impact of the arrival of immigrants and refugees, especially to wealthy European and North American countries. Should immigrants and refugees be allowed in? How many should be admitted? Will they become productive and law-abiding citizens? Will they bring all sorts of problems with them? These controversial questions characterize larger public discourses. This essay does not join these frequently ideological discussions that tend to unfold at a distance from the real life experiences of immigrants and refugees. Instead, I examine the micro level experiences of ordinary people living their everyday lives—immigrants and established locals alike. My central question is less about immigration than about the shared making of multi-ethnic urban lifeworlds. Based on ongoing ethnographic research in the southern Germany state capital of Stuttgart, I introduce an ordinary small urban space where diverse individuals negotiate more inclusive urban futures. Analyzing a hair salon in a multi-ethnic working class neighborhood, I illustrate how employees and patrons negotiate minute aspects of everyday lifeworlds. I argue that their ordinary interactions, efforts, and conversations are crucial, yet often overlooked, elements in the making of inclusive urban cultures that accommodate and represent a vastly diverse urban population.

Multi-ethnic urban lifeworlds are not created in municipal offices or conference rooms. Instead they are creatively negotiated in small and smallest spaces. Immigrants and refugees become locals among neighbors, colleagues, relatives, friends, and acquaintances in encounters that take place in neighborhood spaces, apartment buildings, streets, parks, schools, places of work, public institutions, stores, or restaurants. Of particular importance here are what Ray Oldenburg (1999) termed "third spaces," where people meet and engage voluntarily in random and sometimes unexpected ways. Aynur’s Hair Salon is a small neighborhood "third" space where a cast of multi-ethnic individuals and others interact and, in the process, remake urban lifeworlds and cultures.

MULTI-ETHNIC STUTTGART

Stuttgart is the sixth largest city in Germany (600,000 inhabitants). The Stuttgart metropolitan region (Region Stuttgart), which includes the city and five additional counties, has more than 2.5 million residents. Stuttgart is a high-tech, automotive, and banking city that is home to global industries including Mercedes, Porsche, and Bosch. Stuttgart is the German city with the largest share of residents who are either immigrants or have backgrounds of migration (Migrationshintergrund). In 2012, 39.9 percent of all residents in Stuttgart had a Migrationshintergrund. For those under the age of three years, the figure was 57.5 percent and roughly a fifth of the city’s population are foreign nationals. (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 2013:12). In the everyday experiences of immigrants in
Stuttgart, economics clearly play a role, but ordinary people’s lifeworlds are not centrally marked by fierce struggles over economic resources. Tensions are often cultural and political and arise over issues of exclusion, recognition, participation, discrimination, and civic rights. The position of immigrants in Stuttgart is not characterized by ghettoization, substandard housing conditions, or dramatically high rates of unemployment. While many immigrants occupy the lower end of Stuttgart’s rental market and experience higher rates of unemployment, Stuttgart does not share the social problems of some Parisian housing projects or British cities. Within the framework of recent movements of Middle Eastern, North African and Sub-Saharan African refugees into Germany, the city of Stuttgart housed more than 8000 new refugees in the summer of 2016 (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 2017:8).

IN THE HAIR SALON

Aynur’s Hair Salon is located in a multi-ethnic working class quarter in Stuttgart. Aynur Osman, who came as a child from Turkey to Stuttgart in the 1970s, has been running this successful salon for almost a quarter century. For years she has employed a multi-ethnic cast of hairdressers (e.g. Turkish, German, Italian, Portuguese, Eritrean, Macedonian, and others) that serves an equally diverse clientele. I have been a regular at this salon since 2006 and more formally interviewed Ms. Osman in an earlier phase of my research (Kuppinger 2015). I witnessed the business move to a different location on the same street, and experienced several cohorts of apprentices and employees in the salon.

Recently Ms. Osman, like the rest of her profession, has faced a severe shortage of qualified employees (Sommerfeldt 2018). In a booming economy with historically low unemployment, Ms. Osman struggles to hire trained hairdressers. Subsequently, in the summer of 2016, she sublet part of her salon to Sabine Meyer, a hairdresser who lost her lease in a nearby wealthier part of the city. Aynur’s and Sabine’s salons now co-exist in the same premises. Ms. Meyer brought her exclusively ethnic German clientele (largely middle-aged to elderly individuals) and part-time employees with her. Everybody on Ms. Meyer’s side of the salon is not only ethnic German, but also ethnic Swabian (ethnic group of the Stuttgart/Württemberg region) and speaks the Swabian dialect. What once was the city’s lingua franca is now rapidly disappearing among the younger population and replaced by the standard German. Spatially, Ms. Meyer occupies one corner with three to four chairs (about a quarter of the space) of the rather large salon, whereas Aynur’s has six to seven chairs. The two salons share the two washing stations on Aynur’s side, which makes for constant traffic and mixing of workers and customers.

The unexpected sharing of a space by these two salons created an interesting third space where interactions have become even more complex than in Aynur’s salon’s earlier version (see Kuppinger 2014, 2015: 228). In order to understand the changes and negotiations underway at the salon, one has to sharpen one’s eye to minute details. First there is the cast of characters, in particular on Ms. Osman’s side. As noted, her salon has always had multi-ethnic employees, apprentices, and customers. With the current shortage of qualified hairdressers, Ms. Osman had to cast her net ever wider and use creative recruitment efforts. She now also employs a male hairdresser, Ahmed Murad, who is from Algeria. There is a young intern/helper, Julia Mwangi, who recently arrived from Kenya and initially spoke almost no German. Ms. Osman hired her for future training and her potential. There is a male apprentice, Hassan Ali, a young refugee from Afghanistan, who is currently in the second year of his three-year professional training. In short, Ms. Osman’s
current employees include, not only established immigrants (e.g. from Turkey), but she hires more recent arrivals from North and Sub-Saharan Africa and refugees from Asia. Multi-ethnic workers not only add linguistic or cultural diversity to the salon, but also bring new work processes and techniques, like eyebrow plucking with the use of a sewing thread.

While much of the small talk in the salon remains within the two respective salon sides, there are moments when conversations bring the two constituencies together. When Ms. Meyer was preparing for her daughter’s wedding, employees from both sides contributed advice on dress and hair issues and exchanged notes on German versus Turkish weddings, the pains of planning and possible issues with in-laws. Hairdressers from both sides seem to bond or engage not only over work, that is hair-related issues, but on several occasions over household matters. One day, Ms. Osman, Ms. Meyer and two of their employees debated the merits of pressure cookers and how they themselves and their mothers used them and preferred certain models. On another occasion, they debated the merits of Tupperware and by the end of the debate, Ms. Özdemir, one of Ms. Osman’s hairdressers promised Ms. Meyer to bring a catalogue and show her the models she thinks would work well for Ms. Meyer’s needs. Other objects of debate are the weather, vacations, shared rants about those who mis-park their cars outside the salon, and jokes about those who stand outside the salon’s door to indulge their smoking habits.

Ms. Meyer’s patrons are less engaged in all-salon talk, but are clearly listening and watching the other side. Ms. Osman always makes a point with regard to her multi-ethnic operation that almost all talk and small talk in her salon (even between Turkish individuals) is conducted in German. Thus (almost) everybody can join in the conversations. This allows Ms. Meyer’s clientele to listen in to multi-ethnic debates in Aynur’s salon (“Ahmed is back home in Algeria, will he ever come back again or like it too much there?”). They can also watch Ms. Özdemir and Mr. Murad working on eyebrows with a thread (something that is not done in ethnic German salons). They can overhear accounts of Turkish and other weddings and get the details on a Turkish husband’s culinary preferences. They can listen to Ms. Osman patiently explaining relevant professional terms to Ms. Mwangi. They can watch Turkish brides getting ready for their weddings. They can observe how housewives of different ethnicities struggle with similar cooking and food storage issues. Depending on the topic, everybody with interest and expertise can join in the debate. It is important to note that salon encounters are not one-way streets. Instead, all constituencies hear and observe things that might further their understanding of others. Ms. Mwangi (now that her German has improved) hears what middle-aged middle-class ethnic Germans do on weekends or for their vacations. Everybody learns about all sorts of customs and cooking experiences. Everybody can share their own household disasters and successes, especially if they make for either a good laugh or provide valuable advice.

While the sharing of a space was a default solution triggered by financial demands and pressures of a globalized city (i.e., high rents and a shortage of qualified personnel), the unexpected combination of their hitherto largely separate lifeworlds produced interesting interactions for workers and customers alike. Observing people and work procedures and listening to and participating in public conversations in the salon allows those present a glimpse of the lives of those they might not usually encounter or seek out in their everyday lives. Everybody learns new things about other urbanites of different ethnicities and different lengths of residence in the city and country. Most importantly, participants might
recognize how much they have in common and recognize shared interests. They also learn that some issues are more generational than ethnic (the pressure cooker topic engaged largely middle-aged women across ethnic lines). Salon conversations are democratic. Regardless of ethnicity, race, religion, and class, everybody is entitled to participation, opinions, and the sharing of experiences and expertise. The salon becomes an experimental space, because there are not too many spaces where such diverse individuals freely engage or at least listen to each other. Only with regard to gender the salon is biased, and even though Mr. Murad and Mr. Ali work there and both salons serve male customers, I have never heard men and "male" topics dominate salon talk. It might indeed be the dominant female worlds and concerns that help individual women to recognize the large sphere of shared interests and concerns.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SMALL SPACES IN THE MULTI-ETHNIC CITY

To understand the making of urban cultures and futures, one has to look beyond larger political landscapes and debates, and sharpen one's focus onto small spaces, especially "third spaces" where diverse people encounter each other in often unexpected ways. Listening to others' conversations, like in a hair salon, can be a crucial first step to becoming familiar with others and their lives. Being able to casually overhear others in a shared and protected sphere provides newcomers an entry to diverse urban lifeworlds that some might never have experienced so closely. Listening and participating in debates, especially about mundane issues like hair, beauty issues, or household and cooking concerns, shows everybody involved how much they have in common. They might also see how sometimes generational lines are more decisive than ethnic ones (the appreciation of pressure cookers; some remarks about the "obsessive" use of cell phones by the younger generation). To understand the making of urban cultures and futures, it is crucial to look at the daily cultural work performed in small spaces. Here, diverse "locals" (including long established immigrants like Ms. Osman), more recent immigrants and refugees meet as equals and rather democratically interact with each other and devise ways and manners for more inclusive individual and communal lifeworlds and a shared urban future. Everybody turns into a relevant local actor in such spaces.

ENDNOTES

1 To be sure not all encounters in such spaces are meaningful, inclusive and culturally productive. In fact, the spaces also accommodate some of the worst public interactions marked by discrimination, exclusion, and insult. For the current paper I will focus only on positive or constructive encounters or interactions.

2 All place and personal names are pseudonyms.

3 The category mit Migrationshintergrund remains problematic, but is frequently used in public debates. It denotes a person who has at least one parent who was born outside Germany.

4 I have written elsewhere in more detail about this hair salon and analyzed interactions that predate the changes described in the current chapter (Kuppinger (2015: 228 and 2014).

5 The (southern) Swabian dialect is often made fun of in larger German/media contexts. Standard German and Swabian are close enough to be mutually understandable. The difference in dialects in the salon does not pose much of an obstacle to communication for those who are conversant in German.
A few years ago Ms. Osman employed a hairdresser from Eritrea which brought African customers to the salon which required yet other techniques.

REFERENCES
PHOTO ESSAY – DACA SPACES
In the United States today, over 800,000 young people have received DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) status. This designation provides eligible undocumented youth a reprieve from immediate deportation and allows them the opportunity to pursue their education. Still, undocumented students remain one of the most vulnerable populations in the United States. They are foreign-born, but many have spent most of their lives living in and acculturating to life in the U.S. Despite their strong identity as “American” (Cebulko, 2013), these young people do not have the same rights and privileges enjoyed by their peers who are citizens or legal residents. DACA students’ temporary status provides no direct pathway to permanent residency or citizenship (Gonzales, Terriquez, and Ruszcyk, 2014). They also face unique daily stressors from family obligations, financial challenges, their lack of a sense of belonging, and the constant threat of their or their family members’ deportations (Bjorklund 2018; Gonzales, Suárez-Orozco, and Dedios-Sanguineti, 2013).

While there is a growing literature focused on undocumented students in general, there are few studies that provide a visual space analysis of the "transnational spaces" they encounter (Chang 2017, Gonzales 2016, and Muñoz 2015). One such "transnational space" is the campus Dream Center envisioned to provide a safe and supportive haven for students as well as access to legal and financial assistance.1 This essay expands upon the work of educational anthropologists in identifying and analyzing the experiences and spaces that transnational individuals encounter (see Gonzales, 2016, Pallares & Gomberg-Muñoz, 2016). Through a visual snapshot, we examine three campus Dream Centers in order to discern the significance and meaning of these centers for undocumented students as they encounter, engage with and pass through them. We look specifically at the extent to which these centers are visible, accessible and integrated into campus life on three Southern California campuses: Campus #1-a public urban university, Campus #2 a suburban private university, and Campus #3 a suburban regional state university.

By “visibility” we mean how prominent the Dream Center is on each campus and how easy it is for students (and visitors) to find on campus maps or websites. We consider “availability” in terms of how the center is staffed, resourced and its hours of operation. We evaluate how each center is “integrated” into campus life by looking at its physical placement on campus—whether it is centrally located, placed near other student resource centers, or situated in a more obscure or remote campus location.

We suggest that Dream Centers are critical spaces for anthropological inquiry because their visual presence and prominence may reflect and convey important messages regarding the campus community’s commitment (or lack thereof) to the academic, personal and social well-being of their undocumented students. DACA students, in turn, may feel empowered and benefit from the resources (for example, information about state or local scholarships and loans [Villadares, 2012]) provided by the centers. Alternatively,
undocumented students may feel disempowered and even more vulnerable when centers are hard to find or poorly resourced. Through our photo essay, we provide a visual tour of these three Dream Centers to explore these issues.

**METHODOLOGY**

The two co-authors visited three Dream Centers, all located on west coast college campuses in spring 2018. We examined the characteristics of each of the three centers in terms of appearance, position on campus, and availability as a "transnational space." One Dream Center is located on an “urban” campus, while the other two centers are located in more “suburban” settings. We visited each campus multiple times and took photographs of each center, including the interior, the exterior and the surrounding areas. We analyze each Dream Center in terms of visibility, accessibility, and how well it is integrated on each campus. Among the three centers, we find both similarities and differences in their presentation of their spaces, their usage, their campus integration as well as the messages they convey to students.

**PUBLIC URBAN UNIVERSITY DACA CENTER #1 - PROMINENCE**

We easily found the building in which this first center is located. It is prominently shown on maps and college flyers. In terms of availability, this center has a full time staff member who offers daily office hours. We find it to be a welcoming space with colorful chairs and transparent glass offices. It is located alongside the Women’s, LGBTQ+, Retention and cross-cultural centers. Thus, this center is well integrated with other resource centers on campus.

There are two social-justice-themed murals on the outside of the building and one on the inside depicting the history and value of the area’s multicultural population. The inside mural, depicting agricultural, industrial and educational scenes, acknowledges the long history of contributions made by women and people of color to the United States. Very importantly, this large visual display conveys to the viewer that this university values all students regardless of background. Other visuals include signs and posters located outside the Dream Center.

One large poster reads "SOLIDARITY NOTES" with instructions inviting student comment.

![SOLIDARITY NOTES](image)

*Photo 1 by Jenny Banh*
Beside the doorway one can see the “Undocumented Student Center” placard and a flyer that reads, “WHAT TO DO IF ICE COMES TO YOUR DOOR” followed by instructions. The other side of the doorway is accessible to the public and is filled with messages on colorful post-it notes.

This Dream Center is very prominent on campus. The publicly displayed post-it notes invite multitudes of students to read them as they pass by the center. Additionally, the Dream Center is located adjacent to other highly visible student centers, indicative of the strong administrative and financial support it receives from the university. One can also clearly see through the glass walls into the center where graduate school preparatory books are available to students interested in pursuing post-baccalaureate degrees. This conveys that the center supports the continuing education of its students.
SUBURBAN PRIVATE UNIVERSITY DREAM CENTER #2 - LIMINALITY

Our second Dream Center was difficult to locate. There is no orientation to the center on any campus map or building. After wandering about the campus, we finally located the space. To us, this center feels somewhat hidden. In fact, students have to pass through what appears to be a mailroom in order to find it.

We regard this center as liminal or “betwixt and between” (Turner 1970) in terms of its accessibility. While it is located on the campus, it is not fully institutionalized or easy to access. The poster on the center door reads, “POP UP Dream Center” which implies that this center is temporary. Unlike other resource centers on campus, students cannot just drop-in to this Dream Center for help when needed. However, a flyer on the door does provide an email contact so students can schedule appointments with a staff member.

This center is situated on the far northern edge of the campus. It is significantly smaller in size and located farther from the center of campus where we find the other campus cultural and religious centers. A flyer on the door notes (in small print) some upcoming events such as legal clinics, discussions for dealing with stress, and information about support groups. This suggests to us that the center is somewhat integrated but not prominent in the overall campus community.

While the current center appears temporary, we did learn that this university recently voted to approve funding for a permanent Dream Center with a permanent staff member. No information has yet been released about when the permanent center will open or where it will be located. At present, this Dream Center is temporary, hard to find, hard to access and far from other student centers.
“Whereas institutional agents would like to imagine that they have played an active role in the recruitment and retention of undocumented students in college, for the most part, few examples of institutional efforts have been developed with undocumented students in mind.” (Buenavista 2017:112)

We searched for this third Dream Center but could not find it on the college map. It is not located in the main student areas and there is no prominent signage anywhere on campus indicating the center’s location. Once we finally found the nondescript building, we concur that the university did not have DACA students in mind in the placement and visibility of this center (Buenavista 2017). We expect there to be minimal student foot traffic to this location because it is not in a highly trafficked student area. In fact, the only indication of the Center’s location is a paper flyer wrapped in plastic outside the door. There are colorful couches beyond the open desk area. The sign indicating the Dream Center is completely covered by a large 9-foot banner depicting the university mascot. We find that the obscured sign and virtually hidden Dream Center create a distinctly unwelcoming environment for DACA students.
This space consisted of a single room that was open to the public. When we visited, no staff person was present. The room is attached to a larger building housing two large fast food chain restaurants. Rather than being located near other student cultural centers, as is center #1, it is isolated and hidden. The fact that this Dream Center has no full time staff member or even posted office hours, and is isolated in terms of location, makes it largely inaccessible to undocumented students. This lack of accessibility may impede or discourage undocumented students from seeking the support they may desperately need. We suggest that this university may, inadvertently, convey a lack of support for undocumented students. The message it conveys is that this university is not normalizing their undocumented student population.

CONCLUSION

Undocumented students contribute to their universities in critical ways. However, unlike their citizen peers and given the particular challenges they face, undocumented students are less likely to graduate or take longer to graduate (Conger & Chellman, 2013; Gonzales 2016). Thus, university Dream Centers that are visible, accessible, and well integrated, as we found with Dream Center #1, may also foster academic achievement and increase undocumented students' retention and graduation rates. Universities with understaffed and under-resourced centers, that are placed in obscure locations, as in our second and third examples, may convey unintended and negative messages to undocumented students, making them question the level of institutional support for their academic and personal well-being.

Although we have just scratched the surface in this brief photo journey, we maintain that there is an urgent need for more in-depth and systematic research into the ways in which universities create their "built-environments" in general and their "transnational spaces" in particular. Campus Dream Centers are critical 'transnational spaces' intended to
support students, increase their social networks, foster a sense of acceptance and belonging, and facilitate their academic and personal achievement. However, without careful attention to the construction of these spaces and the messages Dream Centers project, they may also convey messages to our students that are unintended and unsupportive.

ENDNOTES

1 We are using “Dream Center” as a general term, although universities may use a different designation for their centers that serve their undocumented students such as AB540 or undocumented center.

2 Site #1 has a student body of over 30,000 students. Site #2 has over 40,000 students and Site #3 has over 20,000 students. We could not get the number of all the DACA, Undocumented, and AB540 students as there are FERPA (Family Educational Right and Privacy Act) laws where no one can get information about a student unless there is a legal warrant.

3 For privacy we do not name the locations of the centers.

REFERENCES


PART TWO

UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION – THE UNITED STATES

As a settler colony, the United States long took pride in being a nation of immigrants. While many citizens – many of whom are themselves immigrants – still take pride in this fact, debates about migration in the United States have taken a different tone in recent years. This coincides with recent legislative changes aimed at reducing the number of migrants to the United States. And yet, in 2017, there were more than 22 million applications from around the world for a US Diversity Visa through the lottery system alone.

According to the 2016 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (the most recent available), over 5 million individuals have been granted permanent residence since 2012. Of the nearly 1,200,000 admitted in 2016, the highest numbers of new permanent residents came from Asia (n=462,299), North America (n=427,293) and Africa (113, 426). The states which received the highest number of lawful residents are California (over 223,000, or approximately 20 percent), New York (over 159,000), Florida (over 136,000) and Texas (nearly 111,000). Nearly 85,000 – representing 1 of 15 new residents – were admitted with refugee status. More than half the refugees (n=48,000) had come from Asian and Middle Eastern countries, and approximately one-third (over 31,000) from Africa. Even as these numbers of legal immigrants are on the rise, Executive Order 13,768 “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States (signed January 25, 2017) provided new guidelines for removal of individuals in the United States illegally; ICE removed over a quarter of a million individuals in 2017 following Department of Homeland Security protocol.

The essays in this section go beyond these statistics to provide a glimpse of the lived experiences of individuals who confront a number of issues related to migration and resettlement. These include on the one hand those who experience the realities of adjustment while resettling, or for others, the uncertainty of living in limbo due to an uncertain immigration status. On the other hand, one reads of the experiences of individuals who provide legal advice, services, and other forms of support. All have in common the reality that crossing borders does not eliminate the barriers to full integration in one’s destination.

Jenny Bahn and Alison Tripp explore the built environment relative to the Deferred Action Childhood Arrival (DACA) or “Dream Centers” on three California campuses. Their exploration of DACA Centers is one of the first to examine visually what the location and appearance of these Centers, as well as the services they offer, tell us about the intended and unintended messages they convey to students on these campuses.

Edgar Hernandez’s discussion focuses on seven youths attending a Southern California university who have Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) status. In

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compelling words, these students who had grown up in the U.S. and consider it their only home share their fears about the present and future. In addition to their poignant recollections of what it meant to learn they had neither the same rights nor the opportunities of their classmates, these young adults discuss how the temporary status DACA accorded them made it difficult to plan for the future, while the end of DACA puts their future in even greater jeopardy.

Luis Tenorio’s essay continues the theme of undocumented youth, in this case focusing on the experiences of unaccompanied minors who entered the United States after leaving Central America. Through interviews and analysis of cases of migrant children and youth involved with the New York Metropolitan Area courts, Tenorio explores three areas of the children’s lives – namely, legal procedures, family, and school – that shape the children’s ability to settle and adjust to life in the United States. Tracing the consequences of immigration policy in these three areas, he examines ways that the lives of these vulnerable children have become even more complicated.

Joseph Wiltberger also explores the notion of services provided in the migratory process. He focuses on the experiences of volunteers involved in the “No More Deaths” organization that provides aid in the form of leaving food, water and medicine for migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. Based on participant observation and interviews with volunteers and migrants, Wiltberger examines the legal and social consequences of actions of both parties within the broader context of geopolitical and social dimensions of the criminalization of humanitarian aid.

De Ann Pendry offers an insider’s view of working on migrants’ behalf, in her case as an ally with the Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition (TIRRC). She explains that activists involved in this group have attempted to raise awareness of the contributions that migrants make to society and have advocated for their authorized status. She discusses that advocating for social justice, and educating the public, has become all the more important for allies and those they support in light of recent shifts in state and federal immigration policies and practices.

Catherine Crowe’s research focuses on why providing social support to refugees is essential as they attempt to resettle and adapt to life in the United States. Building on her observations and interviews conducted as an intern at the Integrated Refugee and Immigration Services (IRIS) agency in New Haven Connecticut, Crowe asserts that the emotional support received as these refugees develop social networks is essential to their successful resettlement. She contends that these narratives underscore the importance of recognizing ways that social capital and friendship facilitate the human capacity to overcome barriers.

Also speaking to issues of refugee resettlement, Hadidja Nyiransekuye explores the challenges faced by American NGOs that provide services to refugees as they increasingly confront xenophobia and the rising tide of neo-nationalism. Contending that refugees are not hapless but rather have much to offer the host country, she argues that these organizations could learn how to be better advocates from the refugees themselves. She presents three refugees who are actively engaged in self-advocacy and community service as they try to rebuild their lives in the United States.

Melesio Peter Espinoza offers an historical perspective on the lives of indigenous Central American refugees who have settled, and established a community, in Texas. The plight of the Miskitus immigrants he discusses involved travelling from Nicaragua to
Honduras and Costa Rica before seeking and receiving asylum status in the US. As Espinoza discusses, global processes continued to impact the lives of individual Miskitus. Political changes in Central America, the tightening of U.S. borders and immigration policy, and including the revocation of their Temporary Protection Status (TPS) have complicated their immigration status and Miskutus’ lives.

Finally, Jennifer Zelnick’s essay shifts away from discussions of Central American and Mexican immigrants seeking to relocate to the United States and examines the harsh realities faced by non-citizen Cambodian-Americans who face deportation from the U.S. Contending that stateless “deportable refugees” – who also lack citizenship in Cambodia – are virtually absent from research on migration and flexible citizenship, Zelnick explores how they must rely on transnational kinship and social networks. She argues that this contributes to a transnational imaginary of both the U.S. and Cambodia.
THE NIGHTMARE WITHIN THE DREAM: ‘DACAMENTED’ STUDENTS’ EVERYDAY STRUGGLES IN UNCERTAIN TIMES

Edgar Hernandez

INTRODUCTION

The heated political climate in the United States has polarized a discourse surrounding undocumented immigrants that either praises immigrants as hardworking or demonizes them as transnational criminals. Among those affected most poignantly by punitive U.S. immigration laws are the 1.1 million undocumented youth (Passel and Cohn 2010) who were brought or sent across the U.S. border at a young age. The lives of many in this situation changed in 2012, when former President Barack Obama signed an Executive Order known as the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, commonly known as DACA or the “Dream Act.” This historic legislation allowed qualified applicants who met specific conditions to live and work legally for two years in the U.S., with the possibility of renewal. The conditions were: (1) under age 31 in 2012 (2) had arrived in the U.S. before turning 16, (3) lived there continuously since 2007, and (4) met strict requirements regarding being of “good moral character.” Over 700,000 youths were granted DACA status. However, as the narratives below reflect, because the DACA program does not provide a path to permanent residency or citizenship, individuals with DACA status are enmeshed in a web of illegality and liminality.

Although recent scholarship has explored undocumented students’ struggles to successfully navigate and complete their academic endeavors (Batalova et al. 2014; Gonzales 2009), less is known about the ways that DACA students perceive the program and the chronic uncertainty it creates. This essay builds on Roberto Gonzales and Leo Chavez’ (2012) concept of undocumented students’ “awakening to a nightmare” once they learn of their status. I discuss here the distress that emerges in the narratives of DACA students at a southern California public university who struggle to pursue their dreams of establishing their careers and households despite not having permanent legal status in the only “home” they have ever known.

ILLEGALITY AND MENTAL HEALTH

Scholars have found that undocumented students’ status results in them feeling constrained by a “lack of mobility along multiple dimensions: educational, economic, and physical” (Gonzales and Chavez 2012: 265). They are aware that they are not “American” nor legally welcomed in the United States, which can result in trauma, anxiety and depression (Gulbas et al. 2016; Lusk et al. 2003; Negron-Gonzalez 2013; Quiroga Szkupinski et al. 2014; Vargas Bustamante et al. 2012). Gonzales and Chavez (2012:262) assert that students’ acute stress begins with the “nightmare” of “coming face-to-face with illegality, a condition that they had been partially protected from by their age and by their parents.”
This resonates with the experiences of the seven students who participated in my ethnographic research study conducted in 2015-2016 with seven DACA students recruited at a center with a mission to empower students. I give each a pseudonym here, and provide their place of birth, future aspirations, and class standing in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Future Aspiration</th>
<th>Class Standing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frida</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>Graduate (1st year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Business owner</td>
<td>Graduate (1st year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angel</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>Senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flor</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Foreign Service officer</td>
<td>Senior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karla</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Elementary Teacher</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teresa</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Elementary Teacher</td>
<td>Freshman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alejandro</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Medical Director</td>
<td>Junior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All seven students had become aware that they were living illegally in the U.S. in their senior year of high school. In one case, Flor (a double major in Political Science and Communications) described her “awakening” as a realization that her friends were obtaining their driver’s licenses and applying to colleges. She felt “stuck” in a “world of unreachable illusions and aspirations” that meant, “I am not going to college because of financial reasons. I am not going to have money for this.” Her narrative parallels the other six students’ descriptions of their high school experience.

The perception that DACA constrains future aspirations led many to say they felt as if they were “abject” individuals at the bottom of the social pyramid, who were unable to integrate to society, and were ultimately marked as “disposable” (de Genova 2002; Gonzales and Chavez 2012). In one case, graduate student Frida said she felt that “all I [could] aspire to be is a waitress cleaning table tops and mopping floors.” Others described having to work at odd jobs and under the table before they obtained DACA status. Even so, the uncertainty of DACA solidified what Frida termed “the looming monster of illegality.” For her, this abstract notion took on a life of its own, and surrounded her like a “cloud of darkness.” The liminality of the students’ DACA status manifested itself in depression and hypervigilance. Frida spoke of experiencing a depression so severe that she was unable to get out of bed. She recalled feeling “judged,” and

“Having these guilty feelings, it was almost like a bubble or a cloud of darkness around me, and I can’t even explain where my mind was at the moment. I just know that I wanted to give up and disappear, you know? I was done. I was going to tap out.”

In another case, Flor’s bout with depression led her to a daily routine of “going to school, doing homework, and sleeping until the next day.” She spoke of contemplating
suicide because she saw herself as a “burden” to her financially struggling family. Alejandro, a junior majoring in Health Administration, said that living in a liminal state led him to suffer severe depression. His cycles of hopelessness resulted in him crying to his mother while asking her, “What am I going to do? Am I wasting my time?”

For these students, dealing with school and the emotional fallout of being in a “betwixt and between” (Turner 1967) was part of a daily reality: the duality of being documented yet undocumented they found difficult to bear. However, because of the constructed narrative of undocumented students as hardworking and goal driven, many felt that taking a break from school would further ostracize them and made them experience an increased sense of guilt. Frida recalled thinking:

“Oh my gosh, I need a break; but then at the same time, I know there is no time for that. You know what I mean? And then the shame I had to feel, what are people going to say? How are people going to look at me? What are people going to say? There were a couple of people that were like, she couldn’t do it, you know; and it’s like what else can I do?”

Feeling stigmatized exacerbated the students’ mental distress and affected their perceptions of the world around them. For example, Marshall, a graduate student majoring in Education, said that his exclusion from the American way of life forced him to see authority figures as a threat:

“Oh once I found out I was undocumented, I was like ‘oh there’s a cop; I should be careful.’ I was always scared because people that were born here [in the U.S.], if they do something bad, they get a ticket or go to jail. For me, if you do something bad you get sent to Mexico.”

Frida expressed similar discomfort directed at authorities, and recounted the time she had unknowingly befriended a police officer. Once she realized her mistake, she immediately began to feel “extreme anxiety” that she could be deported if her new friend “found out” about her status. These experiences reflect that, like other undocumented immigrants, DACA students are “circumscribed by a multitude of regulations that protect citizens” (Gonzales and Chavez 2012: 267). Whereas U.S. citizens may get peace of mind from seeing a police officer, the undocumented student may see the officer as a symbol of their “deportability” (De Genova 2002).

BITTERSWEET FEELINGS ABOUT DACA

Consistently, these students described their DACA status as “bittersweet.” They were thankful for it, but skeptical regarding how much DACA would change the structures of inequality they experienced. Each stated that others believed that because DACA had been approved via executive order, they no longer had a reason to be depressed or stuck in limbo. Per Frida:

“Being approved for DACA status makes one ‘DACAmented,’ a word coined as a play on being documented.”
DACA students are issued a Social Security number and state identification card, and they are allowed to work legally. For many, most importantly, this status legitimizes their identity. However, not all appreciated being identified as DACAmented.

For Frida, being DACAmented politicized her identity and robbed her of her individuality. Marshall said this label highlighted the unresolved issue of his dual-identity. He described it as “putting a Band-Aid on students' struggles without addressing the core problem.” In Teresa’s assessment, “something bigger and greater could have been done for us.” Thus, in a very real sense, these students felt that the term DACAmented called attention to the liminal status and further isolated them from mainstream college life.

CONCLUSION

Scholars have consistently described DACA students as hardworking, goal driven, unafraid, deserving and unapologetic; they also emphasized their perseverance in overcoming obstacles related to their academic endeavors. This seems to negate the more taboo topic of the emotional distress undocumented students feel regarding their lack of rights and protection that U.S. citizens enjoy. My research indicates that the effects of illegality have become ingrained in the lives of undocumented youth, affecting their future aspirations and the future of the United States. Although grateful for the opportunity to study, the students nevertheless experience fear of deportation and anxiety that they will never be able to establish themselves in the U.S., start a family, or accomplish their professional goals. Thus, it seems DACA failed to create a sense of belonging for undocumented youth; instead it further marginalized them by officially classifying them as members of an unwanted community. Like other immigrants living in the U.S., their greatest fear is that one day they will receive a call advising them that ICE has detained one of their family members.

REFERENCES


In June 2018, the Trump Administration’s ‘Zero Tolerance’ approach to immigration policy and practice captured nation-wide attention with the separation of immigrant families at the United States-Mexico border. As images and audio of detailed children crying out for their parents circulated through various media channels, debate and rallies were galvanized. Much of the reaction focused on the children in these separations—the conditions of their detention, the effects of separation, and feasibility of reunification. However, even as these children at the border dominated headlines, public discourse ignored that this is far from a new issue. Throughout the past decade, the United States has witnessed the migration of hundreds of thousands of unaccompanied migrant minors from the Northern Triangle of Central America: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Many of these minor migrants who reside in the United States are still attempting to seek immigration relief. This essay focuses on the legal quagmire children from this region encounter.

A number of factors present challenges to unaccompanied minors’ legal processing and resettlement. These include the absence of a parent or legal guardian at the time of their arrival or apprehension, traumatic experiences endured in the country of origin and/or along the journey to the U.S., and the reality that each has arrived in a country in which no one—not even a minor—has guaranteed access to legal counsel in immigration court. The study of this population and their experiences has largely focused on the motivations for migration (Lorenzen 2017), the legal and human rights dimensions of these cases (Bhabha and Young 1999; Bhabha and Schmidt 2006; Carr 2009), and analysis of this type of migration as part of a broader conceptual group of immigration policies and practices (Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanun 2016; Zatz and Rodriguez 2015). I focus here on three interrelated areas of these minors’ processing and resettlement experiences: court, family, and school, to examine the multilayered complexities that affect child migrants’ long-term incorporation. Methodologically, these renderings draw from a combination of participant observation at a legal services non-profit and interviews. I observed the legal developments of 42 unaccompanied migrant minor cases in the New York Metropolitan Area. The minors observed range from seven to seventeen years old (this denoting the age at the time in which the case of the minor was opened). I also conducted 35 in-depth interviews with attorneys, caseworkers, and advocates between 2014-2018.

COURTS

In the United States, absent any obligation on the government’s behalf to provide or appoint legal counsel to individuals lacking the resources to acquire it on their own, many unaccompanied minors go unrepresented. Without representation, those with grounds for relief may not know how to advocate for and seek such relief, and ultimately may be
coerced into voluntary departure. In response to these concerns, during my initial field observations, various non-profit organizations and pro bono attorneys worked collaboratively with immigration courts to increase access to free legal counsel. Advocates were provided space inside immigration court to screen and interview unaccompanied migrant minors, and identify community programs to help with health screenings, and school enrollment. However, in the latter portion of my observations, as immigration became increasingly politicized and visa retrogression set in, these collaborations were severed. Some attorneys interviewed even recounted being kicked out of court for trying to screen potential clients. Several described this shift in climate and relationship with immigration courts as “hostile.” An attorney working out of Brooklyn noted the following:

“You may think of court hostility being more location-specific...so, in particular states like Georgia you may have much more of an uphill battle seeking relief...but [in] New York that may look very different. Though now I would say it is really a generalized hostility—like it is a wildly different world of immigration to practice in. And sure, some courts are still more favorable than others, but really, across the board things have just become so hostile to these cases.”

This brewing of a more hostile court environment extends beyond severed collaborations and even beyond immigration court itself. In seeking relief, these minor migrants may actually go through other courts or institutions. One of the most common is family court (for those seeking relief through special immigrant juvenile status), where the court determines whether it is in the minor’s best interest to return to his or her country of origin. Over the years, judges have placed more and more attention on how the child arrived in the United States as opposed to the findings that qualify them for relief. Encapsulated in this is also a questioning of the legitimacy of the minor’s narrative. An immigration attorney interviewed described this in the following way:

“You get the sense that judges are really looking for this ‘ah-ha, gotcha!’ moment. The thing is, that isn’t necessarily the role that they are supposed to be playing. These cases [of special immigrant juvenile status] are very straightforward: we build a case as to why the child meets the criteria for relief, the judge holds or denies those findings, they appoint a guardian or custodian, and then we have the ability to apply for the visa...Yet some judges seem to think these children are undermining or abusing their court, which leads them to go into this wild interrogation of how these children got here, which does nothing but make them feel undeserving of relief.”

An advocate I interviewed connected these court interrogations of the minor’s narrative to the current federal administration’s rhetoric around immigration policy, articulating:

“This is what [the Trump Administration] wants. Throughout the campaigns they talked about a self-deportation approach, and that’s what we have. Children that have a right to relief are questioning their own deservingness.
The process of seeking relief has become so taxing that they don’t see it as a hope anymore. Even if they do advance somewhat, they are still stuck in this ambiguity for who knows how long. It’s insane. And that’s just what we see, who knows what they are experiencing outside that only adds to this. They are succeeding in making conditions just so, so unbearable that people give up or are left hopeless.”

FAMILY

Minors and members of their immediate networks feel anxiety and other effects of these policies and practices. This plays out in family dynamics that dictate a significant portion of these minors’ lives. Minors who are migrating unaccompanied begin seeking relief as independent individuals. In the case of special immigrant juvenile status, they are made dependent on the juvenile court and assigned a legal guardian or custodian. At times this appointed guardian or custodian might be a distant relative who is either undocumented or has permanent residency or citizenship. When such a family connection is not present in the United States, the minor may be placed in the foster care system. In each of these scenarios, the burden of delayed processing, court hostility, and questioning of deservingness has an impact on family dynamics.

In instances where other members of the household are undocumented, the delays in processing or case complications of the unaccompanied minor create an increased sense of uncertainty. In family dynamics witnessed in recent fieldwork, this same concern was often also connected to threats and news of ICE raids in the area and increased deportations. As a result, at times potential guardians or custodians would express, albeit reluctantly, an unwillingness to continue to serve as the unaccompanied minor’s potential guardian or custodian. A few of these cases resulted in the potential guardians or custodians deciding to leave the United States entirely; this was most common when they did not have families of their own. This left the unaccompanied minor without a caregiver, further hindering the processing of the case or plans for seeking relief. On a more socio-psychological level, this exacerbated the minors’ sense of desperation and frustration. One fifteen-year-old from El Salvador noted in particular:

“I left to not have to deal with gangs trying to recruit me and to escape their threats...it happened all the time. They had killed my best friend. I saw him die. The only thing I thought to fix things was to leave. I left alone because that is all I had—no one else to support me...Now, I am a different kind of alone. Some can help me, but it is risky for them. It is not fair, to them or to me. I know they are scared. I am scared. But what am I supposed to do?”

In a few cases where the proposed custodians or guardians had legal status or citizenship, there was a noted tension in the home regarding complications with the unaccompanied minors’ case processing. This typically resulted in minors having a deepened sense of guilt and frustration about the tensions their case was causing. The highest degree of tension occurred in instances where the household was of mixed legal status, with some members having temporary protective status or other visas, others with residency or citizenship, and still others undocumented. In these cases, minors spoke of arguments and tensions that arose due to members’ varying degrees of security and access.
to relief. Although no cases observed under these circumstances resulted in a potential guardian or custodian withdrawing willingness to aid in the unaccompanied minor’s relief-seeking process, this did impact the minor emotionally.

**SCHOOL**

During fieldwork, a noted shift occurred in unaccompanied minors’ interest in entering the workforce as quickly as possible. Initially, unaccompanied minors had expressed an interest in working and pursuing education. Many took proactive steps towards attaining as much schooling as possible. However, as the outcomes of their cases grew more uncertain, and tensions arose in the home environment because of their precarious status, more and more minors identified entering the workforce as their primary goal. Many held different jobs in service industries. Others took other routes common to undocumented laborers, including working in construction, agricultural labor or temporary jobs.

Increased political tension around the issue of immigration caused challenging encounters for some who attended school. One sixteen-year-old from Honduras said:

“There are other kids at school without papers. They don’t like me. They try to fight me or give me looks. They say that it is unfair I am getting help. Maybe they know I have an attorney. They say I don’t deserve it.”

Several other minors noted that they felt uncomfortable at school even if the discrimination was not overt. They said that it felt as if, in some way, their peers or instructors knew they were undocumented and treated them differently. Significantly, younger minors seemed to feel this less than older youth.

**CONCLUSION**

Ultimately, while current events keep our attention at the United States-Mexico border, it is important to remember those who, already having crossed a significant physical border, continue to encounter a number of symbolic and figurative borders in their legal processing and resettlement. In doing so, given the recent detention and separation of children migrating with their families, we must seriously consider the ways that the experiences of these unaccompanied minors relayed in this essay also misalign with our values and beliefs as a society. For migrant minors, these experiences in seeking relief and resettling during such formative years have critical consequences for their continued growth and development—both as individuals and as residents in the host society. Only by understanding and analyzing these often-overlooked experiences holistically with the other developments under the current administration can there be hope for potential reform of our long-broken immigration system.
REFERENCES
On January 17, 2018, a humanitarian volunteer on the U.S.-Mexico border named Scott Warren was charged with the felony of harboring unauthorized immigrants. Warren volunteers for No More Deaths, a group that seeks to save the lives of migrants in the Sonoran Desert, mainly by depositing water and food and providing first aid. Warren's arrest came just hours after No More Deaths (NMD) released videos of U.S. Border Patrol (hereafter BP) agents dumping out jugs of drinking water NMD had left in the desert, and it followed a string of federal civil charges against other volunteers over just a few weeks.

This essay examines the contentious politics of humanitarian aid and deterrence strategies at the border, arguing the desert borderlands are a space of ambiguity, exception, and symbolism, and the blurry boundaries of legality are continually tested and remolded through the twinned efforts of activists to provide humanitarian aid to migrants and the U.S. government to criminalize this work. At stake are the lives of migrants, hundreds of whom die each year attempting to cross the hazardous desert environment.

Drawing upon my ethnographic fieldwork with NMD volunteers, this essay analyzes the context of the desert, both as a site of “environmental deterrence” and as a space where the actions of contending actors are mediated by broader discourses and debates on U.S. immigration. It then focuses on NMD's approach to saving lives while navigating the threat of criminalization in a U.S. climate of hardline immigration policy enforcement.

The desert borderlands of Arizona near the Mexico-U.S. border are the site of hundreds of migrant deaths each year. Heat exhaustion, dehydration, and debilitating injuries are commonly suffered by migrants crossing into Arizona, a trek that involves several days of walking through harsh conditions and extreme temperatures. Presuming that environmental conditions would deter migrants from entering the U.S. through the desert, BP has maintained a more limited presence along this section of the border compared to other areas. The reduced surveillance has funneled migrants through the desert, despite the life-threatening dangers.

The border is seen as an expansive, desolate, empty space. Through one lens, it appears to be an unmediated territory, a land of lawlessness with the freedom for clandestine activities to go unsupervised and unregulated. In this regard, it is a space of exception. Without others watching, people can sneak across the border, traffic drugs, and BP agents can carry out enforcement with limited regulatory supervision over interactions with vulnerable migrants who have little possibility for legal recourse against potential misconduct.
Through another lens, it is a space of hyper-surveillance and hyper-visibility, and a home to diverse residents. With BP helicopters flying overhead, and pervasive surveillance technology such as video cameras atop towers and motion sensors set to detect migrants' movements, local residents complain that they also feel they are under constant surveillance in a panoptic space. As a militarized space, the border is a highly mediated and highly visible zone of conflict. U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal for a border wall further contributes to the meaningfulness of the border as a site of public attention, symbolic of the tensions, hostility, and xenophobia surrounding national debates on U.S. immigration. As a zone of conflict, the border is where the limits and boundaries of legality, belonging, and sovereignty get defined and redefined—with life or death consequences for migrants—in the interactions and confrontations of various contending actors in a space characterized by ambiguity and exception.

**NO MORE DEATHS: CONFRONTING “ENVIRONMENTAL DETERRENCE”**

Among these contending actors are migrants, smugglers, BP agents and contractors, vigilante watch groups, and those who provide humanitarian aid to migrants, including NMD. The organization’s founding leadership has ties to the Sanctuary Movement, an inter-faith coalition in the U.S. to support refugees fleeing the Central American civil wars in the 1970s-90s.

Volunteers embark on regular hikes through the desert to leave supplies and provide first aid during direct encounters with migrants. NMD explicitly frames its work as addressing the “symptoms” of a larger problem: the U.S. government’s strategy of “environmental deterrence.” As a pro-bono attorney for NMD stated, “we are a neutral party in a war zone.” Reinforcing the idea that humanitarian aid to migrants implies neutrality rather than a contentious, politicizing practice, the group characterizes its work as a matter of “civil initiative.” In contrast to the tradition of civil disobedience, civil initiative was conceptualized as taking direct action to fulfill “the right and responsibility to meet human rights needs.”

Nonetheless, such “direct action” to aid the survival of migrants, even if framed as innocently humanitarian rather than activist in character, is highly political. The sole act of aiding migrants’ survival brings visibility to the organization’s suggestion that death is the consequence of the U.S. government’s political strategy on immigration enforcement. Furthermore, NMD has extensively documented migrants’ complaints of neglect and abuses by the BP. By merging activism and humanitarianism, NMD draws attention to the U.S. government’s responsibility for such recurring harm and deaths.

**HUMANITARIAN AID IN AMBIGUOUS TERRAIN**

On July 9, 2005, BP agents arrested volunteers Shanti Sellz and Daniel Strauss and the three migrants they were taking from the NMD base camp in Arivaca to a hospital in Tucson. The arrests were unexpected, since in the past NMD volunteers had taken migrants in critical condition to the same hospital for emergency care when necessary (rather than calling for BP agents to arrive on site, since they often showed up hours later and with limited medical aid on hand). Sellz and Strauss were charged with transporting unauthorized migrants in furtherance of their illegal entry. In response, NMD launched a campaign, “Humanitarian Aid is Never a Crime.” The charges were dismissed a year later.
The drama surrounding the arrests illustrates the blurriness and malleability of the boundaries of legality that condition, on one hand, humanitarian aid to unauthorized migrants at the border, and on the other, the potential for its criminalization. Should northbound transportation, even if intended as a life saving measure, be understood as a criminal act that furthers unauthorized migration? In such ambiguous situations, the messy, dynamic limits of legality—like the border itself—can get tested, crossed over, constructed, and reconstructed, both by the actions of those providing aid to migrants and by the maneuvering of the U.S. government to frame such aid work as illegal activity.4

In this in-between space of legality and the borderlands, volunteers must use their discretion to determine what actions can be taken to aid migrant survival. NMD had developed its own set of general legal/ethical guidelines to help in uncertain situations. When volunteers encountered migrants in poor health, they could assist them, often at the migrants' own request, by calling BP so the migrants could receive medical attention (and then get processed and likely deported). This was generally a safer path for those who would risk death if they continued to traverse the desert. Often migrants found in the poorest of health had already been left behind, and so they were alone and sometimes lost.

The decisions volunteers made about how best to assist migrants had life and death consequences. In conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty, the perceivable limits of these actions were open to debate and conditioned by the threat of criminalization. In one episode during my fieldwork, a cadre of volunteers encountered a group of about thirty migrants in the desert. One was clearly struggling and exhausted. As volunteers offered aid to the group, a paramedic checked the individual's vitals to find that his respiratory rate was persistently high, even after he immediately fell asleep while the group took a rest. Clearly, he needed fluids, but the paramedic was not legally permitted to provide them. On the heels of Sellz and Strauss's arrests, volunteers were advised not to offer medical evacuations. The man insisted on moving on. As he trailed further behind his group, volunteers were left with the worry that his health would continue to deteriorate. There remained a quandary about whether something more should have been done to protect his life. As the ambiguous situation was debated later that night at NMD's camp, some believed that the group had done everything possible within legal parameters, particularly in the wake of the recent arrests. Others suggested that, with the moral duty to save lives, volunteers should never leave a risky situation in such ambiguity. Perhaps, it was debated, the group should reininitiate medical evacuations.

This example demonstrates how understandings of what is possible and impossible—like the opaque, subjectively imagined and determined borders of legality—were open to negotiation, adaptation, and change. It also exemplifies the exceptionality of the space of the border. In any other location, would it not be the legal and moral obligation of any bystander to see that he receives necessary medical attention? As a space of exception, the border becomes a laboratory in which the value and dignity of human life gets tested and redefined. Debates about the merited rights and the economic and human value of immigrants in society at large play out in this life-threatening terrain, at the expense of individuals and populations whose lives are considered expendable in public imaginations.
HUMANITARIAN AID, CRIMINALIZATION, AND THE SHIFTING POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION

The contentious and politicized actions of NMD and the BP are mediated by the shifting legal-political dynamics and discourses that surround a deepening anti-immigrant U.S. political agenda. The recent charges brought against Scott Warren and other NMD volunteers coincide with the arrests of a host of others across the U.S. who have advocated on behalf of unauthorized migrants. Arizona has experimented with a series of hardline immigration enforcement measures, such as SB 1070, which civil rights advocates warn could lead to racial profiling against immigrants. In spite of the link between an escalating anti-immigrant climate in the U.S. and efforts to criminalize the activities of humanitarian aid providers at the border, the charges against NMD volunteers have led to increased support base for NMD, including a substantial legal aid fund.

At the border, the arrests of volunteers and the videos of BP agents dumping out water jugs do the powerful symbolic work of shaming adversaries and sending messages that challenge the broader public to consider whether unauthorized migrants deserve sympathy and support, or at the least, survival. Are such actions to deter people from sympathizing and offering humanitarian aid to migrants intended to be in line with the kind of symbolic and punitive effects of other deterrence strategies that the U.S. government has experimented with, such as allowing environmental hazards to stand in the way of migrant survival, enforcing the separation of migrant families at the border, or holding migrants in cold and fenced-in rooms in detention? The limits of legality—what is allowable by law and what is not—will continue to be struggled over at the exceptional and in-between space of the border. While these limits may never be defined, the effects of deterrence will continue to get mapped onto the bodies of migrants in the form of routine harm.

ENDNOTES

1 I conducted ethnographic fieldwork by accompanying NMD volunteers during aid distribution on the migrant trail, at NMD basecamp, and in Nogales, Mexico, for durations of one to two weeks each during three research visits to the border region between 2007 and 2010. In sum, ethnographic interviews and participant-observation were carried out among more than 30 volunteers, including NMD leadership. Field research was funded by UNC-Chapel Hill.

2 As Jason de Leon (2015) suggests, the border security assemblage involves a combination of human-made and natural elements. The routine and perceivably normalized physical trauma it inflicts upon migrants gets framed by the U.S. government as an unintentional consequence of this environmental/human-made security apparatus (Jusionyte 2018).

3 These explanations of NMD’s position were drawn from my communications with NMD volunteer leadership during fieldwork in July 2007.

4 As argued in research by Cook (2011) and Rose (2012), both BP and NMD attempt to wield law and redefine legality in different ways. While NMD appeals to a “higher” or “moral” law to make claims about the legality of its work, the BP relies on an authoritative, technical version of the law to be able to frame provisions of humanitarian aid as illegal.
REFERENCES
This essay is based on my participation since 2005 as an ally supporting the Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition (TIRRC) and groups in Knoxville, which has included attending meetings, assisting immigrants, doing outreach, helping organize marches and vigils, and lobbying public officials. TIRRC was founded in 2001 following a successful campaign to pass a state law permitting people who could not present a Social Security card to obtain a driver’s license. In 2007 the state withdrew that permission. Since 2002 approximately twenty anti-immigrant laws have passed in Tennessee, a trend being repeated in other states. This apparently has been orchestrated through the American Legislative Economic Council with the goal of making the lives of immigrants so miserable they will self-deport. Immigrant rights advocates have countered: “aquí estamos, y no nos vamos,” or “we are here, and we aren’t leaving.” As this essay describes, since 2001 immigrant rights groups in Tennessee have contested anti-immigrant and/or anti-Mexican/Latino policies and discourse and have promoted alternatives that acknowledge the contributions of unauthorized immigrants and enable them to regularize their status. In 2005 I felt compelled to support these efforts through activism. If misinformation and racist stereotypes seemed to be driving policymaking then, it has become even more urgent for anthropologists to use their research and writing skills to offer alternatives to the proposals being generated by the Trump administration and the well-funded anti-migrant bloc supplying them with ideas (Gonzales 2014).

Over time, a shift occurred in internal enforcement directed at unauthorized immigrants: from high-profile raids of employers under the Bush administration to individual detentions under the Obama administration. We witnessed and responded to the effects of this shift in Tennessee. The groundwork for the shift can be traced back to federal reforms in 1986 and 1996 that did not address the need for future migration of “unskilled” workers (Massey and Sánchez R. 2008). After 9/11, lawmakers increased “security” at the border and internally. The 2005 Real ID Act and circulation of anti-immigrant proposals prompted state legislatures (including Tennessee) to restrict access to drivers’ licenses. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) has a 287(g) clause that encourages state and local police to collaborate with federal immigration enforcement. Under 287(g) programs, patrol and/or jail officials are trained and deputized as immigration enforcement agents. States and counties pay the salaries. Participation is voluntary. After 2001, some states and counties began enrolling. By 2008 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) also instituted “Secure Communities,” which asked enrolled county jails to run fingerprints through FBI and ICE data bases, and ICE would decide whether to hold an arrestee (Conley 2013:64-69,72-79). All this meant that unauthorized immigrants (many of whom had been living and/or working in the United States for years) could be stopped for traffic violations and arrested...
for driving without a license (a misdemeanor) or arrested for other crimes and be placed in deportation proceedings.

Under the Trump administration ICE has hired more agents for internal enforcement, invited county sheriffs to enroll in 287(g), and conducted workplace and other raids. One raid took place in April 2018 in a meat-packing plant near Knoxville. The anguish of family members reminded me of what we saw in Chattanooga in 2008 after a raid at a chicken processing plant. Back then only three of over one hundred people detained obtained relief from deportation. Several people in the recent raid are fighting their deportations.

**STATE-LEVEL IMMIGRATION POLICIES EMERGING IN “NEW DESTINATIONS” LIKE TENNESSEE**

Since the mid-1980s, immigrants have been moving to Tennessee and now comprise about 5 percent of the population. In 2012, an estimated 130,000 were unauthorized, comprising 2% of the population and 2.8% of the labor force; about 59% having migrated from Mexico (Migration Policy Institute 2015, Pew Hispanic Research Center 2016). Knoxville has immigrants from Mexico, Central and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

In 2005-2007, Congress considered reforms that would have created more felony charges for unauthorized immigrants and people who aided them. Immigrant rights groups organized protests, and thousands turned out around the country, including in Nashville and Knoxville, Tennessee. Sustaining the momenta of the marches was difficult, but activists continued to foster organizing among immigrants (Conley 2013, Gonzales 2014).

During the early 2000s some states passed inclusionary policies, but exclusionary proposals escalated in 2006. In Tennessee there were 20 anti-immigrant proposals in 2006, 44 in 2007, 66 in 2008, 35 in 2009, and about 40 in 2011 and 2012. TIRRC’s lobbying efforts helped prevent some from passing and provided language to lessen the negative effects of some bills. From 2002 to 2012, the legislature passed 17 exclusionary bills. None passed from 2013 to 2015. By 2016 more exclusions were being considered. In 2018 the legislature voted to oblige state and local law enforcement to collaborate with ICE.

Several states passed omnibus immigration acts, including Georgia (2006 and 2011), Arizona (2010), Alabama, South Carolina, Utah, and Indiana (2011). Tennessee’s proposed acts in 2008 and 2011 did not pass due to fiscal notes, but legislators introduced elements of these acts as separate bills. Some were anti-Muslim and anti-refugee. Others restricted services, reiterated federal laws but added state fines, required employers to use E-Verify (which is voluntary under IIRIRA), authorized state troopers to be trained as ICE agents, and eliminated access to licenses (Pendry 2011, Conley 2013, TIRRC 2012, 2015, 2018).

**IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CAMPAIGNS**

In response to these trends, groups such as the National Day Laborers began campaigns to end deportations: “Ni una más, not one more” and “Stop separating families.” Immigrants and allies in Tennessee held vigils, created online petitions, and visited ICE officials to ask them to use their discretion not to deport specific individuals. Immigrants
and their families told their stories, posted family photos, and stressed their family life and contributions. Not everyone obtained relief from deportation, but several did, and people learned how to defend their rights. Groups in Tennessee also help immigrants obtain legal assistance and raise funds to appeal deportations.

The sheriff in Nashville participated in 287(g) from 2007 to 2012. He apparently thought it would generate revenue, but 287(g) only covers the training and a few computers. The county paid officials’ salaries, and ICE did not reimburse for detention prior to the ICE hold, and rapidly moved immigrants to other facilities. During those five years, over 10,000 people were placed in deportation proceedings. An estimated 85 percent were detained for misdemeanors, such as driving without a license (ACLU 2012:6).

TIRRC organized protests and documented abuses. Juana Villegas was nine months pregnant when she was jailed for a traffic violation and driving without a license. She went into labor. At the county hospital they kept her shackled to the bed until right before the baby was born. She was not allowed to see her husband and did not know who picked up the child, because county officials immediately took her back to jail, where she experienced breast milk complications. Lawyers sued and won a large settlement, and Juana obtained a U-Visa, which entitled her to apply for permanent residence.

In 2012 after activists had demonstrated abuses associated with several 287(g) programs, ICE announced they were considering signing new agreements with Knox County, Tennessee and Horry County, South Carolina. Immigrants and allies in Knoxville repeatedly requested meetings with our sheriff, but he never met with us. We delivered petitions and cupcakes to his office and organized protests. The county mayor said he had no control over the sheriff. County commissioners determine his total budget, but not how he spends it. Nevertheless, we provided data about the problems and costs in other counties. We organized events to inform the public. Juana Villegas and others came to Knoxville to give testimonies. We sent letters to the editor, wrote to ICE asking them to withdraw, and made Freedom of Information requests for records.

In 2013 the “Undocubus” filled with immigrants organized by the National Day Laborers journeyed throughout the South. In Knoxville, the Undocubus riders and local immigrants and allies accompanied four people who sat on a banner in an intersection, pumping fists in the air and chanting “no papers, no fear” and “no to 287(g)”. They were arrested after 15 minutes. Lawyers were ready to help get them released. We held a rally and march downtown, contacted the press, and posted photographs and videos on the Internet.

In July 2013 the sheriff was not moved when over 200 community members at a public hearing expressed concerns about 287(g) and racial profiling. In August he received a letter from ICE explaining, that due to sequestering of federal funding, no new 287(g) programs would be initiated. He publicly responded that with or without their help, he was planning “to stack up violators in his jail like cordwood.” The next day we rallied to stack up cordwood and people outside his office.

However, after Donald Trump took office in January 2017, by February ICE had invited our sheriff and 17 other sheriffs to enroll in 287(g). By May our sheriff had signed the agreement, and by September thirteen jail officials had been trained. We had to submit information requests to learn about this and are continuing to monitor the effects.

In addition to operating in a defensive mode, immigrants and allies in Tennessee advocated for federal immigration reform, the DREAM [Development, Relief and Education
for Alien Minors] Act, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and the DACA extension and Deferred Action for Parental Authority. In 2012 we started lobbying for in-state college tuition. In 2015, a bill passed in committees and the Senate. The House voted 49 yes, 47 no, 3 absent, but it needed 50 votes to become law. Several Republicans voted for this bill, but in the wake of Trump’s presidential campaign, it was not put up for vote in 2016. Advocates continued to work on this in 2017 and 2018.

CONCLUSIONS

These campaigns lifted up immigrant stories to counter anti-immigrant discourse and policies and promote inclusionary policies. I have heard some politicians in Tennessee respond negatively to immigrants, some are polite but non-committal, others have been moved, and some express open support. Anthropologists have highlighted immigrant stories in ethnographies that are accessible to general audiences, and as happened to me, many have engaged in activism. When doing outreach to non-immigrant community groups, I have learned that even people who are inclined to support immigrants do not know much about the history of immigration laws or how the current system has operated. Freedom of Information requests provide data and remind officials that researchers and other members of the public are paying attention to their practices. Anthropologists have written and continue to write letters to the editor, white papers for policy makers, and blogs and other social media posts that reach broader audiences. We need to continue to share ideas about what more can be done to promote social justice and human dignity.

REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

Refugee resettlement in the United States is often treated as a “pull yourself up by the bootstraps” situation. The current system provides on average (which varies from state to state) three months of monetary support towards rent to a resettling person or family, basic job placement services, and a brief cultural orientation upon arrival. It is expected that within this time, resettling refugees will master the language, earn enough money to fully support themselves and their families, and begin to pay back the State Department for the plane ticket(s) purchased for their trip to the U.S. (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2012). With such heavy emphasis on economic integration and self-sufficiency, personal well-being, and fluency in the language, the building of social connections and capital and emotional support are not always fostered by existing resettlement mechanisms.

Refugees require more than economic assistance. Emotional support sustains refugees through the trying conditions of resettlement (Simich 2003, 575). Without emotional support, refugees have struggled to integrate into the economy and find work (Lanphier 1983, 10-15; Simich 2003, 577). Refugees participating in U.S. resettlement programs report feeling they lack the emotional support and social connections needed to ease their transition (Simich et al. 2003; Simich 2003, 586-589). Social capital, the ability of a person to make interpersonal connections and access resources, as well as the existence of friendships and support systems, has been proven to be extremely important to the sustained success of resettled refugees. For resettling refugees, friendships can provide access to resources that the current, formal resettlement institutions and systems do not. The social capital and emotional stability found in a friendship can be, and based on my research with the Integrated Refugee and Immigrant Services (IRIS) often is, integral to the adaptation process.

METHODOLOGY

This case study of IRIS used participant observation and qualitative semi-structured interviews that engaged refugees about their resettlement experiences, specifically looking at their friendships and the support systems designed by past refugees, local community members, and IRIS staff in New Haven, CT. These aided in forming a new community for the resettling individual. IRIS is a comprehensive resettlement agency. Clients (refugees) are offered youth care, cultural competency classes, community orientation, English classes, and job placement services (IRIS 2017). All auxiliary programs—those outside the federally funded job placement, health, and rent assistance—are funded through private donations and grants (IRIS 2017).

For three months in 2017, I worked as an intern providing services to resettling
individuals. I interviewed 21 resettling people, ranging in age from 18 to 65. Participants relocated from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Syria, Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, Tanzania, and Jordan. Interviewees were prompted to share their experiences in resettling, with secondary questions asking them to elaborate on their evaluations of the existing systems. I present their perspectives on friendships and social capital below.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF FRIENDSHIPS**

“Forever,” Hilla responded to her friend Nawal. It was a ritualized response, a verbal celebration of their friendship: “Be careful with the friend, the friend is not for the month or the year, it’s forever.” This affirmation came after a long interview, in which they detailed their deep bond. It was a sentiment I heard repeated many times among the women and men who visited IRIS as part of their resettlement process in New Haven.

Interviewees often cited their friendships as essential to their integration and overwhelmingly supported the existing consensus of the importance of social capital. Every person interviewed mentioned the emotional support of their families and friends as essential to their current well-being. Participants commonly spoke of wanting easier access to English classes, more rent assistance, and more time to learn English to find a better job and to be able to interact with the community. Four interviewees cited forming friendships as a marker of success. Seventeen considered their friends to be the reason they were able to find a better job.

Women were especially likely to report friendship as important to their resettlement process without prompting. Men were more likely to cite as helpful the systematic assistance IRIS provides and the informally organized groups of refugees that assist newcomers, and would speak of the kindness and acts of service done for them by other resettling refugees. The interviewees complimented IRIS staff, using the words “friend” or “help me out” or “I can count on them” close to 40 times. It may be because IRIS has such a developed network of support, or because New Haven had just the right confluence of money, liberalism, and determination, that the communities there are working for the people in conjunction with the existing government funded program, to in some way overcome its shortcomings.

For Hilla and Nawal, friendship provided the power of emotional support, and kinship. Nawal’s husband and children would notice a change in her mood if a day went by that she didn’t get to see Hilla. Hilla provided stability in her life, a reason to continue and press on even when things became difficult. Hilla resettled in New Haven from Iraq, where she says she had friends and family around her at all times. The move here left her feeling isolated and longing for the comfort of friendship. Nawal, Hilla says, “will never judge. To Nawal I can say whatever I truly feel and know she will understand. It is so important to me that I can trust her. I can tell her things I cannot even say to my husband, to my family.” The confidence and emotional support Nawal and Hilla provided each other gave them strength and resilience.

Another pair of friends, Ahmad and Rufus, found working together during their initial resettlement period beneficial. When asked to interview, Ahmad responded that Rufus would like to be interviewed, too. Just a few days earlier he’d asked if I could schedule his wife’s English class with Rufus’ wife. He states, “She wants only to go with her, she is scared to go alone and wants her friend.” This pair of couples participated in their initial cultural orientation together. During their interviews, both told me of how the other
had skills that they shared with them, and how they had pushed each other to apply for higher paying jobs and to find English programs for their wives.

Many of the clients who immigrated through an SIV (Special Immigrant Visa) from Afghanistan created a comprehensive network of support led by several middle-aged men who had resettled with their families several years ago. The network of SIVs worked to place people in better paying jobs, provide transportation, driving lessons, and more. During our interview, Ibrar received a call from a newly resettling man who needed assistance getting transport to a job interview. Ibrar knew exactly who to call. Their system was reliable and well maintained.

Ibrar said he wanted to help as many people as he could find jobs that matched their qualifications. Many newly resettled refugees are placed in jobs such as factory work or hotel services, which fulfill the requirement of having a job, but do not always provide adequate compensation to support a family, or ample opportunity for advancement. Resettling means starting over in the United States, and Ibrar is still not doing the kind of work he was when he left his home country. His goal is to help those he can to find better jobs in the U.S.

While some refugees found their resilience in friendships with other resettling people, others found solace in the members of their resettled community. IRIS works to establish refugees as a part of their community by encouraging “host” families or “sponsorship” from larger community organizations and churches. IRIS also offers sports, art/sewing lessons, community dinners, and cultural companions, a program that pairs refugees with a local to build connections and practice English, as well as provide companionship. Of the twelve refugees I interviewed who participated in the cultural companion program, each mentioned and praised the program, without prompting, for providing them with support and friendship. Having even just one initial connection in the community allows refugees a better understanding of the culture, as well as an “in” to forming more social connections with their community (Lanphier 1983, 10; Simich 2003, 586-589).

Michael, who resettled in the United States from the Democratic Republic of Congo, spoke often of how the Cultural Companion program helped him feel more comfortable in his new setting. He spoke of how his Cultural Companion helped him find a better job for his wife, and how IRIS’s educational programs had helped his children feel secure. He also told me about his friend he met at an outdoor community festival. She was a woman slightly older than him. She was the person who took him to the hospital when he was injured; she helped his family. She and Michael were like-minded; he said, “she is one of the reasons I am able to always be smiling for my children, she has given me strength.” For Michael, his friend provided a service IRIS couldn’t possibly provide to each of its clients. It is through friendships that resettling people and families in New Haven are able to thrive. While IRIS, as a resettlement agency, provides the structure needed early on in resettlement, it is the sustained friendships that make a newly settled community feel like home.

CONCLUSION

Friendships are necessary in all contexts, but during resettlement—when an individual or family has been separated from their home, their network, their friends left behind—having a new friend can feel revolutionary. It can feel like freedom, like security.
We see friendship providing people with the power of establishment, of connections, of love.

The resiliency found in friendships is not a solution to an underdeveloped system, but it is currently a successful coping mechanism. From taking each other to the hospital, to advocating for friends in housing situations, to friendships being a primary method for learning English, these friendships were providing support and opportunities that could have been provided from the beginning, from their resettlement agency. Instead of forcing our friendships to do the labor of providing access to better jobs, to transport, and to emotional well-being, we could aspire to designing our resettlement programs to provide the time and setting necessary for a full adjustment and integration.

REFERENCES


Countries in the global North have been closing their borders to people fleeing ongoing wars, famine, and other human rights abuse. A change in immigration policy that is based on national isolation is considered inhumane and dangerous by migrants and their advocates (Matthews 2008). Humanitarian agencies and people in the helping professions are scrambling to reverse isolationist narratives in the receiving communities. The refugees, for their part, are coming up with new strategies for self-advocacy that take into consideration not only their vulnerability but also their creative ingenuity, resiliency, and perseverance as full contributing members, to the betterment of life in their host communities.

Using Gergen’s social constructivist theoretical framework, in-depth interviews, and participant observation, I collected and analyzed data for an ongoing oral history research project on refugees that asked the question, “What does it mean to be a refugee at a time of rising neonationalism in America?” Using a snowball sampling method, 40 men and women from different refugee communities and their service providers from refugee-serving agencies were recruited for interviews. Participants consisted of refugees who have been in the United States for more than eight months and refugee service providers willing to be interviewed on camera.

Several intriguing themes emerged in my ongoing refugee research project. I focus here on one, that of refugee self-advocacy. Thus, in highlighting this new phenomenon of refugee self-advocacy, this paper unveils the resistance that is manifesting itself in refugee communities in the United States. As reflected in the discussion and in case studies below, young immigrants and refugees are taking a stand, speaking for themselves, and resisting the rise in the discourse of exclusion and marginalization caused by neonationalism. They are building coalitions through the power of social media, and their civic engagement is on the rise. As a significant new strategy for addressing the refugee issue, it is essential that the refugees’ contributions to their new community be acknowledged in the country of final resettlement.

**THE NEW PHENOMENON**

A new phenomenon is taking shape in the United States amidst rising neoliberalism and neonationalism: refugee self-advocacy and the call for cultural pluralism. For many years, refugees have been seen as more of a problem than an asset; however, currently their voices now are clamoring for recognition of the positive impact they have had on the communities in which they live. Refugees have woken up to the injustices and unfairness of their situation.

A feasible option for addressing the refugee issue has been using advocacy to influence government's resettlement policies for refugees. In the Cold War era, refugee
advocates were able to gain support for refugee resettlement when those seeking refuge could be identified as freedom fighters, with political aspirations mirroring those of the West. However, for the last 30 years, this image has been replaced by that of destitute women and children, a burden to the public welfare system (Pupavac, 2008). The new image does not appeal to the Western political apparatus and thus the plight of refugees falls on deaf ears. Peters (2017) explained how the strong business lobby of the 1950s that advocated for an increase in the number of immigrants had almost become silent by 2010 because of globalization and automation. For many industries today there is no longer any interest in importing workers.

Refugee reliance on service providers for advocacy purposes represents a double-edged sword. Advocates craft a message that paints refugees as a vulnerable group that have fallen on hard times through no fault of their own and in need of the world’s sympathy; yet this casts refugees as monolithic, denying their true complex individuality (Cabot, 2016). The irony of realizing that the same people who want to give a voice to the refugees could also end up taking that voice away is what makes the new phenomenon of refugee self-advocacy worth considering. For example, some refugees object to having their children placed in special classes for students whose English is not the native language of the parents. They argue that their children can learn English fast enough to warrant placement in mainstream English classes with other American children. In this case, the advocacy of the service providers does not correspond to the desires of their refugee clients.

It has become necessary that refugees espouse a new strategy for advocacy: one that presents the group as an economic and political asset because of their voting power and financial contribution to the economy of their host country (Colorado Office of Economic Security 2018). Instead of being viewed solely as the downtrodden in need of aid, refugees are now forming coalitions, building partnerships to assert their role as valid partners, and contributing members of society. One notable self-advocacy coalition is the Refugee Congress, consisting of refugees, asylees, asylum seekers, and stateless people. Created in 2011 to serve in an advocacy and advisory role for refugees and with refugees, it aimed at creating a safe and successful resettlement experience. The Refugee Congress works in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and has the backing of several nonprofit organizations that support refugees. The partnership serves to elevate the voice and the visibility of refugees beyond resettlement. As a result, refugee leaders and members of the Refugee Congress have moved from being dependents to becoming partners. They are no longer spoken about, but spoken to. They are taking the opportunity to assert themselves.

Some of the gains related to refugee self-advocacy from the last several years include the creation of platforms where refugee communities and advocates can share views, problem solve, and lend strength to each other. These platforms highlight the talents and expertise from different refugee groups and individuals. They provide opportunities for the host communities to interact with refugees as fellow residents of the same communities. Moreover, refugees have taken on the role of aiding and advocating for other refugees. Throughout the country, refugees are framing the narrative about their lives and their contribution to society. Many former refugees are involved in service to other refugees as entrepreneurs, mental health clinicians, case managers, and heads of refugee-serving agencies, business owners, and goodwill ambassadors. Some are traveling to
refugee camps to provide services as part of humanitarian relief teams. This new phenomenon, which adds a new dimension to the refugee identity, is certainly worth highlighting. Refugees are taking an assertive stance to speak for themselves. Reflecting on refugee self-advocacy, they are adopting a strategy of interest targeting to attract more allies. These include refugees who are educators, lawyers, musicians, poets, and working mothers. Refugees are using their multilingual skills in spoken word expression and creating art to make their presence known. There are numerous examples of this. Refugee experiences have inspired poetry, and artists who are refugees have painted murals on airport walls and other public buildings. Moreover, refugees who are mental health practitioners are joining other care providers in presenting on issues related to refugees at conferences. It is important that others take notice of this new strength and build on it for a more just and inclusive society.

FIRST-HAND DATA FROM THE PROJECT’S FINDINGS

The following participant profiles, based on project interviews, bring to life some of the work done by refugees, using their own strategies for self-advocacy. The names of the participants have been altered in the interest of privacy and confidentiality.

BINTU

Bintu is a young woman from Africa who came to this country 10 years ago. She fled her country of origin following the massacre of her family and friends, ending up in the United States as a refugee. Alone, afraid, and uncertain of what the future would bring, she had taken the journey leaving behind her four children. The desire and determination to provide for her children motivated her to take advantage of the new life she had been given. She worked in menial jobs like most of newly resettled refugees but soon decided to be her own boss and became a cab driver. A few years ago, she quit cab driving to become the sole owner of a grocery store that catered to the large African immigrant community in a neighborhood that had become their home away from home. Bintu’s store has become a gathering place for women, men, and children who long for a role model and a way to connect to others in the community. In addition to attracting new customers to her business, Bintu is intent on strengthening the community where she lives by initiating a mutual assistance group, using the social media “WhatsApp.” It is through the messages posted on the WhatsApp group page that community members can learn about the well-being of other people. Recently Bintu and her friends created a shelter for battered Muslim women, as well as a “GoFundMe” movement to assist people in need, especially those who fall ill and need medical assistance or need to visit relatives who were not resettled together.

Bintu and her friends are refugees who have decided to create their own infrastructure in response to the growing marginalization by a political system that has become increasingly nationalistic and reminiscent of authoritarian and oppressive regimes of the countries they have fled. Building an economic power and social capital through their coalition ensures the future of their community and that of their children. It is also the best self-advocacy tool they can use to influence policies that impact their lives.
RANIA

Rania was born in Iran and was brought to the United States by her parents when she was 15 years old. At a very young age, without fully understanding the world of the adults, Rania knew that Iran was not a safe place for her and people of the Baha’i faith, like her parents. She was required to wear a veil any time she stepped out of the home and was not allowed to get an education past the primary school, which was considered a criminal offense if one was Baha’i. For Rania, being a refugee means “being unwanted in Iran because [I am] Bahai and being unwanted in the U.S because [I am] Iranian.” Rania’s deeply unsettling realization of her predicament did not stop her from making a name for herself as a community advocate who heads the “Education is Not a Crime” initiative. Additionally, her photography project has been on display at a major airport for quite some time.

GHARY

Ghary and his family fled Iraq to seek asylum in nearby Jordan; but not being allowed to stay, he applied and was granted resettlement in the United States. The first week after arrival, he was confronted with anti-Muslim protests in the middle of a major city. Upon seeing signs that read “Refugee go home”, he reflected, “How can we go home when we have just arrived?” He asked his American friend if the protests were frequent, to which the friend responded, “It happens. I am sorry.” Ghary went on to work first with a refugee-serving agency and later created a nonprofit organization with other like-minded friends. Ghary is now a motivational speaker who not only speaks out on behalf of refugees but also trains other refugees to know their rights and use their voices to emphasize their many contributions to their new home country.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HELPING PROFESSIONS

The three profiles described above are not isolated cases. Refugees all across the country have been mobilizing, in partnership with allies in the refugee-serving communities and others. They still participate in mass-letter-writing campaigns addressed to policy makers and frequently agree to be the refugee at fundraising events for refugee causes. However, what is new and encouraging is that refugees are re-interpreting in their own way what advocacy should look like. They are also creating their own infrastructure and networks to respond to the needs of their communities. There are numerous cases of former refugees as city mayors and congressional representatives or as journalists and business owners. Refugees are taking a stand to prove that they are indeed Americans, with all the responsibilities and privileges that come with their new identities. In the interest of cultural humility, refugee service agencies and the helping professions must be open to accepting this reality and integrating it in the way they design new programs and strategies for advocacy.
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NICARAGUAN MISKITUS AND CHANGES IN U.S. POLITICS

Melesio Peter Espinoza

Immigration policies have been debated in the United States for the last thirty years but have become more significant with Donald Trump’s rhetoric of zero tolerance towards undocumented migrants. This essay focuses on analyzing how Miskitu migrants in Port Arthur, Texas experienced changes in migration policies from 1980 to 2004, and also will discuss developments since then.

Miskitu migration from Nicaragua to the United States was significant during the 1980s, due to the war with the Sandinista government, when Miskitus were claiming their historical rights to autonomy. Approximately 20,000 Miskitus abandoned their communities. Most fled to Honduras and Costa Rica as refugees, and the rest emigrated to different countries, principally to the U.S. as undocumented migrants traveling through Guatemala and Mexico. When Miskitus arrived, they were given asylum because the U.S. government viewed them as fleeing the political persecution of a communist regime. That privilege ended up being temporary. When Violeta Chamorro defeated the Sandinista government in 1990, the special attention given to Miskitus collapsed.

During the post-war period Nicaraguans began to live in peace but were dealing with the economic crisis left by the war. People were experiencing growing insecurity, narco-trafficker violence, and natural disasters such as Hurricane Mitch in 1998. Consequently, Miskitu migration to Port Arthur continued. In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the U.S. pressured the Mexican government to help control migration from Central America, and Mexican authorities intensified surveillance of their southern border, deporting Central Americans before they ever arrived in the U.S. Despite these controls, it was during the 1990s that the majority of Miskitus entered the U.S. Many were undocumented, and coyotes raised their prices. After the attack on September 11, 2001, surveillance increased, and the costs of migrating rose so much that it became difficult to help relatives or friends migrate. Hence the number of migrants going to the U.S. began to decline. More recently Miskitus have been migrating instead to destinations such as Costa Rica, Panama, and Spain. Currently, an estimated, 5-6,000 Miskitus live in the United States, a principal destination being Florida, where they live in several cities. Smaller numbers live in other states.

My research began in July 2004, with six months of intensive participant observation in Port Arthur, followed by periodic visits and phone calls through 2018. In 2005 I conducted a census of Miskitus in Port Arthur and gathered demographic information concerning 320 residents. One community leader estimated there were 100-200 more Miskitus living in Port Arthur. By that time Miskitus constituted a visible ethnic enclave.
NEW LIFE IN PORT ARTHUR

Port Arthur had 53,818 residents in 2010. Historically it was predominantly white and African American, however, from the mid-1970s on, Port Arthur began receiving immigrants: first, Vietnamese refugees, then Miskitus, and later Latino immigrants including Mexicans and Central Americans. Port Arthur was becoming multicultural. Migration was not new for Miskitus. Before the war men migrated within Nicaragua to work in fishing, mining, and the lumber industry. During the war migration shifted to urban areas and abroad. In my census in Port Arthur, I talked to the heads of 47 families, representing about 320 people. 25 families arrived in the 1980s and the rest (and likely most of the families I was unable to survey) migrated in the postwar years. Eight families confirmed they arrived with a tourist visa, while the rest arrived without visas. Miskitus describe the latter as munhtak buswi balri (“I arrived as a wetback from the west,” the location of the border relative to Port Arthur). Miskitus quickly adapted to their new environment. They established their own Moravian church. Men began working in fishing and later as welders in the petroleum industry, while women typically worked in elder care and hotel housekeeping.

The journey to the U.S. included travelling to Guatemala and obtaining a coyote there who guided them through Mexico to enter the U.S. According to my interviewees, at the beginning of the 1980s there was not much surveillance on the road or at the borders, but the migration of people displaced by the conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala was just beginning. If the border patrol picked them up after they crossed the river they would declare, “yang miskitu” (I am Miskitu), and were classified as being exempt from deportation. Officials would analyze their case and require them to confirm their identity by showing they could speak the language. The Border Patrol called Miskitu interpreters (retired Moravian missionaries who had worked in Nicaragua) to speak with the immigrants by telephone. After their identity was verified, the officials granted Miskitus permission to remain in the country and continue their journey to Port Arthur or other places.

Several Miskitus related having experiences like the one I recorded in 2004 in Port Arthur:

“I arrived in Port Arthur in 1983. I crossed the Guatemala border with no problem. I took a bus to Mexico City. There I took another bus to Brownsville. The same, I crossed with no problems. When I stepped into North American territory, la migra grabbed me. They took me to their office. They treated me well when I told them that I was Miskitu. In the office the official dialed a number on the phone and told me: ‘Someone is going to speak to you.’ He asked me in Miskitu, ‘What is your name? What community are you from?’ Later he translated everything to the official in English. Then the official gave me my permission and took me to the bus terminal.”

SUBSEQUENT CHALLENGES

The U.S. government favored Miskitu refugees by granting permission to remain in the country, although without benefits such as the right to work. To apply for asylum and the work permit, officials told them they had to wait until the migration office called them, with no guarantee of when; it could take as long as 6 months to 2 years. Without a work
permit it was difficult to find a job and the United States was experiencing an economic recession. Initially many Miskitus were unable to find permanent jobs. Instead they did temporary work in shrimp fishing, and in extreme cases, relied on artisanal fishing in the river and gulf for family consumption. In Florida there was more support for Nicaraguan immigrants, which was coordinated by mestizos from the Pacific, with the help of Cuban Americans and social service and church organizations. This enabled Nicaraguans, including Miskitus, to obtain asylum and work permits. Some Miskitus in Port Arthur found out about this, and as one put it: “Ten of us men travelled to Miami seeking work permits.” They told me “Thank God” they obtained the work permits. They returned to Port Arthur and two weeks later received the work permits, which cost $150.

A small group benefited from the amnesty that was part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (See Mahler 1995:10; Hagan 1994). To qualify, people had to prove they had entered the country before January 1, 1982. Those who qualified were offered lawful permanent residency. About two thirds of the 5 million undocumented immigrants at that time managed to qualify. Only a few Miskitus qualified, because most had arrived after 1983.

“THERE IS NO WAR IN YOUR COUNTRY”

In the 1990s, the Miskitus in Port Arthur knew their special treatment had ended. They warned others who wanted to come to the U.S. about the risks of being caught and of living in Port Arthur as an undocumented immigrant. One of these immigrants described his trip:

“My cousin paid for my trip. I left my country in 1991. The way here, very difficult. Crossing Mexico, three hard weeks. We finally crossed at Brownsville. Thank God we entered without problems. My cousin took me to Houston to see a lawyer, and he told us that there were no options for me other than to remain undocumented. I said, ‘Well, what can you do?’ Besides, at that time there was not much persecution by ICE in Port Arthur. With NACARA [Law of Adjustment for Nicaraguans and Relief for Central Americans] they gave me a green card and now I am a citizen.”

NACARA was passed in 1997, and through 2000 when it expired, opened the door to obtaining a green card and citizenship. A requirement was that beneficiaries must have arrived in the U.S. before December 1995. Miskitus who entered during that time were able to adjust their status, while other Miskitus remained undocumented. Towards the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, Port Arthur stopped being an isolated safe refuge for Miskitus. More Latino migrants were arriving and, since 2001, it has become common for ICE to pursue immigrants. One case mentioned by several Miskitus was a young single mother, who migrated undocumented in 1990. Her mother, who had become a citizen, was trying to petition for her daughter. However, when the young woman went to the ICE office to enquire about her case, the officials detained her and deported her to Nicaragua.

Following Hurricane Mitch in 1998 in Nicaragua and Honduras, the U.S. government granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to about 2,500 Nicaraguans. TPS is granted when there are safety risks. To qualify Nicaraguans had to have lived in the U.S. continuously since December 30, 1998. This benefited some Miskitus in Texas and other states. In Port Arthur, about 30 families were granted TPS. Some changed their status to
permanent resident through a spouse or another relative, but others continued under TPS. In 2017 the Trump administration announced that TPS for Nicaraguans would be cancelled because there was no longer any danger there, and they would be given a 12-month extension from January 2018 to January 2019.

This has provoked desperation among those affected. Undocumented Miskitus are also nervous. Some have paid thousands of dollars to lawyers to stop their deportations but have not had a response. Others who feel they have no options are just waiting. Nevertheless, harmony among Miskitus remains firm. Just as this news broke out, Nicaragua again has drawn the world’s attention after its people began to protest against the dictatorship of Daniel Ortega and his wife. Protests have called for a free and democratic Nicaragua. The price for these protests has been death, persecution, jail, and forced migration. However, for the aforementioned reasons, Costa Rica rather than the United States has been the principal destination. On July 29, 2018, eight senators sent a letter to President Trump asking him to reconsider renewing TPS for Nicaraguans. At this writing their future is uncertain, as is the future of Miskitus and other migrants who are undocumented under the administration’s zero tolerance initiatives.

CONCLUSION

Several Miskitus affirmed: “Port Arthur is not the same as it was before, now la migra comes to look for people at work.” It is increasingly difficult to obtain work without papers. The first generation of Miskitu migrants benefited from being regarded as persecuted by communists, while those who migrated after 1990 had to struggle like other undocumented migrants. One group managed to become a lawful part of society through NACARA. Others started benefiting from TPS in 1998, but with President Trump’s announcement, unless something changes, they too will be added to the list of undocumented migrants. The senators’ letter has given them some hope. One Miskitu told me, referring to zero tolerance, that God does not forget about the poor. Miskitus also will continue the solidarity they have always practiced. This case study illustrates that, as Saskia Sassen (2003) asserted, “international migration is a function of the dynamics of geopolitical and economic systems.”

ENDNOTES

1 Translated by De Ann Pendry.
2 This is similar to benefits offered to Cubans and certain countries from the former Soviet Union.

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CAMBODIAN AMERICAN DEPORTABLE REFUGEES AND TRANSNATIONALISM

Jennifer A. Zelnick

INTRODUCTION

As of August 2018, 668 Cambodian American refugees with legal permanent residency (LPR) status have been deported from the United States to Cambodia, and advocates estimate over 2,000 more have received deportation orders, making them vulnerable for removal at any time (KVAO 2018). The U.S. government began deporting Cambodian Americans convicted of felonies and certain misdemeanors to Cambodia in 2002, resulting in the emergence of the category of individuals I term “deportable refugees.” These individuals arrived in the United States following war and genocide in Cambodia and Southeast Asia in the 1970s. As refugees, the United States granted these individuals LPR status. However, Cambodian Americans without U.S. citizenship remain vulnerable to deportation, calling into question the notion of permanence they believed they were afforded as LPRs. While simultaneously acknowledging the ways in which deportation harms and traumatizes individuals and families, in this essay I compare the stories of two Cambodian American deportable refugees to examine how deportation can, in some instances, enable individuals to participate in transnational, agentive movements and networks.

SOK

In the mid 1990s, Sok found himself alone in a parking lot, being attacked by two men with baseball bats. He was able to overpower the men and defend himself against their attempts to ambush him and steal his vehicle. When the police arrived, Sok assumed they would arrest his assailants. However, Sok was a refugee with LPR status holding two bats, and his attackers were U.S. citizens, lying disheveled on the ground. It was his word against theirs, and Sok was convicted of aggravated assault. Upon release from prison, Sok was informed that he would be deported to Cambodia, the country he and his family fled when he was a small child. Now in his late 40s, over fifteen years after his initial order of removal, Sok remains in deportation limbo, awaiting notice from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that he will be deported. Through regular, mandated check-ins, Sok’s movements are closely monitored by ICE.

THIDA

Thida grew up in Long Beach, California, having fled Cambodia with her family in the 1980s. As a young adult, she was convicted of credit card fraud, incarcerated, and then deported to Cambodia, leaving behind her family and the only country she remembered. Since her forcible removal from the United States, Thida has obtained a Cambodian passport, and now travels to countries throughout East and Southeast Asia to visit family and friends and to sightsee. For the first time in her life, Thida is theoretically able to visit any country that accepts Cambodians as visitors, and she can choose when and where she
moves. Of course, reality is much more complex. Thida was unable to visit the United States before her mother’s death, and has only been able to see her teenaged son once, when he visited Cambodia. Beyond her permanent ban from entering the United States, the visa application process to visit other countries – even with her Cambodian passport – proves arduous and sometimes disappointing. For example, Thida’s first application to travel outside Cambodia was delayed, likely because of her status as a deportee—one of the many questions about which visa applicants are routinely probed.

FROM REFUGEE TO DEPORTEE

Sok’s and Thida’s stories are just two examples of the ways in which Cambodian American deportable refugees’ movements are multiply restrained, restricted, and forced. Since June 2016, I have conducted research in Long Beach, California and Phnom Penh and Battambang, Cambodia, among Cambodian American deportable refugees and their families. In this essay I will argue that, notwithstanding the real hardships and trauma deportation causes, such removals ultimately enable some Cambodian American deportable refugees to engage in agentive, transnational movements. However, before doing so, I will begin with a brief overview of how Cambodian American refugees came to be deportable in the first place.

Over 150,000 Cambodians arrived in the United States as refugees in the wake of two major geopolitical events: 1) the American War and secret bombing campaigns in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and 2) the Khmer Rouge, a communist regime that ruled the country from 1975 to 1979 and was responsible for the death of an estimated two million Cambodians (Needham and Quintiliani 2007; Ong 2003; Smith-Hefner 1999). Today, approximately 250,000 Cambodians and Cambodian American2 live in the United States, the majority of whom entered the country as refugees or were born to refugee parents (Mortland 2017; Schlund-Vials 2012; Tang 2015). Long Beach, California is currently home to the largest community of Cambodians living in diaspora,3 with an estimated 40,000 individuals in the greater Long Beach area (Needham and Quintiliani 2007). Importantly, many Cambodian Americans now living in Long Beach arrived there after initially being resettled throughout the United States, particularly in underserved, low-income neighborhoods (Mortland 2017; Tang 2015). By moving to Long Beach, individuals who have experienced multiple forced displacements counteract the United States’ efforts to disperse refugees as a means to minimize the formation of so-called “ethnic enclaves” (Smith-Hefner 1999). While extremely important, these movements exist within the sovereign bounds of the United States, and are therefore somewhat limited. As Sok’s story demonstrates, while Cambodian and Cambodian American refugees in the United States are afforded certain freedoms of movement, in other ways, as noncitizens, they remain vulnerable to both restricted and forced movements.

Deportation represents one of the most extreme examples of simultaneously restricted and forced movement. Unlike most deportees who return to countries where they were born, previously resided, and have citizenship and family ties, Cambodian American deportable refugees are exiled to Cambodia as essentially stateless noncitizens largely unfamiliar with their “homeland.”4 Born during and after the Khmer Rouge, many deportable refugees left Cambodia as infants, while others were born in refugee camps in Thailand and the Philippines, and have never set foot in Cambodia. As refugees in the United States, Cambodians were afforded LPR status and, therefore, a path to citizenship.
However, due to language barriers, misinformation, and fear of the government, many did not obtain citizenship or did not realize they were not U.S. citizens (Smith-Hefner 1999). Upon conviction for felonies and certain misdemeanors, LPRs can be deported (Kwon 2012), resulting in the removal of deportable refugees, like Sok and Thida.

Deportations from the United States to Cambodia began in 2002 under President George W. Bush, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two countries. The MOU was established following the passage of three U.S. laws: the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994; the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; all signed into law by President Bill Clinton. Together, these laws drastically increased the scope of deportation by: (1) decreasing the minimum length of a prison sentence that triggers mandatory deportation; (2) decreasing the severity of deportable offenses; (3) creating a new category of immigration law—the notion of the “aggravated felony” that can encompass a crime prosecuted in criminal court as a misdemeanor; and (4) eliminating discretionary power in sentencing for immigration judges. These laws arose out of a geopolitical climate of securitization fueled by fears over terrorism and corresponding public anti-immigrant sentiments. In so doing, these policies construct many individuals who were living in the U.S. “legally”—like Cambodian and Cambodian American refugees with LPR status—as “illegal aliens” (Kwon 2012; Reiter and Coutin 2017). Indeed, as Reiter and Coutin (2017: 573) note in their analysis of Department of Homeland Security statistics, following the passage of these laws “levels of deportation increased exponentially: nearly 18 times as many people were deported from the United States in 2013 (n=438,421) as in 1986 (n=24,592).” In April 2018, the United States deported 43 Cambodian Americans to Cambodia, the largest single removal of Cambodian Americans to date, and activists believe the number of deportations will only continue to increase (Yam 2018).

**DEPORTEE TRANSNATIONALISM**

Cambodian American deportable refugees like Sok and Thida have experienced multiple forced displacements in their lifetime, from internal displacements within Cambodia before and during the Khmer Rouge regime, to refugee camps, to eventual countries of resettlement, to deportation. However, from decisions to move within the United States after resettlement, to international travels after deportation, we see that some Cambodian American deportable refugees are carving out opportunities for chosen, rather than forced, movements. Like Thida, these individuals clearly demonstrate what Peter Nyers (2003) terms “abject cosmopolitanism”: the process through which immigrant groups who regularly experience targeted exclusions resist these interdictions and exert political agency. By obtaining a Cambodian passport and traveling internationally, Thida, whose movements prior to and including deportation were always dictated by external forces, now decides when and where she travels. As such, we see that despite the trauma and irreparable harm caused by deportation, some Cambodian American deportable refugees engage in transnational processes and agentic movements after deportation.

Although refugees are typically conceived as legally protected from removal from their countries of resettlement, those lacking citizenship remain vulnerable to deportation, even when granted LPR status. As Sok’s story demonstrates, many Cambodian American refugees continue to experience life in the United States as precarious and potentially
temporary. When juxtaposed with Thida’s story, we see that, without erasing the real hardships and trauma deportation causes, it also has the potential to open up spaces for individuals to engage in new forms of agentive movements across national boundaries: abject cosmopolitanism for deportable refugees. Whereas Sok has been closely monitored by ICE while stuck in deportation limbo for over a decade and a half, Thida now enjoys a level of freedom of movement she never before experienced as a refugee in the United States.

CONCLUSION

As Sok's and Thida's stories demonstrate, some Cambodian American deportable refugees enact agentive movements in their everyday lives, despite considerable constraints. These individuals demonstrate “abject cosmopolitanism” by engaging in and even creating transnational movements and networks. This clearly speaks to broader themes of migrant agency in the face of multiple forms of precarity.

ENDNOTES

1 In order to protect my interlocutors’ confidentiality, all names and some minor details have been changed.
2 I differentiate between Cambodians and Cambodian Americans following my interlocutors’ usage: whereas Cambodians (even those living in diaspora) self identify with Cambodian nationality, ethnicity, language, family history, and culture, Cambodian Americans align themselves with both the United States and Cambodia through the aforementioned categories.
3 This figure does not take into account ethnic Khmer living in Vietnam (c.f. Taylor 2014).
4 Importantly, paths to citizenship do exist for Cambodian American deportable refugees, however, this process can take months or years, and is deeply connected to an individual’s finances, Khmer language skills, family ties, and abilities to navigate Cambodian bureaucracy.

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PHOTO ESSAY – MELILLA
MELILLA, THE BORDER AS SOCIAL FABRIC OF A CITY

Nina Sahraoui

The Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta in northern Africa are the only territorial borders of the European Union with the African continent. Melilla is around 12 square kilometers with 84,000 inhabitants and is separated from mainland Spain by 225 kilometers—a six-hour boat journey across the Mediterranean or an hour flight on small planes. The departure of these planes from Melilla depends on weather conditions, especially in the winter. Melilla is also approximately 400 kilometers overland from Ceuta—a long journey over mountainous roads and two international borders. Thus the two Spanish border cities have limited contact.

Melilla constitutes, in many ways, a liminal space. Shaped by its colonial heritage, it is highly dependent on local border crossings with the neighboring Moroccan region of Nador but is also surrounded by one of the most sophisticated border fences ever built. Inhabitants of Melilla, the Melillenses, are mostly Christian or Muslim but there is a small Jewish community and more recently a Hindu community. Since 1986, the Muslim community was granted the possibility to apply for Spanish nationality, and thus political rights (Guia, 2014); yet to date many have not obtained it. Unlike mainland Spain, Melilla does not belong to the European Schengen zone of free mobility; therefore migrants who arrive in Melilla remain in the enclave for varied periods of time, which makes it a waiting room to Europe. Moroccan citizens residing in the neighboring region are allowed to cross the border to Melilla, per a special agreement between Spain and Morocco, but are not allowed to stay overnight. Hence, migration is the very social fabric of the city and shapes its daily social life.

While local forms of mobility across this border rarely feature in the media, photographs of the city’s triple fence and in particular of migrants climbing the very last wired fence before attempting to enter Melilla, are by now part of a shared imaginary around the notion of “fortress Europe.”
The view in Image 2 was taken from one of the planes that connect Melilla and the “Spanish peninsula”, which is how inhabitants of Melilla refer to the rest of Spain. The border runs along the hills on its western side.
The two enclaves in northern Africa each have a Center for the Temporary Stay of Immigrants (CETI), run by the Spanish Ministry of Employment, that accommodates undocumented migrants and asylum seekers who have managed to enter the enclaves and hope to continue their journey toward continental Europe. In 2016, migrants in the CETI of Melilla were mainly from Syria, Guinea, Algeria, Morocco, Burkina Faso, the Ivory Coast, and Lebanon. This Center is situated only 300 meters away from the militarized fence, right next to the border. Migrants’ stay in the enclave can range from a couple of weeks to several months (and in some cases years), as they await the results of administrative processes. The photograph on the left in Image 3 shows the fence of the CETI, where migrants hang their clothes to dry. The photograph on the right, depicting the border fence, was taken on the road going to the CETI, a few meters from its entrance.

Image 3: Fences in urban spaces

The border impacts Melillenses’ social lives in many ways. The “migration industry" (Andersson, 2014) employs border guards, police forces, social workers, translators, and healthcare professionals. Melilla’s economic fate is highly dependent on both international migration and local border crossings.
The regional mobility agreement facilitates movements between the Spanish enclave and the neighboring Moroccan region of Nador. The local border crossings are absolutely key for the enclave’s economy. The export of European products to Morocco represents a significant source of revenue: national taxes are lowered due to Melilla’s special status and local authorities apply a lucrative ten percent tax to what is called *comercio atípico* or “untypical trade.” As depicted in Image 4, after a few dozen meters of military zone at the border, a large space close to the biggest border passage of Beni Ansar (named after the closest city on the Moroccan side) is dedicated to warehouses. The stored merchandise crosses the border on the backs of Moroccan women referred to as *portadoras*. Many sleep at the border to save their place in the queue. Their appalling working conditions and the frequent accidents, at times deadly, have attracted attention from human rights groups, scholars, and journalists.

Leisure activities in Melilla also take place with the border in the background. On Sundays, the border on the eastern side becomes a jogging trail and children playing on the beach can see the Moroccan harbor behind the metallic fences (Image 5). The Melillenses often cross to Morocco on the weekends and holidays for tourism and leisure, escaping the limited confines of the enclave.
Right next to this international border, where the Moroccan flag flutters, a couple of little abandoned houses on the Spanish side remind us of the social and geographical continuities that the political border cuts across. Such continuities are enmeshed with the voids that the militarized fences create by imposing a highly surveilled military zone on both sides of the border. Socially, the city is about multiculturalism as much as it is about defensive identities. Historically a Spanish military outpost in North Africa, Melilla is the only Spanish city to keep a statue of General Franco, as other cities have removed their statues following the 2007 Historical Memory Law. At the same time, the city of Melilla is home to the biggest Muslim community found in any Spanish city. Though the city has
rebranded itself as “Melilla of the four cultures” in all tourist literature, this narrative of cosmopolitanism and diversity hardly conceals the multiform borders and spatial divisions that run through the social fabric of the city. Rather, the life of the Melillenses is paced according to the border. The daily boat arrivals from mainland Spain, the traffic jams at the border with Morocco, the entry of migrants through the fences, the occasional closure of the border, the constant supply of additional military and police forces from mainland Spain, or even the opening hours of the supermarkets situated closest to the border; all of these events shape the city’s life. If, as happens on some occasions, the border closes for a couple of hours, life in Melilla feels different.

References

Acknowledgments
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PART THREE

GLOBAL SOUTH
INTRODUCTION – GLOBAL SOUTH

Media sources give the impression that a large proportion of the world’s population is actively crossing borders. In fact, most people tend to remain in the country in which they were born and raised. Nevertheless, the topic of migration remains a serious concern for countries around the world that are rethinking their citizenship criteria, asylum policies, the place of immigrants in their midst, and the nature of their borders. Whereas much attention has been focused on nations in the North that are tackling the issue of economic migrants and refugees coming from the South, less is reported about South to South migration. According to the International Organization for Migration, there is more South to South migration than South to North. Hence, nations in the South also deal with the challenges of immigration but with fewer resources and media hype.

The ethnographic essays in this section offer valuable insights into the experiences of the often unnoticed South to South migration. They demonstrate the many ways in which migrants and refugees adjust to their new homes and create sustainable but precarious communities. These essays document how resourceful migrants can be in crossing borders and finding innovative economic opportunities in host countries. But they also illustrate the impact of migrants on the local population and government policies in host countries. In addition, the contributions in this section demonstrate the need to enhance governmental and non-governmental capacities to facilitate migrant adaptation, analyze the role of emotions as migrants strive to carve out spaces of belonging for themselves in host countries, examine migrant women’s vulnerabilities, discuss contradictory government attitudes impacting refugee integration, and point to the challenges of liminality experienced by low-wage migrants. These authors highlight that migration will continue to play an important role in national economies and politics.

The social and economic impact of migrants is the subject of Nina Sahraoui’s photo essay. Through her photos, Sahraoui documents the fence that was built to keep the migrants out of the only European territory in North Africa. Melilla, the Spanish city bordered by Morocco and the Mediterranean, has developed a socio-economic structure that is centered on migration and migrants. Separated from the mainland by the Mediterranean Sea, it relies on cross-border trade with Morocco even as it tries to keep out African migrants seeking passage to Europe. Meanwhile, the fence that was built to do just that has become a part of the Melillenses’ daily practices.

Andrew Nelson explores the growing South Asian community in Quito, Ecuador. He provides a fascinating account of the unintended consequences of Ecuador’s leftist government policy to offer Universal Citizenship. This led to the growth of the South Asian community in Ecuador. Many members of this community came intending to continue their journey
north. However, those who have stayed established restaurants in a central district of Quito. While the South Asians contribute to the culture and economy of the city, they are still a precarious community. Despite the attempts of some to assimilate, others still aspire to continue their migration. Those that stay are aware that their place in Ecuador is contingent on the local government and social acceptance by Ecuadorians.

Also in South America, Walter Imilán and Paola Jirón take a round-trip journey from Chile to Peru with Jorge, a Peruvian migrant living and working in Chile. The trip is one of many that Jorge takes on a regular basis to his home country to import supplies for his business success in Chile but also to maintain a connection with his family in his hometown in Peru. Beautifully documented by Imilán and Jirón, the journey reveals the mobility skill of Jorge as he navigates and negotiates social, political, and economic boundaries between Peru and Chile.

Patel Ashivina addresses the ways in which conferral of refugee status on Rohingya migrants in India allowed them opportunities to integrate into the economic life of Delhi that are not available to locals. The services and support from the UNHCR and local NGOs have equipped them with the skills and resources to engage in commercial activities that maintain the solidarity of the Rohingya community in Delhi. At the same time, the refugees are able to extend their commercial networks to include the local Indian communities living nearby.

Rachel Newcomb and Sarajane Renfroe offer a comparative perspective addressing the different vulnerabilities migrant women face in the United States and Catalonia. Training their ethnographic lens on Florida and Barcelona, the authors zoom in on Celia, a Latina migrant in the U.S. and Fatima, a Moroccan migrant woman in Catalonia. The authors argue that the availability of vibrant non-profit organizations assisting migrant women in both locales does not automatically translate into comparable or similar outcomes in terms of migrant wellbeing. Much depends on the nature of the relationships between non-profits and local governments in the respective environment. Collaborative ties facilitate Moroccan women’s integration into the host society even as these women raise concerns over economic insecurity and racism, while non-profits could comparatively be of limited assistance to Latina migrants given the ongoing criminalization of especially undocumented immigration in the U.S.

Amanda Poole and Jennifer Riggan analyze the coexistence of two contrasting attitudes by the Ethiopian state toward Eritrean refugees: openness to cross-border movements as a matter of national policy on the one hand, and surveillance and control at the local level, on the other. While the former allows the country to garner monetary and political support internationally toward its refugee regime, the latter means that Eritrean refugees cannot find viable paths to citizenship and economic livelihood. This creates what the authors insightfully call ‘paradoxes of welcome’ whereby exclusion and inclusion operate simultaneously and in ways that do not necessarily or always prioritize refugees’ needs.
Lisa Reber highlights the affective and material forms of precarity accompanying labor migration in the Middle East. She examines the consequences of low-wage migrant workers’ liminality in the United Arab Emirates. Despite easy and lawful passage to the U.A.E. to work, the temporariness that came with these workers’ status meant that they found it next to impossible to claim unpaid wages, seek better accommodation, or fight societal exclusion. Unenforced labor laws, threats of job termination, or losing the right to be in the country are among the factors adding to the instability and uncertainty these low-wage migrants experience in their already tenuous circumstances.
Although Ecuador has historically been a sending country, over the last decade its migration patterns have started reversing with an increase of return migrants, asylum seekers, and economic migrants. As part of the country's leftist turn, in 2008 President Rafael Correa announced a policy of “Universal Citizenship” which effectively allowed any nationality to enter the country. Among the more common immigration from other South American countries, a growing number of Asian, Caribbean and African immigrants have used this policy to enter Ecuador, often with the intention of reaching the United States. Many of these migrants, however, have remained in Ecuador forming what I call an "accidental diaspora." As a product of a migration boom produced coincidently by Ecuadorian state policy, this diasporic formation, however, remains precarious and vulnerable to the uncertain shifts of other factors, such as xenophobia, labor dynamics, and the immigration policies of other countries.

As part of a larger project on South Asian labor migration to Latin America, this essay is derived from a 2016 research trip to Ecuador with journalist Rob Curran, with whom I am writing a magazine article on South America's global migration industry. In this essay I focus on a tangential phenomenon of the emergence of Ecuador's 'little South Asia’ – an enclave of restaurants and bars in Quito’s central neighborhood of La Mariscal. Just a few blocks from the neighborhood’s central plaza of La Foch, an area known for its tourist and nightlife appeal, one can find a number of establishments run by Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis catering to the area’s mix of students, tourists, expatriates, and migrants. Based on participant observation and interviews conducted in the South Asian spaces of La Mariscal, I discuss the relationship between the 2008 policy shift and the formation of a South Asian diaspora in Quito.

Instead of immigration policies informed by the liberal paradox of allowing capital flows but restricting immigration (Hollifield 2004), the South Asian presence in La Mariscal better reflects the globalization/transnationalism from below cases (Mathews 2011; Mathews & Vega 2012; Smith & Gaurnizo 1998) in which deregulation allows working-class immigration to increase while remaining under the radar of state surveillance. However, whereas other 'below' cases tend to be products of neoliberalism, Ecuador’s embrace of open borders was coupled with its ‘post-neoliberal’ agenda articulated through the economic populism of import substitution and increased social spending (Ramirez Gallegos 2015). The liberalization of immigration laws was intended to further the populist agenda by luring expatriate Ecuadorians back home; that it also led to an unprecedented level of immigrants was, thus, an unexpected outcome (Acosta Acarazo & Freier 2015; Margheritis 2016). Consequently, Quito has become a global transit node, an in-between point defined by the uncertainty of “errance” (Echeverri Zuluaga 2015; Echeverri Zuluaga and Sáenz 2018), from where agents and migrants weigh future mobility options. The fact that some have stayed in Ecuador, then, is an accidental outcome for both the migrants and...
the state.

The accidental nature of a South Asian presence in Quito is manifested in an ethnic hierarchy fragmented by access to investment/migration possibilities created by Ecuador’s 2008 policy. At the top of the hierarchy are the pre-2008 migrants who own high-end restaurants and remain committed to Ecuador. Below are the post-2008 migrants who are divided into two groups – those individuals, often low-end restaurateurs, who balance some investment in Quito with a ‘wait and see’ attitude toward future migration aspirations; and others, often workers, bidding their time in Ecuador until the next labor-migration opportunity arises.

In our conversations, the older generation of restaurateurs tended to distance themselves and their establishments from the negative reputation of unauthorized migration schemes associated with the post-2008 boom. Rashid, a Pakistani from Islamabad, claims to have started Quito’s first Indian restaurant in 2000. He was recruited to Quito by a Jesuit priest who convinced him to introduce Pakistani food to Ecuador. He learned Spanish and married an Ecuadorian woman, with whom he has three children. He has seen many South Asians come and mostly go. He admitted to me that the trafficking industry draws South Asians to Ecuador, and lamented that several of his workers have become “filthy rich” as agents, or through dalal work. They connect labor migration agents in South Asia’s robust “manpower industry” with the extensive network of coyotes, drivers, and safe houses in Latin America.

One block over from Rashid’s restaurant is La Mariscal’s most upscale Indian restaurant, started by a Punjabi man who immigrated to Quito in the late 1990s. His son, Ajit, joined his father when he was a teenager. Preferring Spanish to English, he spoke of Quito as his home and India as a place he occasionally visits. The family founded the Ecuadorian Indian Association, a group of mostly settled Punjabis who host annual Diwali and Holi parties. The only experience they have with trafficking, Ajit assured me, is when they lose staff to migration. He complained that while Ecuadorians refuse to work in service, South Asians do not stay, adding “They will be here for a year, and then suddenly, without any warning, they are gone in the night.” He has since decided to hire only family from India or migrants who have married Ecuadorians.

The more recently established South Asian restaurants tend to be fast-food joints catering to students and working-class migrants. Colloquially known as shawarma for their trademark wraps filled with meat cooked in Middle Eastern spices, these restaurants build on the long legacy of Lebanese migration to Ecuador with a South Asian twist that adds to Quito’s own form of multiculturalism. Instead of the Bollywood films on the televisions of the older restaurants, one finds soccer games and telenovelas at the shawarma places. Indian dishes are listed next to salchipapas and Cuban sandwiches on the billboard menus, along with cheap beer and karaoke. While the older restaurants demonstrate longer connections to Ecuador, the shawarma restaurants reflect an Asian-Latin hybridity infused with a working-class cosmopolitanism inspired by the migration boom.

The relationship between the shawarma restaurants and migration is transparent, as South Asian migration agents and South American drivers, young Indian migrants and Cuban workers mingle in these restaurants. In such places, the mobility aspirations of reaching the United States are a constant topic of conversation. At one shawarma, the owner Pulash, an outgoing Gujarati man who came to Ecuador in 2010 with his wife,
qualified his aspiration to migrate to the United States by declaring "I will only go the legal way." They were granted citizenship in Ecuador when their daughter was born four years prior to the interview. He figured, "why would I trade that for an illegal life up there ... after all, I'm making dollars here in Ecuador." He employed a Cuban cook and a part-time Punjabi assistant, Projit, who just arrived one month before our meeting. Thinking he would immigrate to Uruguay, Projit changed his destination to Ecuador at the last minute and was weighing whether to continue on to the United States or not, stating "All come here with going to America in their mind."

Amid the constant talk of moving north, many also take pride in their decision to stay in Quito. At one shawarma and take-out counter, the three Bangladeshi owners/managers reflected on their desire to reach the United States when they arrived in Ecuador in 2010. However, their plans quickly changed as Ecuador grew on them for what they call its tranquil nature. Similarly, another restaurant owner, Prasher, a Brahmin from the Punjab, lived in the United States for a few months before deciding to return to Ecuador. Despite having papers to stay, he realized that he was unhappy due to the pressure to work in the United States. He explained, "In Ecuador, I can relax and take my time, life is not just about work." Prasher's restaurant caters events for the Indian TATA Company that has recently established a subsidiary in Quito and has brought approximately one hundred additional Indian families to Ecuador.

Despite the relaxed lifestyle and business opportunities in Quito, it is also common to hear stories of exclusion and discrimination. Many of the restaurateurs pointed to the discrepancy between a welcoming government and a local population that looks down upon them. Many interviewees believed that obtaining papers in Ecuador was more about gaining legal status in the Americas than about seeking assimilation into the Ecuadorian nation.

The ambivalence about life in La Mariscal appeared even starker in the narratives of restaurant workers. For many workers, staying in Ecuador led to feelings of reluctance. For instance, one shawarma worker, Rohit, reflected on his time in Ecuador and saw betrayal. He came to Quito from the Pokhara region of central Nepal back in 2010 when Nepali laborers counted "in the hundreds." He was introduced to a migration agent by a village friend who had just returned from Ecuador and spoke of its natural beauty. Rohit had just married and needed to find work abroad to support his family. The agent promised him that he would make between sixty and seventy dollars per day in Quito, which was slightly more than what his friends made working in the Gulf countries. He had to pay five thousand USD for the trip, which was substantially more than the price of migration to the Gulf, but he figured he could earn enough to save up for future migration to the United States.

When he arrived in Ecuador, Rohit found a reality different than what he was promised. Initially, after food and rent was subtracted from his pay, he made just five to six dollars after working a twelve-hour shift per day. He has since acquired "papers" and makes between fifteen and twenty dollars a day, which still requires a frugal lifestyle to make ends meet. He is stuck in an apartment at the edge of the city and has neither a computer nor television. As a server, he viewed himself to be at the bottom of the restaurant hierarchy, below the Bangladeshi chef and Afghani owner, both of whom never fail to remind him of his inferior rank. His position was weakened further by the gradual disappearance of fellow Nepalis who had left Ecuador either for the United States, to
pursue work possibilities in Chile, or return to Nepal. Just a few months prior to my visit, his wife was able to join him, but had not yet been able to find employment. For them, the choice was not between the United States and Ecuador, but rather between staying in Ecuador or returning to Nepal. Rohit was leaning towards the latter, explaining, “I have a sixty-nine-year-old father back in the village to take care of, barley and rice fields to cultivate.” He had neither the money to think of moving north, nor the social contacts to rise in the La Mariscal restaurant hierarchy.

Rather than an outcome of neoliberal policies, La Mariscal’s South Asian diaspora reflects the effects of ‘post-neoliberal’ Ecuador where immigration liberalization is partially embraced by leftist populism. Although the shifts in Correa’s immigration policy did not intend for international diasporas to form, they created the conditions for clandestine migration networks and ethnic restaurants to emerge in a thriving tourist neighborhood of the capital. However, the survival of an accidental South Asian diaspora remains dependent not just on state immigration policy, but also on the perceptions of social and economic opportunities in other destinations (United States/Chile), social acceptance in Ecuador, and the fragmentation of a labor hierarchy internal to the diaspora.

ENDNOTES

1 Ecuador’s 2008 constitution “advocates the principle of universal citizenship, the free movement of all inhabitants of the planet, and the progressive extinction of the status of alien or foreigner as an element to transform the unequal relations between countries, especially those between North and South” (Article 416).

2 For instance, based on the paradigmatic case of Hong Kong’s Chungking Mansions, Mathews (2012) argues that globalization from below occurs most commonly in places that are “out-neoliberalizing” the global north by deregulating both economic and immigration policies.

3 The rapid rise of Quito as a base of “irregular migration,” however, caused the Ecuadorian government to rescind its visa-free policy for ten nationalities – including Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Nepali, and Afghani – just two years later in 2010.

4 Dalal refers to a common term for middlemen in South Asian Indo-European languages, but carries a particularly negative connotation.

5 While the exclusion of Nepalis from the visa-free policy in 2010 slowed their arrivals in Ecuador, it was not until four Nepali agents were arrested in 2014 in Quito that Nepali migrants shifted their American entry point from Ecuador to Bolivia, where they can still gain visas upon arrival.

REFERENCES


TRANSBORDERING TRADE FROM BELOW: MIGRANT CREATIVITY IN THE CHILEAN NORTH

Walter Imilán and Paola Jirón

TRANSBORDERING

Jorge1 from Peru sells a refreshing beverage with medicinal properties in Alto Hospicio in Chile. The seeds and herbs that make up Jorge’s beverages known as emollients2 come from Lima; and every couple of months he makes the journey to his home country in search of raw materials. The distance between Alto Hospicio in Chile and Lima in Peru is 1,500 kilometers. Jorge sells a trans-border product that requires a strategic mobility that he manages well.

Border studies in Chile have examined the movement of people and objects through national borders mainly from a state centered approach. Mostly based on movement across the Chilean-Peruvian-Bolivian borders, these studies place emphasis on the importance of state control (Tapia and Gonzalez 2014), the production of otherness based on national origin (Guizardi et al. 2017) or the construction of circulation routes that connect both sides of the border (Garcés H, Moraga R, and Maureira C 2016). A more recent conception of borders sees them as dynamic, constantly shifting and changing. This involves understanding the way they are currently being constructed and the implications of living, crossing and experiencing borders (Jirón 2018). This involves observing the experience of individuals and their mobility practices across borders. These mobilities involve more than the simple change of place or the connection between two points. Mobility is a set of practices that produce spatialities (Urry 2007) and special attention is given to what happens in and through mobility, including experiences, meanings and affects, and particularly the way these practices are embodied in/through mobility (Jirón, Imilán, and Iturra 2016).

Jorge’s trans-border emollient concoction is based on his personal skills and knowledge, given that it is a handcrafted product, both in its production and commercialization. Jorge’s experience illuminates other ways of understanding the transbordering dynamics, the complex relation among states, affects, know-hows and migrations, that go further than higher circuits of global trade or the daily presence of state frontiers. Jorge’s story is based on a collective ethnographic endeavor3 (Jirón and Imilán 2016; 2018) carried out in Alto Hospicio during 2016 and 2017, to understand current ways of dwelling in intermediate cities through different mobility practices. We first met Jorge selling emollients in Alto Hospicio square and traced his transbordering practice through an extended shadowing of his mobility practice during the summer of 2017. The following story exemplifies how mobility practices across borders involve long, variegated, stretched-out spatialities and embody practices that go well beyond the actual border being crossed.
JORGE’S ENTREPRENEURIAL INITIATIVE

Jorge is almost 34 years old; he was born in Huánuco, a small town at the entrance to the Peruvian Amazon jungle, and is married to a Peruvian woman from Tacna (Peru) – a city bordering Arica, Chile. They have two daughters and live in a small house they rent in Alto Hospicio. Jorge has been a restless soul since he was very young, always seeking new adventures and learning multiple trades such as mechanic, builder, and welder. An old man in Lima who sold emollients hired him as his assistant. That is how he learned about the preparation techniques, although he already knew many of the herbs used in the preparation, from his childhood in his hometown of Huánuco. After seven years in Chile, and having moved around many cities and trades, he decided to settle in Alto Hospicio and sell emollients.

Alto Hospicio is the fastest growing city in the history of Chile. With less than a thousand inhabitants in 1990, it currently has a population of 190 thousand inhabitants. The mining boom in the Tarapacá Region during the 1990s generated a housing pressure that was resolved by massive social housing construction in Alto Hospicio. Most of Alto Hospicio’s residents are migrants. They mainly come from Peru, Bolivia and the south of Chile, but also from more distant countries like Colombia and Ecuador. The majority of them sell something in one of the numerous markets in the city. Jorge was the first to sell emollients in the city. With another salesman, he purchased a street-food truck and obtained a municipal permit. He went to Lima, specifically to the Gamarra Market, where he acquired the ingredients to make emollients to sell in Alto Hospicio’s main city square. Import of raw materials for his emollients in Chile is often restricted, as it has to go through tough agrarian custom control. Jorge relies on complex strategies to obtain the ingredients for his emollient business.

JORGE’S JOURNEY

Accompanied by his wife and two daughters, he leaves Alto Hospicio to Arica by bus at 6 PM. Once there, they quickly take a taxi with Peruvian plates to Tacna. Close to 8 PM Jorge heads towards Tacna bus terminal. His wife and daughters stay at the house the family owns in Tacna, and will wait there until Jorge returns. The farewell is quick; his wife and daughters will spend the time visiting with friends and family.

Tacna bus terminal is extremely busy. He pays 5 Soles (US$ 1.5) to an “assistant” who gets him tickets on the “the most convenient bus” to Lima. After a few minutes, the assistant comes back alerting him that the last bus to Lima is about to leave. A few minutes past 8 PM he is sitting on a small seat with faded fabric; Jorge doesn’t mind being uncomfortable. Outside it’s already dark, he chats with the person sitting next to him for five hours. Jorge goes over his travels and trades; he appears as a veteran adventurer. Once on the bus, he decides to extend the trip and go to Huánuco from Lima. He has not told his wife and daughters about going to his hometown. The last time he went there was four years ago. He wants to see “his people”, but he also plans to obtain for his emollients an herb preparation that his aunt makes. Jorge falls asleep despite the cold wind that sweeps through the bus from the windows. Up and down, as the bus crosses over the mountains, the engine makes heavy noises on each slope. When he wakes up, he’s in Chala, and a large
group of miners wearing thermal clothes and helmets get off. The coastline appears and extensive olive plantations can be seen. Two women hop on the bus to sell olives; he buys some to ease the morning hunger. He has no breakfast and the bus will not stop until noon, close to Nazca. The bus stops at a gas station and Jorge eats breakfast/lunch. The bus continues while the landscape alternates from desert brown to oasis green, valleys and rivers.

It’s already dark when he arrives in Lima and he immediately buys his ticket to Huánuco. Two hours later, he’s on a modern bus on his way to his hometown. Tired from the trip so far he falls into a deep sleep. He wakes up in the morning, a few kilometers away from his destination due to a flat tire. After half an hour the passengers start getting off the bus; some start picking herbs from the side of the road; others decide to ask for rides from cars waiting on the road. Jorge does the same, paying a few soles to the driver of a pickup truck to get him to his town as fast as possible.

The landscape is beautiful: jungle green and blue sky. Jorge’s house is old and big, made out of bricks; one of his sisters and her family live in it. His parents and brothers have come to meet him at the station and take him home to a lavish feast. He soon becomes involved in a complex family problem regarding his sister: abandoned children, domestic violence, alcoholic husband, mother having to work in a nearby city. For three days, the joys of sharing with the family are accompanied by discussions, some of which are quite aggressive. Jorge meets his friends at bars; he parties and watches football matches. He is excited about being home after four years of absence. He spends three very intense days in Huánuco.

He returns to Lima, heading directly to the Gamarra market. He is only in Lima for six hours, enough time to wander through the most important fruit, vegetable and groceries market in the city. Jorge goes through the aisles, inspects prices and bargains. He buys a total of 12 two-liter bottles each filled with different color liquids. They are recycled Coca Cola or other soft drink bottles, filled with herb preparations, the raw material for his emollients.

He barely has time to eat and he gets on a modern bus that will take him back to Tacna. The first few hours on the bus are fun; he talks to a Colombian man and then a Venezuelan migrant couple heading to Chile for the first time. Once in Tacna, he goes directly to the bus terminal to take the bus back to the border crossing to Arica. Jorge has coordinated with his wife and daughters to meet him there. After hugs with his daughters, Jorge starts distributing the load, each one will cross the border with two two-liter bottles of herb preparation, the maximum allowed by customs. At that moment, Jorge tours around the terminal that at this time is full of merchants taking goods from Tacna’s markets into Chile. A few minutes later he comes back with a woman and her 15-year-old son; both will take the four remaining bottles, and he will take two mountain jackets and four pairs of running shoes that belong to the woman. Without knowing each other, they all carry their load and head towards customs border control. They each take a different queue, ignoring each other while waiting for their turn. The officer inspects Jorge’s luggage and asks about the bottles. Jorge immediately tells him they are soft drinks; without looking at him, he waves him through. Jorge’s wife and children have all passed customs control without problems. When they get to Arica, they wait for the woman and her son for almost an hour to make the exchange. Joking about selling the jackets in case the woman does not make it, they wait for her, until she arrives with the bottles. The exchange is made in silence; they
thank each other and go their own way. They still have to get to Alto Hospicio a few hours away. At 1 AM, they get off at the Alto Hospicio terminal. Jorge takes all his goods and with his daughters and wife walks home.

GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: HANDMADE TEXTURES
Jorge’s transbordering experience involves a certain knowledge that allows for the production and sale of his emollients in Alto Hospicio. In everyday life, this transbordering experience does not distinguish between the familial and the commercial; Jorge’s transbordering is a continuum that transcends state and geographic frontiers. Unveiling these experiences of people provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics of contemporary migration geographies. These are not just about what is left behind, how the frontier is crossed or what is reached at the end, but about how this transbordering experience takes place as a constant, continuous experience that lingers in those transbordering moments and the objects they transborder with.

Alto Hospicio’s economy is based on "transbordering trade from below" carried out by migrants who, through small businesses, develop their own migratory projects. The territory dwelt in by Jorge and many of the inhabitants of Alto Hospicio becomes a transnational space whose existence is strengthened, despite adverse conditions including the city’s precariousness and stigmatization, by highly sophisticated and creative everyday practices in order to link up diverse spaces beyond their national borders.

In Jorge’s story, we see a personal globalization where locals not only move prefabricated goods but produce the goods themselves through their mobility practices: the networked relations and knowledge that emerge and are consolidated through this mobility. This is crucial in understanding borders from a different point of view than state-based border studies. The mobile border presented here provides not only an extended and expanded border, but also one that has its own rhythms.

ENDNOTES
1 Jorge’s real name has been omitted in order to maintain his anonymity.
2 Emollients are a very popular beverage in Peru and are made from grains and seeds including barley and flaxseed and herbs such as aloe vera, cat’s claw, horse’s tail and many other well-known Peruvian traditional herbs. However, its sale in Chile is rare. While Peruvian migrants in Chile have successfully developed Peruvian gastronomy as economic strategy (Imilán 2015), emollients have not entered the market, apparently due to the difficult access to the Peruvian ingredients required to make them and their restricted entry to Chile.
3 For further detail on Intermediate Dwelling Research Project: www.habitar-intermedio.cl. Special thanks to Benjamin Cortez for his collaboration on fieldwork.

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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN REFUGEES IN INDIA

Ashvina Patel

BACKGROUND

“Ahindistanis don’t have a water pump. They only give pumps to Burmawala, not to us.”

A poor Hindu woman complains about the perceived favoritism by the Indian government for the “Burmawala,” or people from Burma. The _Burmawala_ are Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, living among India’s urban poor in New Delhi. Unlike the _Burmawala_, she claims to be a local. Indians living in these urban slums are migrants, who came to the city in hopes of finding work. She points at a water pump that is shared by numerous slum dwellers. The Indian poor have to cross a busy street and walk the 50 meters to access the pump, however the _Burmawala_ have five hand pumps in their settlement. The woman feels that the government is treating Rohingya refugees better than they are treating her. In reality, this is more complicated.

The settlement area is in South Delhi; it runs alongside the Yamuna River providing the urban poor a place to wash and collect water. Most of the area is underdeveloped with unpaved roadways; dirt paths are lined with individual and community slums thatched together with bamboo and tarpaulin. Not far lies a crematorium, a place considered impure by Muslims and Hindus alike. But here, within a half square mile, is an economy defined by political hierarchies and global relationships. This paper considers the economic position of one small settlement of approximately 250 Rohingya refugees located in the peri-urban space of New Delhi. Data were collected by means of semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and informal conversations at the settlement over the course of eleven months in 2015 and 2017.

The Rohingya are a Muslim-ethnic minority from Myanmar. The Rohingya Crisis of August 2017 is defined by the mass displacement of nearly 800,000 to neighboring Bangladesh. However, the persecution of the Rohingya is not new. Since Myanmar’s independence in 1948 the government has been attempting to push them out of the country, claiming that they do not belong. In fact, the 1982 Citizenship Act under General Ne Win stripped them of their citizenship, making them a stateless people. In 2012, violence broke-out following the rape and murder of a Rakhine Buddhist woman that led to the displacement of 12,000 Rohingya. Because the Rohingya were unable to receive international protection in Bangladesh, thousands fled to India. They made their way across Northern India to the capital city. In New Delhi they underwent a rigorous Refugee Status Determination (RSD)\(^1\) process at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) offices in New Delhi. Once cleared, they are internationally recognized as refugees with legal status. After registration some Rohingya found work and accommodation in New Delhi, but most went to more affordable cities throughout India. Although India is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, there are currently
17,500 registered Rohingya refugees in India under the auspices of the UNHCR, 1,200 of them in New Delhi.

There are three things that contribute to the structure of Rohingya political economy in this settlement: an expanding sense of community guided by their relationship with the UNHCR, the production of an ethnic and refugee identity that creates a narrow sense of community, and finally I suggest that this deceptively local settlement is a profoundly global one. Each of these factors is a unique manifestation of how post-colonial institutions, like the UNHCR, mass media, and community power dynamics influence the economic lives of refugees.

The expanding and narrowing sense of identity is the result of building different types of social capital. From Putnam (2007) I borrow the general concepts of bridging and bonding forms of social capital to demonstrate how they work in tandem to create a micro-economy at this particular settlement. Bridging social capital is understood as building “social leverage” in the community (Briggs 1999). Brettell (2005:868) presents examples of bridging organizations used by Asian Indians in Texas along ethnic, national, and regional lines. However the Rohingyas in Delhi live relatively simple lives as compared to the highly educated and mobile legal immigrants of Texas. Therefore, their bridges are created through relationships within the same socio-economic class; they connect with their Indian neighbors based on their shared socio-economic position, money lending practices, and participation in local cottage industries.

Bonding social capital deepens “social support,” implying “dense ties and thick trust” (Briggs 1999; Lancee 2012:24). The Rohingyas live separately where they maintain a sense of ethnic and religious identity through shared traditions, foods, songs, language, and migration experiences. Furthermore, their refugee identity is reproduced through everyday experiences that set them apart from the Indian community that surrounds them. The networks Rohingyas have built have allowed them to leverage their social capital toward relative financial success and increased participation in civil society.

EXPANDING COMMUNITY

At this settlement Rohingya refugees are in an advantageous economic position vis-á-vis their neighbors. Both the Rohingyas and Indian men typically work as day laborers, earning around 250-350 rupees (about 4 to 5 USD) per day. Rohingyas women typically remain unemployed for cultural reasons; the few who do work tend to be house cleaners earning approximately 7000 rupees (about 107 USD) a month. Some of the Rohingyas are involved in the community’s cottage industries supported by UNHCR livelihood programming.

In New Delhi, UNHCR contracts Implementing Partners that are local organizations specializing in various activities to help refugees become more secure in the host country. During the course of my fieldwork there were three: Access helps refugees with employment, business management, entrepreneurship training etc.; Socio-Legal Information Center (SLIC) manages all legal matters from claims of domestic abuse to deportation and police sensitization; and Don Bosco provides language education, health care training, as well as advocates on behalf of refugees at public schools and manages the refugee health care process.

There are several opportunities to improve the urban refugee economic circumstance through Access programming. The program that has had the single biggest
impact on the community is the small business grant program. Refugees can apply for a one-time small business grant of up to 25,000 rupees (385 USD). There are six shop owners who have applied for such grants: There is a butcher who sells chickens, a vegetable seller, a woman who sells luxury goods like face moisturizer and jewelry, and three convenience shops that sell a bit of everything i.e. rice, oil, soap, tobacco, candies, etc. The cottage industries that operate at the refugee settlement also serve the neighboring hutsments that house India’s local poor.

Aside from the economic stability these shops generate for the Rohingya, they also serve as a bridge between them and the larger community. Since the plight of most living poor is to live hand-to-mouth, owners keep a tab for those who cannot pay immediately. This interest-free lending between Rohingya shop owners and the Indian community not only increases their profitability in the long run, but from a cultural point of view it builds social capital through feelings of trust and indebtedness. Participation in commercial economy can also provide a sense of normalcy and dignity for refugees (Oka 2014). This indebtedness creates a larger sense of community that extends beyond their settlement to the entire area.

**NARROWING COMMUNITY**

In addition to expanding notions of community, there are activities that also narrow definitions of identity, thereby creating cohesiveness among ‘strangers in flight’ within the Rohingya settlement. Bonding social capital is produced by creating a sense of ‘Rohingya-ness’ and ‘refugee-ness’. Although SLIC and Don Bosco do not have a direct impact on the economic aspects of the Rohingya settlement, they, along with Access, play a role in producing community exclusion. The exclusiveness of the Rohingya community has made them more successful as a unit. Exclusion is produced through programs that teach women Hindi, how to sew, and basic sanitation and health. The sense of belonging comes from participation in programming specifically for the refugees. The Rohingya refugees receive professional care from NGOs that neighboring Indian poor envy.

Being Rohingya and a refugee are also reproduced during the month of Ramadan. Since the settlement is exclusively Muslim they receive attention from local Muslim organizations, individuals, masjids, and university students that provide cash donations, clothes and promises of long-term investment in the community. Community leaders disperse these donations among the 250 residents. Often there are too many donations for such a small community to absorb, so families begin selling items to the local community. Indian locals negotiate the purchase of items such as rice, oil, or blankets. Rohingya women team together to set market prices and engage in spirited haggling. These micro-economies create a power dynamic between the Rohingya and the local community, as well as a gendered power among women in the community. The UNHCR is painfully aware of the disjuncture created by their programming and outside support. However, they have little control over outside contributions.

**A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT**

The refugee identity is a global identity fashioned by the UNHCR, automatically casting light on the subjects of their protection. In a democratic country, attention to urban refugees who live among local citizens brings a certain level of accessibility. Rohingya refugees are able to contact local and international media outlets to report on their experiences, just as easily as reporters are able to approach them. Transnational NGOs can
locate this small settlement to provide humanitarian aid. And because this particular settlement has received disproportionate media attention over five years, it has turned a small peri-urban plot of land into a global space. This uniquely provides the Rohingya refugee with a form of bridging social capital that far surpasses the life experiences of their neighbors.

The general public, including most university students and NGOs, would not be aware of these if it were not for journalists reporting on Rohingya settlements. With every breaking international news event, local media outlets are quick to visit Rohingya settlements in New Delhi to help locate India’s position in the larger story of displacement. Most media outlets do not protect the location and identity of their subjects thus allowing the general public to literally drive-up to the Rohingya settlement.

Those visitors who arrive with good intentions, and not all do, come with donations. Typical donations include rice, lentils, sugar, oil, candies; unfortunately not everything has good nutritional value. Unbeknownst to the donor, they are valuable in terms of resale. Through support of local donations, the settlement has been able to maintain an Imam for their masjid, rebuild their toilet facilities, and generally maintain their economic position in the neighborhood. Some have acquired sewing machines and refrigerators from individual contributions.

The global can also be observed in the attitudes of the people. The settlement is frequented by international journalists and researchers making the inhabitants (including the children) barely flinch when visited by Westerners. They are accustomed to seeing their own faces in newspapers and often critique the reporting. Their engagement with foreigners and international matters is far greater than that of the average Indian. Therefore, the power dynamics of the settlement is not simply defined by its economic prowess; instead it is the constant reification of a Rohingya refugee identity that places them at the apex of a political micro-economy with a global imprint.

CONCLUSION

Everyone in this neighborhood is poor but this analysis is about relative poverty being informed by the politics of place and identity. Because the Rohingya refugees are internationally recognized, they have access to building bridging networks that are domestic and international. If we zoom out from this small neighborhood, the precarity of the Rohingya’s position within the context of the greater Indian society becomes apparent.

The nationwide attention on a small population of refugees has created a precarious condition for Rohingya throughout India. On October 3, 2017 a case for deportation of all Rohingya from India was heard by the Supreme Court, coordinated by Narendra Modi’s administration. This case claims that Rohingya refugees are a threat to national security and therefore should not receive the benefit of India’s protection. This case is still pending. Due to fear of the government, fewer employers offer work, landlords have stopped renting to Rohingya, and some have even been forced to evict. The tenuous position of the Rohingya is well known throughout India since the federal administration has repeatedly broadcast in the national media that deportation is in the interest of the state. Such speech emboldens otherwise apathetic citizens to discriminate and question the legitimacy of Rohingya refugees on their land. In spite of this precarity, and arguably because of it, the political economy of this small settlement continues to thrive for at least one more day.
ENDNOTES

\(^1\) RSD interviews determine if individuals seeking refugee protection meet the legal standards as determined by the 1951 Refugee Convention. Usually states administer this process but because India is not party to the Convention, the UNHCR does (Gill & Mahendru 2017).

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Reducing Vulnerabilities Among Female Migrants in the United States and Spain

Rachel Newcomb and Sarajane Renfroe

Migrants who establish connections in the host culture, particularly through nonprofit organizations, are more likely to integrate successfully into host societies (Martinez Garcia and Jariego 2002). Yet, anthropologist Maria Olivia Salcido and sociologist Cecilia Menjívar have noted, “gender hierarchies are embedded in the formulation, interpretation, and implementation of immigration laws, as experienced by immigrants” (2013:336). Our research, which compares two field sites in Apopka, Florida and Barcelona, Catalonia, demonstrates that despite the presence of vibrant organizations in both places, legal barriers in the U.S. hamper social integration by preventing women from accessing basic services necessary for survival. The criminalization of migration in the U.S. forces Apopka migrants into what Giorgio Agamben has called “bare life,” living in a political system that both criminalizes their presence and excludes them from the benefits offered to citizens (Agamben 1998). In Barcelona, however, political autonomy within the Catalanian region has motivated local governments to offer greater support to migrants than is true for Spain more generally. While migration produces gendered vulnerabilities exacerbated in situations where women lack support networks, ethnographies of local migrant women in both places reveal these vulnerabilities can be reduced by cooperation between non-profits and local governments.

GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXTS: BARCELONA AND APOPKA

We chose to compare Moroccan migrant women’s experiences in Catalonia to Latina migrant experiences in Florida because both regions share similarities: geographic proximity to sending countries, significant increases in migration over the past two decades, and linguistic challenges for migrants.

In the 1940s after the Spanish Civil War, Barcelona received waves of economic migrants from other regions of Spain, but since the 1990s, migration flows have been external. According to Ricard Zapata-Barrero (2014, 67), the migrant population of Barcelona has exploded from 4.9% in 2001 to 17.6% by 2010. Regional policies emphasizing “a culture of diversity” facilitate the ability for migrants to integrate. While the central government manages immigration flows, local government policies in Catalonia, such as the 2009 Reception Bill of Immigrants, assert that Catalonia has the right to issue work permits and assist with education, healthcare and housing (Zapata-Barrero 2012: 231). Undocumented migrants can obtain legal residency after three years of living in Catalonia if they have a work contract. Advocates for Catalanian independence promote immigration as a way to gain support for their cause through integrating non-Spanish-speaking migrants into Catalan culture.

Apopka, located in an agricultural region twelve miles north of Orlando, Florida, has a population of 51,564, of which 26% are Hispanic migrants (U.S. Census). Until the 1970s,
agricultural migration was internal, but in the past few decades, most farm laborers have come from Mexico and Central America. Although many farms in the area have closed since the 1990s due to agricultural pollution, migrants find economic opportunities in greenhouses, lawn care, construction, and the service sectors. But in contrast to Barcelona, in Apopka there are few ways for undocumented migrants to access social services, save through nonprofits. The local police are also generally perceived to be hostile, inclined to seek out migrants for deportation.

METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AND NONPROFITS

From May to September 2017, we conducted eight semi-structured interviews in Apopka and twelve in Spain with women migrants, nonprofit workers, and volunteers. Interviews lasted from thirty to ninety minutes, covering topics including the interviewee’s migration story, education, family and work history, ability to access basic services, and degree of comfort in the host society, with space for interviewees to share the challenges of migration. In Spain the women had arrived on average ten to fifteen years earlier and were in their mid-twenties to early forties. In Florida our interviewees ranged in age from mid-twenties to earlyforties and had been in the U.S. from four to eighteen years, with an average of ten years in country. In Barcelona, nonprofits assisting our research were Bayt al-Thaqafa and Fundación Ibn Battuta. In Apopka we worked with HOPE CommUnity Center and the Farmworker Association of Florida. We also attended cultural events and volunteered when possible.

In both places, nonprofits offered similar programs, such as language classes, legal clinics, and empowerment workshops. The nonprofits in Barcelona had more opportunities to collaborate with local government, and during our research a large interfaith Ramadan dinner was held in central Barcelona, attended by local city officials, nonprofit and interfaith leaders. By contrast, we volunteered at a Mother’s Day celebration at the Farmworker Association of Florida that was exclusively attended by local migrant families and nonprofit workers. As Ricard Zapata-Barrero has argued, in Barcelona an emphasis on public, official displays of religious diversity is part of a comprehensive project to integrate migrants, while in Apopka no such attempts exist (69).

This sense that government and non-profits provided safety nets and welcomed migrants was echoed in multiple interviews with Moroccan women migrants in Barcelona. Migrant women in Apopka more frequently expressed fear of detention and deportation, of local law enforcement, and their inability to access medical services. Moroccan women, by contrast, voiced concerns of economic insecurity and societal racism while expressing confidence in their freedom of movement and access to medical care. Because of their undocumented status, migrant women in Apopka could only help out as volunteers. In Barcelona, Moroccan migrant women were involved at a much higher level in the nonprofits, as lawyers, psychologists, and directors.

FATIMA AND CELIA: TWO STORIES

We have chosen two migrant women’s stories from our interviews to represent the differences in women’s vulnerabilities that we witnessed. In Barcelona, the availability of services facilitating linguistic, social, and economic integration meant that migrants could legally earn an income and focus on integration without constantly fearing deportation and separation. In Apopka, the absence of laws supporting undocumented migrants meant that
work, education, and mental and physical health were precarious, with most women speaking of living in fear and struggling to make ends meet.

A vibrant young Moroccan woman in her twenties, divorced with a small child, Fatima worked as a pharmacist. As an adolescent, she had moved to Spain with her family, and her father benefited from local legislation enabling him to work in agricultural jobs. In school, Fatima received extra support to learn Catalan, the primary language of instruction, and was able to catch up to her peers quickly. Economically, it wasn’t always easy to find employers willing to sponsor migrants, but there was a clear path to legal residency. Now, Fatima was involved with local non-profits, particularly in interfaith activities, and was an active participant in civic life.

The Moroccan migrants in Barcelona said they were never stopped by the police, had access to decent medical care, and felt they were generally treated with dignity. “There is racism,” Fatima told us, “but only when I wear my hijab.” She did not wear her hijab at work and otherwise did not feel discriminated against. If she had a problem, she could rely on the police to help. “It’s easy to live here,” she told us. “There’s more stress [unlike in Morocco], but at least we have health and security. The laws aren’t a problem…. If you call the police, they come... And if you don’t have what you need to live, the state will help you out – they’ll give you 420 Euros a month for food if you don’t have a job.”

Celia, a migrant in her twenties from Honduras, came to the US ten years ago. After a traumatic border crossing, she lived with a controlling uncle in Arizona and worked day and night cleaning offices and washing dishes. Hoping to escape her uncle, Celia moved in with another uncle, who was a heavy drinker and often placed her in compromising situations with his friends. When she tried to return to the first uncle, the second uncle threw her belongings away, including her identity documents.

Joining her father in Florida, she worked as a waitress and met her future husband, who did not want her to work because she would be around other men. Now, Celia spends most of her time caring for their young daughter Raquel, who suffered from diabetes for years before she was properly diagnosed. A parenting class offered at the HOPE CommUnity center helped her become an advocate for her child. “The parenting class gave me the courage to finally leave the house to help Raquel,” she told us.

**DISCUSSION**

In comparison with Fatima’s story, Celia’s life experiences indicate how the insecurity of undocumented status often forces migrant women into dependence upon male family members. Celia felt trapped in her house, but she feared going out. Fatima, by contrast, worked and had an active social network. Like many women we interviewed, Celia took English classes at the nonprofit, but was limited in being able to engage with society: she could not work and risk deportation and had no options to regularize her status, her mobility restricted by male relatives and by fear.

Our interviewees in Apopka told us that women in abusive situations could not turn to the police, risking deportation and separation from their children. Although the Violence Against Women Act authorizes resident visas for women who are victims of domestic violence, the current political atmosphere in the U.S. means that few women are even able to take the first step of reporting domestic violence to the local police. By contrast, in Barcelona, local nonprofits worked with government financial support to house women seeking to escape domestic violence, offering language and job training so they could
support themselves. The Florida nonprofits also devoted considerable time to supporting migrant families split apart by deportations, but migrant women in Florida experienced greater threats to their psychological and physical health because they could not depend on the law to protect them. Studies have demonstrated that being undocumented and female in the U.S. is associated with negative health consequences because of the embodied impacts of stress on women’s bodies (Lopez et al. 2017: 4).

CONCLUSION

U.S. immigration policy reflects and perpetuates gender hierarchies for migrant women from the Global South, determining how immigrants are able to access citizenship and all of its accompanying benefits (Salcido and Menjívar 2013: 343). Interviews conducted with women in these two communities demonstrate that the absence of legislation to legalize the status of undocumented migrants in the U.S., combined with a lack of local programs promoting integration, prevents women migrants’ full participation in society. Women additionally experience the everyday structural violence of being unable to rely on law enforcement or to access resources such as healthcare. In Catalonia, regional integration policies worked alongside nonprofits to offer migrants the potential for a documented and inclusive future. While migrant women in Barcelona are not immune from racism and patriarchal constraints, the criminalized experience of migration in the United States exacerbates women’s vulnerability, simultaneously placing them outside the protections of the state while still subjecting them to legal and social control at every level.

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INTRODUCTION: POROSITY, BUREAUCRACY, HOSPITALITY

At the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) office in the town of Shire in Northern Ethiopia, we bumped into Habtom, an Eritrean refugee university student we had met in the camps. The ARRA office in Shire is the regional branch of the Ethiopian state office tasked with managing four refugee camps in the Tigray region and controlling movement in and out of the camps. Habtom was adeptly navigating ARRA’s bureaucracy to complete multiple tasks when he interrupted his work to help us get an audience with an official. Simultaneously, he was also assisting a relative who had just arrived from Eritrea by trying to facilitate her access to the camps. Unlike Habtom, his relative was not a refugee, but had crossed from Eritrea through Sudan into Ethiopia to visit her children who resided in one of the refugee camps, and meet her grandchildren for the first time.

Ethiopia, we were told, facilitates this kind of cross border movement by not putting a stamp in the passports of those who have originated their journey in Eritrea so that they might visit their families in Ethiopia and then return to Eritrea, something they could not otherwise do given that the two countries are still engaged in a frozen conflict over their disputed border. Since beginning our ethnographic research on refugee policy in Ethiopia in 2016, we had heard many other similar rumors of porous borders, including accounts of Eritreans and Ethiopians crossing the border to attend weddings and funerals. However, once Habtom’s relative arrived in the camp, she faced internal bureaucratic boundaries and was sent back to the regional office in Shire, nearly two hours away, to get permission to spend more than a few minutes with her relatives.

This vignette illustrates the ways in which flows of people are strategically managed in Ethiopia, alternating between surprising forms of openness and the facilitation of movement across porous borders, on the one hand, and gatekeeping, surveillance and the control of movement on the other. The Ethiopian government is willing to enable Eritreans to enter their country—as refugees or as visiting family. Once refugees are in Ethiopia, the government is keen to monitor and control their movement and activities. These efforts by the government result in a proliferation of gatekeeping activities at the local level of refugee management. This dynamic became apparent during interviews and participant observation with Eritrean refugees that we have conducted since 2016 as part of an ethnographic research project related to the politics of refugee management in Ethiopia. We argue that this apparently contradictory reaction to the management of refugees in the Global South is a logical response to a new refugee management policy paradigm whereby European and other wealthy countries attempt to stem the flow of refugees towards their borders by making host states in the Global South more hospitable. While material and figurative walls go up around the world, Ethiopia seems to be encouraging the flow of
refugees across its borders, in part to secure new resources that make refugees economically and politically beneficial to hosting states in the Global South. At the same time, policies geared towards making refugees want to stay may not accomplish their objectives, in part due to local level processes of gatekeeping.

SITUATING ETHIOPIAN POLICY AMIDST REFUGEE MANAGEMENT PARADIGM SHIFTS WORLDWIDE

In light of the so-called refugee crisis in Europe, states such as Ethiopia are playing integral roles in international initiatives intended to stem the flow of refugees to the North/West. Ethiopia has been praised for adopting policies that move towards local integration and has gained a great deal of international political cachet from doing so. Ethiopia has adopted an open-door policy toward refugees and is in the process of rewriting its refugee laws to become a more effective long-term host of an estimated 800,000 refugees. Ethiopia is now being rewarded for its planned policy changes with financial resources from donor nations as well as political capital and international recognition of Ethiopia's ostensibly stabilizing leadership in a turbulent region (Riggan and Poole n.d.).

The Ethiopian state has been at the forefront of international efforts to develop and implement refugee integration in regions of origin. It plays a pivotal role in being one of the first countries to roll out the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CFFR), an international effort that promotes these efforts by seeking to “enhance refugee self reliance and inclusion,” shifting refugees from humanitarian burdens to economic actors and agents of development (UNHCR 2017). During the September 2016 Refugee Summit in New York, of which Ethiopia was a co-host, Ethiopia made nine pledges toward greater integration and improving the livelihoods of refugees. These pledges involved expanding an out-of-camp program, expanding access to education and work permits, developing industrial parks that would employ both refugees and host community members, and enhancing social services like civic registration. Given Ethiopia’s previous policy of encampment and effective lack of work permits for refugees, these pledges represent a substantial shift in approach.

Eritrean refugees have arguably been at the vanguard of many of these integrative policies in Ethiopia. Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after thirty years of guerilla warfare; prior to this, Eritreans were considered Ethiopian citizens. In 2010, citing these historical and cultural linkages with Eritreans, Ethiopia created the Out-of-Camp Policy—a policy that allowed Eritrean refugees who had a sponsoring family member in Ethiopia to forego refugee assistance in exchange for living out of camp. However, even though the Ethiopian state has been relatively open to Eritrean refugees, Eritreans in Ethiopia face a series of invisible boundaries that serve to constrain their abilities to work, travel, and access services. Our opening vignette was one illustration of how Ethiopia strategically utilizes the relative openness of international borders while surveilling, monitoring and regulating internal borders around camps. For Ethiopia as the refugee hosting state, gatekeeping involves not only an open-door policy for Eritreans that cross the militarized international border, it also involves establishing new zones of control, like camps; systems of selective movement, like out-of-camp and travel pass policies; and what appear to be highly lucrative forms of border crossing that channel capital to new areas, like the booming town of Shire where we encountered Habtom at one
of its many aid industry offices.

POROUS BORDERS AND INVISIBLE BOUNDARIES:
THE VIEW FROM A REFUGEE CAMP IN TIGRAY

The refugee camps in the Tigray region have no walls, but the borders are very real. One year after we met him, Berhane had been elected as the refugee camp coordinator. It was a demanding position, placing him at the lower end of a long bureaucratic chain that other refugees had to pass through to access resources, like replacement ration cards and pass permits that allowed refugees to travel out of the camp. When he described his role, it was with a dry humor—he was a leader, yes, a leader in unpaid work. On one of the afternoons we spent with him, this work entailed a visit to his office—a small room in a long structure built from corrugated metal, with two desks, thin wood benches, and dog-eared notebooks that recorded the activities of the office in precise handwriting. Though he was only planning to stop in and leave quickly, when people noticed the door open, the line began. Berhane admitted that he hated his job, the incessant line of people seeking his signature for resources that he himself had no power to grant, as ARRA had the final say. Pass permits, for instance, were restricted to those who participate in camp functions and were doled out by neighborhood. It was nearly impossible for married couples to get passes to travel together. Even for the refugee camp coordinator: in the past eight years, Berhane had seldom been given a pass permit to travel to the neighboring town or capital city.

Like the pass permits, the out-of-camp program (OCP) is also a limited, scarce resource around which processes of everyday gatekeeping arise. The OCP is open to Eritreans who can show themselves to be self-supporting. Doing so requires having a relative already in Ethiopia. Even for those who can show that they have a relative who will support them, access to the OCP program can be hard to come by. These permits are also allocated at the discretion of various ARRA officials and refugee representatives through processes that are lengthy, cumbersome, and, some refugees even report, corrupt. ARRA officials themselves note that they cannot give everyone who wants it access to OCP status. Some refugees report that getting OCP status either requires a wait of an indeterminate length or, alternatively, that it is possible to get bumped up in the line by providing some payment to a unit leader or refugee representative. In other camps, although we didn’t hear stories about payments for OCP status or pass permits, people did note that one had to show up for all required volunteer activities and in general be a good refugee citizen if one wished to access these and other scarce resources.

Once refugees receive OCP status, they are often vulnerable to an array of other gatekeepers including police, landlords and Ethiopians with whom they are obligated to partner or work for. It is illegal for refugees to work formally in Ethiopia, thus they are confined to the informal sector. As one refugee college graduate described, “I like that, from the government; they allowed us to go there [Addis Ababa], but how to live there?” The difficulties and lack of support for refugees in the out-of-camp program leads some to return to the camps, where they feel they can take advantage of educational and training opportunities. The fact that some refugees with the opportunity to live outside of the camps choose to remain within them reveals the multifaceted ways that refugees attempt to navigate the contradictory system of care and containment that is framed by new sorts of gatekeeping.
CONCLUSION: PARADOXES OF WELCOME

Despite intentions to the contrary, Eritrean refugees have a great deal of mistrust of their circumstances in Ethiopia and it seems unlikely that they will want to stay in Ethiopia in large numbers. Indeed, 81,000 registered Eritrean refugees (of an estimated 150,000) were found not to be present in the camps in 2015 and are suspected of having moved on through irregular channels (UNHCR 2016). It might seem, under these circumstances, that Ethiopia’s use of its role as refugee host to curry favor with donor nations and promote a good international and global reputation for itself is on a collision course with the reality that the situation for refugees in Ethiopia is unlikely to change a great deal in the near future. In addition to this, due to restrictions of entry into Europe, they may find themselves in a position of not being able to leave Ethiopia.

Ethiopia continues to assert a message of welcome, priding itself on its hospitality. While hospitality is a key cultural and political principle in Ethiopia, it is buttressed by new global policy paradigms that emphasize local integration with the hope that it will discourage northward migration. Simultaneously, hospitality has its limits and may uneasily coexist with integration. A refugee is a guest and a guest, by definition, is someone who is there temporarily. This guest/host relationship has an important cultural valence in the region, and the temporary nature of guests is enshrined in Ethiopian policy that, to date, has not included a path to citizenship for refugees in anticipation that they will someday return home. Consequently, the forces of exclusion and the forces of inclusion are two sides of the same coin, as they produce a paradox of control and welcome that ultimately generates precarity for refugees—a “life without the promise of stability,” (Tsing 2015, 2) that prevents them from envisioning and working towards a future in Ethiopia.

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BOUNDARIES OF “ILLEGALITY:” TEMPORARY LOW-WAGE MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Lisa Reber

The United Arab Emirates is a popular destination for temporary low-wage migrants from the Global South. For some, this is because of the ease with which they can find a job from within their home country, allowing them to enter with a contract and employment visa. For others, it is the immigration laws that allow them to arrive on a visit visa. However, the leniency of these laws and the apparent advantage of the country’s soft borders can be easily lost once one is in the country. Drawing from a ten-month ethnographic study (2015-2016) including in-depth interviews with forty-four temporary low-wage migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates, this essay examines the boundaries of “legality” that these workers cross within the country and the liminality of their experience. The sample includes eighteen individuals from five Sub-Saharan African countries, twenty-four from five South Asian countries, and two from the Philippines. They worked in fifteen different occupations. Seventeen were female and twenty-seven were male and all earned in what would be considered the lowest wage bracket of Dh1500 (408 USD) or less per month. All entered the country with legal documentation; approximately half entered on visit visas and half on employment visas which they had secured in their home countries. Regardless, once in the country, the majority of my participants feared losing their right to be there.

MOVING IN AND OUT OF “LEGALITY”

There are multiple ways foreign workers who have legally entered the United Arab Emirates can later “break the law” and hence move into “illegality.” The most common way is to work while one is still on a visit visa. Visit visas are for one or three months. Twenty-three of my participants entered on a visit visa and all but six worked “illegally” at some point. Doing so was fairly routine but often subjected one to exploitation. Employers lead individuals on with promises of an employment visa; however, the visa often never materializes and the weeks worked are not paid. If individuals do not want to overstay their visit visa, they have two options: leave the country or accept whatever job offer they can find. Companies typically ask when an individual’s visit visa is about to expire, waiting to make an offer until the applicant has no choice but to accept a contract with exploitative conditions. Upon signing a contract and gaining an employment visa, individuals then re-cross the boundary of “legality.” Companies who informally employ individuals who are on visit visas are also breaking the law. However, workers will not report them to authorities for fear of losing potential employment and incriminating themselves.

Most participants in my study were able to secure “legal” employment before their visit visa expired. Those who did not but chose to overstay their visit visas crossed one of the “hardest” legal boundaries. Overstaying one’s visit visa can result in jail time, a fine, deportation, and an immigration ban. Those who choose to cross this boundary and stay in the United Arab Emirates work “illegally” to earn as much money as they can before being
caught or choosing to turn themselves in to immigration officials. For those who choose to enter this zone of “illegality,” the boundaries between themselves and authorities are invisible and everywhere. As a result, they confine themselves to spaces that are smaller and less visible to avoid detection.

Peter, a Nigerian man in my study, was the only one to overstay his visit visa and work “illegally” after failing to secure a contract. He was both working “illegally” and doing “illegal” work that involved placing business cards for a massage salon on vehicle windshields. He felt he had no choice but to stay and said that he had heard that the penalties for overstaying one’s visit visa were not necessarily enforced. Another Nigerian had told Peter that if he overstayed—and was not caught overstaying or working illegally—he could go to immigration and turn himself in. At immigration, they would scan his eyes, allow him to leave the country, but ban him for life. There would be no fine or jail time. Peter said he knew many who had departed this way. Regardless, he still lived with the constant fear of being caught.

Danjua, a Sri Lankan woman in my study, had received her domestic work visa and contract prior to arriving in the United Arab Emirates. However, due to the harsh work conditions, she chose to “abscond” (run away from her employer) soon after arriving. When I met her, she was working “illegally” as a live-out domestic worker. Her Consulate had told her not to worry, that she could continue working if she wanted to. When she wanted to depart, she should turn herself in. She would do a month in jail and then be deported. Despite her fear of being caught, she felt at greater ease than when she had been a live-in domestic worker. While jail time is undesirable, the ability to stay and increase one’s earnings before choosing to leave or being caught is for some an acceptable risk (Fargues and Shah 2017).

Although the penalty for overstaying a visit visa can be quite harsh, the penalty for staying in the United Arab Emirates after an employment contract ends can be quite lenient. After a contract ends, an individual is granted a thirty-day grace period to stay in the country. After this, the worker has to pay a relatively small fine for overstaying. Immigration officials are not concerned with why the employment visa was cancelled or the length of the overstay; they simply want the fine paid. Once new employment is found, the worker pays the fine and moves back across the boundary of “legality.” For some, this movement is not possible, because the individual is unable to pay the fine. Often, however, the new employer will grant a salary advance. This is a relatively “soft” boundary because one can fairly easily purchase the right to re-cross it.

THE “LEGAL LIMINALITY” OF TEMPORARINESS AND UNCERTAINTY

Whether or not the participants in my study held a visit visa or employment visa at the point of entry, once in the country their vulnerability to termination and loss of the right to be in the country was a fear that the majority constantly held. This placed them in a condition best described as a state of liminality.

The concept of liminality was developed by van Gennep ([1908] 1961) in his work on the rites of passage. Victor Turner (1967, 65) popularized the term with his classic description of liminality as being “neither here nor there . . . betwixt and between”. For temporary transnational migrants, the concept of liminality can describe their experience in the host country, an experience that can become transformative (Aguilar 1999; Lehmann 2014; Menjívar 2006; Tsuda 1999). The concept of liminality can also reflect migrants’
vulnerability to having their “legality” taken away from them. Menjívar (2006) uses the concept of “legal liminality” to describe the tenuous hold some immigrants in the U.S. have on “legality.” She points out that although we typically think of only those migrants without authorization as being at risk of deportation, this is not always the case. She explains that there are migrants in the United States who are not authorized; however, they are granted a temporary stay on deportation. This stay allows them to “legally” remain in the United States for a certain amount of time. These temporary stays, however, can go on indefinitely.

This was the experience for many of my participants. They were made liminal by their tenuousness (Menjívar 2006), temporariness (Vosko, Preston, and Latham 2014), and exclusion from mainstream society (Trudeau and McMorran 2011). Many of my participants believed, and evidence showed, that if they demanded unpaid wages, complained about their accommodation, or took their complaints to the Ministry of Labor, they risked termination and a six-month employment ban. This inability to advocate for their rights, combined with temporary status and the condition of being socially excluded within society produced a state of “liminal legality.” These workers were often “legally” present but were “liminally legal” because of their conditions.

**RELENTLESS PRECARITY**

For the most part, the rights of workers are being addressed through U.A.E. labor laws. However, lack of enforcement is an issue as is a system that notifies employers when employees submit a complaint. In addition, migrants’ lack of knowledge about the laws, the complexity of the processes, and the fear of doing the wrong thing keep workers from reporting. Workers who are desperate to keep their jobs will not risk this. Also, for workers who know about the laws, their ability to logistically carry out the procedures is a challenge. They work extremely long days, and some do not receive a weekly day off. If they do, labor accommodation could be quite far from the Ministry and their respective Consulates. Finally, the laws and procedures can be extremely difficult to understand. Even for lawyers, interpreting the meaning can be challenging.

Issues of liminal legality seemed to impact my participants equally, regardless of nationality or gender. In contrast, differences arose regarding who worked “illegally” while on a visit visa. This seemed to be determined by whether one had established networks in the UAE. The nine South Asian participants who arrived on visit visas already had family working in the country who assisted them with finding a job, while only one of the Sub-Saharan African participants had family there. The financial cost of arriving in the country on a visit visa, without family or friend connections, as well as unscrupulous employers, can increase migrant precarity. For these individuals, a soft border can be a double-edged sword. Crossing the border into the country is relatively easy; however, the ease with which one enters can easily be outweighed by the ease with which one can be exploited. Gender, in this case, played a less significant role among my participants.

All foreigners in the United Arab Emirates are temporary and—as shown during my ten years working in the country—may face the challenges discussed in this essay. However, more affluent migrants are exploited less due to their economic and social capital. Employers know their employees can access and purchase information and assistance, and consequently employers are more likely to respect contractual agreements. Low-wage workers on the other hand face far more extensive structural challenges, including spatial and temporal challenges. Even those who have strong English or Arabic
language skills and who believe they understand the U.A.E. law face the challenges of distance and time.

In summary, although it may seem that many low-wage migrant workers are willing to perpetuate their “illegal” situation, the individuals in my study dreaded being “illegal” and thus most were consumed with avoiding such a status. They knew that their position was always unstable and their rights difficult if not impossible to claim. The border between “legality” and “illegality” was tenuous and often invisible but always strongly felt. It followed them into the interior of the state and moved over them, leaving many in an affective state of liminality and trapped within a zone of marginality.

ENDNOTES

1 All of the individuals in my study had to pay for food out of their salary. Most tried to survive on Dh300 a month, resulting in a diet consisting mainly of rice, bread, and lentils. Since the average salary of my sample was Dh1340 (365 USD), this left about Dh1000 (270 USD) to send home to their families. For most, saving money was not a possibility.

2 Low-wage migrants are also aware that the United Arab Emirates has regularly offered amnesty to foreigners who had violated their visas and were in the country illegally.

REFERENCES


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This volume explores from an anthropological perspective the complexities of borders and migration: the difficulties of crossing a militarized geographic boundary, engaging in the process of moving across a social barrier delineated by linguistic, religious, cultural or political differences, or aiding migrants’ survival through the arrival, resettlement and assimilation process. The authors of the 22 carefully written, sensitive essays included here provide invaluable insights into the legal, social and moral dimensions of migration.

About the editors: Jayne Howell is president of the Society for Urban, National, and Transnational/Global Anthropology (SUNTA); Deborah R. Altamirano is treasurer of SUNTA; Faedah M. Totah is secretary of SUNTA; and Fethi Keles is interim chair of the Committee on Refugees and Immigrants (CORI).